



Anssi Tarkiainen

**FIELD SALES MANAGEMENT CONTROL:
TOWARDS A MULTI-LEVEL THEORY**

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this dissertation is to increase the understanding and knowledge of field sales management control systems (i.e. sales managers monitoring, directing, evaluating and rewarding activities) and their potential consequences on salespeople. This topic is important because research conducted in the past has indicated that the choice of control system type can on the other hand have desirable consequences, such as high levels of motivation and performance, and on the other hand lead to harmful unintended consequences, such as opportunistic or unethical behaviors.

Despite the fact that marketing and sales management control systems have been under rigorous research for over two decades, it still is at a very early stage of development, and several inconsistencies can be found in the research results. This dissertation argues that these inconsistencies are mainly derived from misspecification of the level of analysis in the past research. These different levels of analysis (i.e. strategic, tactical, and operational levels) involve very different decision-making situations regarding the control and motivation of sales force, which should be taken into consideration when conceptualizing the control. Moreover, the study of salesperson consequences of a field sales management control system is actually a cross-level phenomenon, which means that at least two levels of analysis are simultaneously involved.

The results of this dissertation confirm the need to re-conceptualize the field sales management control system concept. It provides empirical evidence for the assertion that control should be conceptualized with more details at the tactical/operational level of analysis than at the strategic level of analysis. Moreover, the results show that some controls are more efficiently communicated to field salespeople than others. It is proposed that this difference is due to different purposes of control; some controls are designed for influencing salespersons' behavior (aim at motivating) whereas some controls are designed to aid decision-making (aim at providing information). According to the empirical results of this dissertation, the both types of controls have an impact to the sales force, but this impact is not as strong as expected. The results obtained in this dissertation shed some light to the nature of field sales management control systems, and their consequences on salespeople.

Keywords: Sales management, management control systems, organizational behavior, motivation
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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

Traditionally Finnish firms have devoted their efforts on technical expertise, leaving less emphasis on commercializing and selling (Fiilin, 2007). This has led to a situation, where the firms are realizing the importance of selling (e.g. Haapakoski, 2005; Wigell, 2002) and are struggling for improving the efficiency of selling (Isotalo, 2005). When aiming at improving the productivity and efficiency of their sales organizations, the firms are facing problems related to design of appropriate remuneration and control systems (see e.g. Haapakoski, 2006b; Lampinen, 2006). These news and writings indicate that there is a need for deeper understanding of sales management control systems (i.e. sales managers' monitoring, directing, evaluating and rewarding activities, see e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987) among Finnish sales organizations. This need for research has been identified also in the academic research literature: research conducted in the past has indicated that the choice of control system may, on the one hand, have desirable consequences, such as high levels of motivation and performance (e.g., Oliver and Anderson, 1994), and on the other hand lead to harmful unintended consequences, such as opportunistic or unethical behaviors (e.g., Ramaswami, 2002; Román and Munuera, 2005).

This dissertation seeks to increase understanding and knowledge of field sales management control systems and their potential psychological and behavioral consequences for salespersons. With such knowledge managers should be able to improve their sales organization performance with appropriate control system design and at the same time avoid pitfalls of unintended consequences.

1.2 THE POSITIONING AND SCOPE

This study contributes to the literature on marketing and sales management control systems, extending the seminal work on control conceptualizations started by Anderson and Oliver (1987) and Jaworski (1988). Its contribution is to follow, to some extent, the research agenda proposed

by Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy (2005) in their synthesis of research conducted in recent decades. Thus, this study can be positioned into marketing and sales management control system literature, and its scope is especially on the control and its salesperson consequences. When looked upon more broadly, the study can also be seen as a part of research examining the antecedents of salesperson performance by studying the impact of organizational factors on performance antecedents, as outlined by Walker, Churchill, and Ford's (1977) conceptual model.

1.3 SPECIFIC RESEARCH GAPS

It is widely accepted that well performing salespeople contribute to the sales organization's overall performance. The sales organization performance, in turn, contributes to firm's overall performance. Thus, it is not a surprise that antecedents of salesperson performance have received attention from researchers. The sales management literature presents several different models of such antecedents. The most widely known and cited of these is Walker, Churchill and Ford's (1977) model, in which sales performance is hypothesized to be a function of the salesman's level of motivation, aptitude or ability, and his perceptions about how his role should be performed. Later on, Churchill, Ford, Hartley, and Walker (1985) published their meta-analysis of 116 research articles, concluding that the main determinants of sales performance ranked as follows: (1) role variables, (2) skill, (3) motivation, (4) the salesperson's personal factors, (5) aptitude, and (6) organizational/environmental factors. Since this meta-analysis in particular there has been general consensus that salesperson performance is determined by role perceptions, motivation, and skills/abilities.

Even though organizational/environmental factors ranked last in the list of performance antecedents, the research on sales management started to shift towards examining the relationship between organizational variables and salesperson performance or its antecedents (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987). The focus has mainly been on studying the relationship between organizational variables and performance antecedents, such as role perceptions and motivation. This follows the logic of Walker, Churchill, and Ford's (1977) conceptual model of salesperson performance, which also proposed that organizational variables (e.g., closeness of supervision and compensation plan) determine the performance antecedents (motivation and role

perceptions). One of the most promising concepts in this attempt has been that of the sales management control system. The conceptualization of the field sales management control system presented by Anderson and Oliver (1987) has been one of the most cited works in this stream of research. It defines such a system as the extent to which sales managers perform monitoring, directing, evaluating, and rewarding activities over their salespeople. Thus, the concept captures a broad range of managerial activities. This was followed by another seminal paper by Jaworski (1988) offering a general theory of marketing control, which was suggested to consist of the formal elements of input, process, and output controls, and the informal elements of self control, social control, and cultural control. Both Anderson and Oliver's (1987) conceptualization and Jaworski's (1988) theory of marketing control have been the foundation for several studies attempting to extend our understanding of the relationship between managerial activities and salesperson performance and its antecedents.

In the two decades following the publication of the seminal papers by Anderson and Oliver (1987) and Jaworski (1988) systems of marketing and sales management control and their potential consequences have been the subjects of rigorous research. Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy (2005) published a synthesis of the research on sales management control and concluded that the findings were encouraging concerning the favorable effects of certain types of control system on salespersons' attitudes and behaviors.

However, even though the research findings indicate the importance of these control systems as antecedents of salespersons' attitudes, behaviors, and performance, there are some important issues unresolved. Despite the fact that they have been under rigorous study for two decades, the theory is still at a very early stage of development (Baldauf, Cravens, and Piercy, 2001). In their review of past research literature on sales management controls, Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy (2005) identified inconsistencies in conceptualizations of control systems. The most significant of these were related to the dimensionality of the control concept (i.e. unidimensional versus multidimensional constructs) and combinations of control (i.e. combinations of different controls versus a fixed set of control categories or types). Based on the conclusions of their literature review, they called for research efforts to revise conceptualizations of control systems in order to resolve these inconsistencies in the future. In addition to these inconsistencies, the empirical

studies have not followed the original specifications of the concepts regarding the level of analysis. Oliver and Anderson (1994), for example, theorized on salesperson-level of analysis and limited themselves on studying salespersons' *perceptions* of control, whereas Jaworski (1988) defined control as designed set of managerial activities. The same theoretical concepts of control have been used to study sales management control systems at different levels of analysis, including those of chief sales executives (e.g., Babakus et al., 1996), field sales managers (e.g., Babakus et al., 1996), and salespersons (e.g., Piercy, Lane, and Cravens, 2002). So far these level issues have not been extensively discussed. Babakus et al. (1996) identified the importance of considering different levels of sales management and suggested that the conceptual models should take samples from different levels of analysis. However, this approach does not take into consideration the fact that the salesperson consequences of field sales management control constitute a cross-level phenomenon. The control is exerted on salespeople by managers, which means that at least two levels of analysis are simultaneously involved. Moreover, salespersons form their own perceptions of the control system in use (Oliver and Anderson, 1994). These perceptions do not necessarily match with those of sales managers. Thus, as Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy (2001) state, there is ***a need for a detailed conceptualization of sales management control systems that distinguishes between the managerial and the salesperson levels.***

Consequently, if there is obscurity over the appropriate conceptualization of management control systems in sales organizations, this obscurity concerns also the findings regarding the consequences of control. Firstly, as Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy (2005) note, the studies using different control conceptualizations have focused on different consequence-variables as well. This leads into a situation, where comparison of research results across studies applying different control conceptualizations cannot be made. Secondly, the empirical studies have focused on studying the relationships of control and hypothesized consequences on a single-level of analysis. In other words, empirical assessments have studied either how *control perceptions* are related to *self-reported psychological or behavioral consequences* or how *self-reported exercised control* is related to *perceived psychological or behavioral consequences among subordinates*. This again limits comparability of results across studies. Thus, even though the salesperson consequences of sales management control systems have been widely studied, there is a ***need for research that***

assesses the relationship between sales manager's self-reported exercised control and salespersons' self-reported psychological/behavioral consequences.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THEIR DEMARCATIONS

The need to re-conceptualize the control system concept and to assess its salesperson consequences was identified above, when dealing with research gaps. These research gaps could be formulated as the main research problem of the study:

How is the field sales management control system related to salespersons' perceptions of control and their psychological or behavioral responses to it?

Answers to this main research problem are sought by first examining the appropriate conceptualizations and operationalizations of these control systems and then considering the salespersons' perceptions of the exercised control. Finally, the relationship between the control system and the salespersons' psychological and behavioral responses to it are assessed. According to this logic, the main problem can be broken down into sub-problems as presented below in the remainder of this section.

i. How should the field sales management control system be conceptualized and operationalized?

A call for the refinement of the conceptualization of the sales management control system, and for empirical research on control relationships at the managerial and salesperson levels in the same organization, has been made in recent research literature. It is asserted here that these two issues are related. Multilevel organizational theory suggests that constructs should be defined with regard to the level of analysis (e.g., Klein, Dansereau, and Hall, 1994). This means that the ideal conceptualization of a control system may be different depending on this level. The present dissertation represents an attempt to answer the above-mentioned calls for research by presenting and empirically testing a multilevel framework for studying the sales management control system

and its salesperson consequences. This framework is a step towards arriving at a multilevel theory of sales management control.

In response to this first sub-problem, the extant literature on sales management control systems is reviewed and the consistencies and inconsistencies of past research approaches are discussed. The major background theories are then categorized according to the level of analysis and reviewed in order to present a conceptualization that is specified accordingly. This conceptualization is, to some extent, assessed empirically.

ii. How do salespeople perceive field sales management control systems?

The second sub-problem deals with the congruence of sales managers' and salespersons' perceptions of the control systems in the same organization. It is examined by means of an empirical investigation of the relationships between the perceptions of first-line field sales managers and salespersons of the concept of sales management control.

iii. How do salespeople respond to the field sales management control systems?

Finally, the third sub-problem deals with salespersons' psychological and behavioral responses to control, i.e. its salesperson consequences. Previous research has identified several such consequences, and the present dissertation offers an empirical assessment of whether these findings hold given the new conceptualization of control.

As this study aims to find answers to the above mentioned sub-problems, some demarcations must be made. First of all, this dissertation focuses only on control over personnel. Jaworski (1988) has distinguished personnel control from control over activities, which focuses on examining marketing or sales strategies and programs etc. Second of these demarcations concerns the domain of control. Previous research on marketing and sales management control systems has not resulted in an explicit definition of the domain of control, i.e. whether the sales personnel should be separated from the more general marketing personnel. Jaworski (1988), for example, aimed at a conceptualization of general marketing controls, which has been applied in studies on sales personnel (e.g., Joshi and Randall, 2001) as well as marketing staff (e.g., Ramaswami,

1996). Anderson and Oliver's (1987) conceptualization of control systems was designed for sales organizations, but while the studies applying this approach have focused on such organizations, the results and theory development have, at least on certain occasions (e.g., Piercy, Lane and Cravens, 2002), been based on the assumption that Jaworski's work is part of the same research domain of control. While there are arguments that the same conceptualization should be used for both sales and marketing personnel (e.g., Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy, 2005), there are empirical findings suggesting that there are significant differences between sales and other marketing positions (e.g., Agarwal, 1996). Since there is no clear consensus over the domain question (marketing vs. sales), this study is limited to theorizing only on field sales management control systems. However, the relevant theory on marketing controls is also discussed and reviewed. Third demarcation is related to intentional purposes of sales manager's control activities. This study focuses on the manager's self-reported controls that are exercised in sales organizations and employee perceptions of and reactions to control. The differences in sales organizations' intentions (e.g. is the sales organization aiming at maximize profits or at growth?) are left out of analysis. Instead intentions are embedded in the control system measures, and bundled together. However, if organizations' intentions were included into the study, it would have lead to the necessity of using more detailed control measures. For example, if companies were aiming at profit maximization then probably the applied output control system would reflect more issues that relate to above mentioned goals. Fourth demarcation concerns the time-span of exercised control. This study limits itself on the examination of different forms of control irrespective of time. It should be noted that the time-span of control (e.g. How frequent is the measurement of performance? What is the length of the period of evaluation?) It is possible that these issues have influence on the employee responses to control. Fifth demarcation deals with geographical focus of the present study. The empirical part of the study focuses on Finnish field sales organizations and field sales that occur in Finland. It should be noted that sales organizations in different countries are faced with different cultures, legislation, and markets. It is expected that these issues have at least some influence on the controls used in the organizations and employee responses to control.

1.5 METHODS

Traditionally sales management research deals with questions that arise from managerial problems, and consequently it has been a common standard to use “real data”, usually collected with survey method (Zinkhan, 2006). This kind of research tradition falls under a positivism paradigm, which views reality as objective and apprehensible (see Sobh and Perry, 2005). In this study, the strict positivist assumptions of ontology and epistemology are relaxed, which means that the adopted approach falls under critical realism. Critical realism differs from strict positivism, in that it acknowledges that our knowledge of reality is imperfect (e.g. Easton, 2002). In sales management control system research, this would mean that salespersons form their perceptions of “true” control and respond to it by how they perceive it. Thus, this dissertation examines both parties in the employer-employee exchange relationship, namely sales manager and salesperson.

The theoretical part of the dissertation is based on an extensive literature review, for which several articles on marketing and sales management control systems were read and analyzed (see Appendix 1).

The empirical data was collected during Spring 2004 by means of two different questionnaires, one designed for field sales managers and another for salespeople. They were both given a numerical code, which enabled the researcher to combine responses from the same sales organization. Thus, there were several respondents from each sales organization (one field sales manager and between zero and five field salespeople) and these respondents were on two different hierarchical levels.

The above-mentioned data structure complicates the data analysis, since using multiple respondents violates the assumption of observation independence that is prevalent in normal statistical analysis techniques, such as factor analysis, correlations and multiple regressions (see e.g., Hair et al., 1998). Special attention was therefore given to the analysis. When the above-mentioned normal analysis techniques were used to test the relationships on one level, the data was split into parts (e.g., the field sales manager sample and the sample comprising one salesperson per organization) in order to fulfill the requirement of observation independence.

When the analysis dealt with phenomena on both levels (i.e. both field sales manager and salesperson respondents), a multilevel modeling technique called hierarchical linear modeling (HLM, see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992) was used. As compared to other multilevel techniques, such as Within-and-between analysis (Dansereau and Yammarino, 2000) and regression with cross-level operator (James and Williams, 2000) HLM is especially well suited to handling data with outcome variable at lowest level of analysis and multiple predictors at same and higher levels (see Hofmann, Griffin, and Gavin, 2000; Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). This method is presented more thoroughly later in the text.

1.6 ASSUMPTIONS

The aim in the present dissertation is to discuss and to empirically assess the *effects* of field sales management control systems on salesperson consequences. Thus, it purports to assess the *causal relationships* between the two. Methodological and philosophical literature has defined certain conditions for causal relationships, both deterministic and probabilistic¹. For a relationship to be causal, it has to fulfill three conditions (Kinnear and Taylor, 1987, 329-331):

- i. covariance between the variables in the relationship
- ii. the independent variable must occur before the dependent variable
- iii. the covariance is not due to an external factor.

Hair et al. (1998, 592) suggest that, in addition, there is also a fourth condition:

- iv. a causal relationship has to have a theoretical foundation.

According to Kinnear and Taylor (1987, pp. 331-356), only experimental or quasi-experimental research settings allow the researcher to make causal inferences. By experimental research

¹ According to some definitions, a causal relationship means that A causes B or A produces B (Cooper and Schindler, 2000, pp. 148). This is quite strict, however, and it does not allow any exceptions. Therefore causal relationships are often divided into two types: deterministic and probabilistic (Kinnear and Taylor, 1987, pp. 329). Deterministic causality means that every time A occurs it inevitably produces B, whereas probabilistic causality is less strict and therefore more suitable for social studies: it means that the occurrence of A increases the likelihood that B will also occur. The term causality hereafter in this dissertation refers to probabilistic causality, as follows from adopted critical realism approach (e.g. Easton, 2002).

settings they refer to studies in which the researcher controls or manipulates one or more independent variables, and measures the effects of the manipulated variables on the dependent variable. In a quasi-experimental research setting the researcher controls the data-collection process (i.e. when and from whom the data is collected), but she or he lacks control over the timing of the effect of the independent variables and the randomness of the exposure. According to Kinnear and Taylor (1987, pp. 341-345), studies using survey or observation approaches do not allow the researcher to make causal inferences because he or she first has to observe the effect and then to find a cause for it, which prevents the fulfillment of the time-order condition in causal relationships.

The present study uses a survey approach based on cross-sectional data. Even though it measures 'the cause' (i.e. the field sales management control system) from the field sales manager's perspective and 'the consequences' from the salespeople's perspective, it fails to fulfill the time-order condition. Thus, it is assumed that the control exercised in the sales organizations is stable across time periods, and that using cross-sectional data allows causal inferences.

1.7 DEFINITIONS

This section delineates some of the central concepts used in the present study in order to help readers to follow the text and avoid conceptual misunderstandings.

Field sales force refers to an outside (in the field) sales force, and consequently the term **field salesperson** refers to a salesperson that works in the field, i.e. spends a considerable amount of time beyond the sales manager's direct supervision. **Field sales manager** refers to the closest supervisor of the salespersons, and the term first line manager is also used interchangeably with this term.

Levels of analysis and theory

The terms "level of analysis" and "level of theory" are discussed rather extensively. Sales organizations are viewed as hierarchical structures on different levels (e.g., salesperson, field sales manager). Naturally, these different levels are characterized by different

problems and decision-making situations. There is a detailed discussion of the levels later on in the text. It is important to note, however, that as the decision-making situations and problems differ across levels, so do the relevant theories and theoretical constructs (e.g., Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). While some of the constructs are clearly specific to one level (e.g., a salesperson's motivation is clearly on the individual level, namely the salesperson level), the organizational variables in particular are often vaguely expressed or defined (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). The construct of the field sales management control system is no exception to this, and therefore the theoretical background is reviewed. These theories are organized into **organization-level theories**, which deal with organizations and their (internal and/or external) environments, and **individual-level theories**, which deal with individual human beings and their characteristics and perceptions of their environments. This dissertation focuses on the relationship between the field sales manager's exercised control and field salespersons' responses to it, which in practice means that the study involves two distinct and simultaneous **levels of analysis**, i.e. the emphasis is on **cross-level relationships**.

The theoretical part of the dissertation considers the different levels in the context of sales-management problems more widely, but the empirical part focuses on the following levels:

- 1) **Field sales manager**
- 2) **Field salesperson**

Even though the field sales manager and the organizational levels can be distinguished from each other, in this study the former represents the latter, i.e. the constructs are assumed to be the same for each salesperson within the sales organization. In this dissertation the control system in use, i.e. exercised control, is measured at field sales manager-level. This is compared to field salespersons' perceptions of this control, which are measured at salesperson-level.

Management control system

General: As the literature review shows, there are conceptualizations of field sales management control systems (Anderson and Oliver, 1987) and of marketing control (Jaworski, 1988). While some researchers argue that the same conceptualization should be used for both sales and other marketing personnel (Baldauf, Cravens, and Piercy, 2005), this dissertation concentrates on field sales management control systems, i.e. the control system only applies to field sales organizations. The literature review also covers marketing control systems, and therefore the term ‘marketing control’ is also used when the author cites this literature.

Dimensions and types of control: One issue that requires more research is the dimensionality of the sales management control system (Baldauf, Cravens, and Piercy, 2005). There is, however, some controversy over what is meant by dimensions and types of control. For example, Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan (1993) use the term control system *type* when they refer to a system that is a certain *combination* of different controls. Challagalla and Shervani (1996) use the term control *type* when they refer to *activity, capability, or output controls*, and they use the term *dimension* of control when they refer to *information provision, rewarding, or punishing*. Oliver and Anderson (1994) use the term *dimension* when they describe how field sales management falls somewhere between the extremes of outcome-based control and behavior-based control. Clearly the terms control type and control dimension mean different things to different authors, and in the present dissertation the terms *type* and *dimension* are used as they appear in the original sources when previous research is cited. However, when the new conceptualization is presented *the term dimension refers to managerial activity (such as close supervision, or output evaluation), and the term control system type refers to a combination of different dimensions*.

Level of field sales management control: The levels of analysis, theory, and theoretical constructs were discussed above. The dissertation examines *both* the field sales manager’s self-reported control system-in-use *and* the salespersons’ perceptions of the field sales management control system.

Salesperson-level variables

As this dissertation concerns the relationships between field sales management control systems and salespersons' responses to it, the study involves several psychological and behavioral variables. A brief definition of each of these is presented below.

Dysfunctional behavior

Dysfunctional behaviors refer to different undesired, opportunistic behaviors that may result from the control system-in-use. In this study the concept covers four distinct dysfunctional behaviors (same conceptualization has been applied by Jaworski and MacInnis, 1989; Ramaswami, 1996):

- 1) Gaming, i.e. behaving in ways that appear beneficial to the organization as assessed by the control system, but which in the long-run are dysfunctional
- 2) Smoothing, i.e. evening out information flow to make the resultant figures appear more consistent over time
- 3) Focusing, i.e. enhancing or degrading selected information so it is perceived more positively
- 4) Inaccurate reporting, i.e. deliberately over/underestimating costs or revenues.

Less ethical behavior

Since people perceive ethical issues differently and it is not always possible to clearly define what is ethical or unethical, there are no ways of measuring ethical behavior directly. Sales personnel may be confronted by two different kinds of ethical issues: (1) ethics in dealing with customers, and (2) ethics in dealing with employers (Tsakilis and Fritzsche, 1989). As the concept of dysfunctional behavior focuses on their behaviors in dealing with employers, the concept of less ethical behavior in this study refers to dealings with customers. Following the example of Robertson and Anderson (1993), the term "less ethical behavior" is used instead of "unethical behavior" because clear-cut ethical generalizations are difficult to make.

Locus of control

Locus of control refers to the degree to which an individual believes that reinforcements are controlled by his or her own behavior (see e.g., Chung and Ding, 2002). Locus externals believe that reinforcements following an action are a consequence of external or unpredictable factors such as luck, fate or chance, while locus internals believe that the same reinforcements are dependent on their own actions and behaviors.

Motivation

The term motivation refers especially to work motivation, which was defined by Pinder (1984) as follows: “Work motivation is a set of energetic forces that originate both within as well as beyond an individual’s being, to initiate work-related behavior, and to determine its form, direction, intensity, and duration” (p. 8). This definition serves the purposes of this dissertation well, and a more detailed discussion about the nature of work motivation follows later in the text.

Role stress

Role stress refers to the concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity (Rizzo et al., 1970). Role conflict occurs when an individual is exposed to conflicting expectations of how he or she should behave, while role ambiguity refers to situations in which an individual feels that he or she does not clearly understand what is expected of him or her.

Sales orientation - Customer orientation

Customer-oriented selling was defined by Saxe and Weitz (1982, p. 344) as follows: “Customer-oriented selling is a way of doing business on the part of salespeople. The term refers to the degree to which salespeople practice the marketing concept by trying to help their customers make purchase decisions that will satisfy customer needs. Highly customer-oriented salespeople engage in behaviors aimed at increasing long-term customer satisfaction”. Previous research (e.g., Periatt, LeMay, and Chakrabarty, 2004; Thomas, Soutar, and Ryan, 2001) indicates that sales orientation – customer orientation is actually a two-dimensional construct: customer orientation and sales orientation (i.e. a

focus on immediate sales) are negatively, but not perfectly, correlated dimensions that share a significant amount of variance but still retain some that are unique.

1.8 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The structure of this dissertation follows the order of research questions presented in section 1.2 (see Figure 1.).




Figure 1. The structure of the dissertation

Chapter 2 reviews the four conceptualizations of marketing and sales management control systems that have been used to predict salesperson consequences. This review identifies the similarities and differences between the conceptualizations in terms of the concept itself, the

theories used in developing the concept and hypotheses about its consequences, and empirical operationalizations and research findings. The chapter ends with a comparison of these different approaches, which serves as a link to the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 3 builds the multilevel framework for studying field sales management control systems and their salesperson consequences. It starts by identifying the levels of analysis in sales management, and then the theories identified in Chapter 2 are first organized according to the level of analysis and subsequently reviewed. The findings from this literature review conclude with a presentation of a multilevel framework that serves as a base model for the study.

Chapter 4 builds on the framework developed in the previous chapter. A more detailed conceptual model is specified by means of research propositions, which describe the concept of field sales management control at different levels of analysis and according to its salesperson consequences.

Chapter 5 presents the research strategy used in order to empirically test the research propositions derived in Chapter 4. The nature of multilevel research is discussed, and appropriate methods for testing the research propositions are presented.

Chapter 6 presents the results of the empirical assessment. First, the empirical sample is described and after that a detailed report of the empirical assessment of the research propositions is presented. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the findings.

Chapter 7 discusses the research findings and their implications, and compares them with existing knowledge. The chapter is organized in three sections, which deal with the contributions of the study, the implications of the findings, and finally the limitations of the study together with suggestions for future research.

2 A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON MARKETING AND SALES MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS

According to Jaworski (1988), there are two approaches to studying control systems: focusing on marketing/sales activities (i.e. strategies, programs, plans, and tactics) or on the control of marketing/sales personnel (i.e. influencing the behaviors and activities of the personnel in order to achieve the desired outcome). The traditional approaches in the marketing and sales literature (e.g., Hersey, 1938; Hulbert and Toy, 1977; Trickett, 1946; Sharma and Achabal, 1982) emphasize control over activities, whereas in the 1970's and 1980's (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Futrell, Swan, and Todd, 1976; Jaworski, 1988) the emphasis shifted to the personnel, which is the focus of the present dissertation.

However, even within personnel research there are different approaches and philosophies. Some scholars tend to emphasize the motivational aspects of the control system, which they relate to performance antecedents such as role clarity and motivation (Futrell, Swan, and Todd, 1976; Anderson and Oliver, 1987). Others, on the other hand, lean more towards the control aspects of the concept, which they relate to potential dysfunctional behaviors caused by control (e.g., Merchant, 1982; Jaworski, 1988). These different philosophical approaches to control have also resulted in different ideas about the characteristics of "good control" (see Table 1). Even though management control systems are related to both sales-force motivation and evaluation/control, these issues have usually been discussed in isolation. For example, textbooks on sales management cover issues of motivation and evaluation/control in separate chapters (see e.g., Donaldson, 1998; Stanton, Buskirk and Spiro, 1991; Jobber and Lancaster, 2003).

Table 1. The characteristics of a good control system

Emphasis on motivating (see Futrell, Swan and Todd, 1976)	Emphasis on controlling (see Merchant, 1988)
Clarity	Future-oriented
Task performance – reward link	Multidimensionality
Guarantees individual control and influence in work situation	Includes assessment of whether good performance assurance has been achieved
	Identifies that good control is not necessarily economically desirable

The contemporary research on management control systems covering sales and marketing personnel is based mainly on seminal papers produced by Anderson and Oliver (1987) and Jaworski (1988). These papers provide two alternative conceptualizations of marketing and sales management control systems, even though others can be identified (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani, 1996; Futrell, Swan, and Todd, 1976), as discussed in the remainder of this chapter. However, the conceptualizations, operationalizations, and findings on the consequences of control systems have not been very consistent (see Baldauf et al., 2005 for a review of studies in the literature on marketing and sales management). An extensive literature review was therefore conducted in order to obtain a clear picture of the different conceptualizations. An article database search was conducted using ABI/INFORM and EBSCO databases. Using search terms *control* and *sales* in article titles resulted 86 documents from ABI/INFORM database and 49 documents from EBSCO, terms *control* and *marketing* resulted 92 documents from ABI/INFORM and 51 from EBSCO. These lists of articles were combined and articles that did not serve the purposes of this study were excluded. In addition, more articles were searched from the references of the found articles. This process lead to review of 37 articles (see Appendix 1). Overall the review covers the main approaches used in sales management control system research²

The literature review revealed that there are different approaches to sales control research, which have some similarities but also differ in their theoretical foundations, levels of analysis, and conceptualizations of control. Baldauf et al. (2005) published a synthesis of the research on sales and marketing management, and they identified two parallel approaches to control: one is based on Anderson and Oliver's (1987) conceptualization of field sales management control, and the other on Jaworski's (1988) conceptualization of marketing control. The first of these approaches places systems of field sales management control on a single continuum ranging from behavior-based control (when the manager focuses on the salesperson's behavior) and outcome-based control (when the manager focuses on measuring outcomes). The latter approach distinguishes two main dimensions of control, the formal (formal control over job inputs, process and/or output) and the informal (control mechanisms that are determined by the individual, the social

² Although it is acknowledged that not all the studies focusing on the subject are included in the review, it is believed that the review is comprehensive. In comparison, the literature review conducted by Baldauf, Cravens, and Piercy (2005) included 33 articles. The focus of their review was on sales management control system's antecedents and consequences, whereas the present study focuses on conceptualization of control and its consequences.

environment, and/or the organizational culture). A more detailed description of these different approaches is provided in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

However, it is argued here that two additional approaches, which differ significantly in their conceptualization of control from these two approaches, can be identified. One of these actually precedes the two above-mentioned streams by over a decade (Futrell, Swan and Todd, 1976), and the conceptualization is less complex, focusing on the issue of how control system characteristics are perceived by salespeople. The other (Challagalla and Shervani, 1996) was published nearly a decade after the two seminal papers written by Anderson and Oliver (1987) and Jaworski (1988), when empirical evidence of the inconsistencies in past approaches had emerged, and offers a more detailed conceptualization of control. This conceptualization made a notion that there are two different types of behavior-based control. Baldauf et al. (2005) saw this stream as part of Jaworski's (1988) approach, but as discussed later in this section, it makes a huge contribution to the literature and could therefore be considered an independent stream. All of the four approaches have served as a basis for empirical research (see Appendix 1). These four different approaches to sales control, and additional conceptualizations that do not fall into any of the four categories, are also briefly discussed. The section is organized in chronological order.

2.1 PERCEPTIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

Conceptualization. Even though this conceptualization was used in only three studies, it should be treated as a separate stream since it was practically the first in the literature on marketing and sales management to focus especially on personnel control. It has been applied by Futrell, Swan and Todd (1976), Futrell and Schul (1978) and Leigh, Lucas and Woodman (1988). Originally based on Todd's unpublished doctoral dissertation (see e.g., Futrell, Swan and Todd, 1976), it examines control systems from the employee perspective, and builds on sales management literature and theories of motivation. The dimensions of the control system as perceived by salespeople include its clarity, its influence and control over establishing job goals, and its performance-reward linkage (see Figure 2).

They argued that the sales manager's tasks of monitoring, directing, evaluating, and rewarding the sales force could be combined into a control-system concept based on a single continuum ranging between the extreme forms of behavior-based control and outcome-based control (see the upper half of Figure 3). Later (Oliver and Anderson, 1994) they specified their concept, arguing that in order to understand the consequences of a control strategy, one should examine the *salesperson's perceived control system* (see the lower half of Figure 3).




Figure 3. Anderson and Oliver's conceptualization of the field sales management control system

Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of both extreme types of control systems, as outlined by Oliver and Anderson (1995). According to this conceptualization, the behavior-based system is characterized by close supervision, and by monitoring behavior instead of results, and consequently the firm carries the risk in terms of the financial performance of the selling function. The outcome-based system, on the other hand, is characterized by minimal contact between the field sales manager and the salesperson, and extensive emphasis on the evaluation of observable results, leading to a situation in which individual salespersons carry the risk.

Table 2. Characteristics of Behavior- and Outcome-Based Sales Control Systems (Oliver and Anderson, 1995)

Behavior Control	Outcome Control
Structured	Low to little structure
Fixed compensation (salary)	Variable compensation (commission, bonus)
Management monitors behavior more than results	Management monitors results more than behavior
Much supervision and many managers (low span of control)	Little supervision and few managers (high span of control)
Much contact with management	Little contact with management
Much reporting	Little reporting
Performance evaluated subjectively on many criteria	Performance evaluated on a few observable results
Firm bears risk	Salesperson bears risk

Anderson and Oliver (1987) draw their concept from agency theory, transaction cost economics, and organization theory. According to them, the behavior-based control system is characterized by a high salary level, and an emphasis on monitoring job inputs and on directing. The outcome-based system, on the other hand, features a high degree of outcome evaluation and reward, with a high proportion of commission in the compensation plan. The first empirical assessment of this single behavior-outcome –based control continuum was made by Cravens et al. (1993), who noticed, however, that the control dimensions of “field sales management control” and “compensation control” could not be integrated in a consistent manner. Oliver and Anderson (1994), in their own empirical work, created an index of behavior-based control, which positioned the studied systems on the behavior-based– outcome-based continuum. The rationale behind the index was the idea that control systems should be studied as an *entity* as *perceived* by salespeople (see Oliver and Anderson, 1994), rather than as separate controls in isolation. Unfortunately, however, the research that could be classified as a continuation of Anderson and Oliver’s (1987) work (see e.g., Baldauf et al., 2005) has not followed this rationale. Behavior-outcome controls have been operationalized on separate control dimensions instead of along a single continuum (e.g., Cravens et al., 1993; Grant and Cravens, 1999), or then the single construct of behavioral control has been assumed to consist of both output and behavioral control (e.g., Babakus et al., 1996; Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy, 2001; Piercy, Lane and Cravens, 2002). Furthermore, no distinction has been made between the units of analysis (i.e. sales managers, salespeople, field sales managers, chief sales executives).

Consequences. According to Baldauf et al. (2005), the research based on Anderson and Oliver's (1987) conceptualization of control systems emphasizes constructs concerning salesperson behavior (i.e. planning, teamwork, adaptive selling). Various forms of motivation (i.e. intrinsic vs. extrinsic, see Oliver and Anderson, 1994; 1995) have also been studied within this stream. In their original paper Anderson and Oliver (1987) applied cognitive evaluation theory (see Deci and Ryan, 1985) to their discussion on the effects of control on motivation. Generally, their results suggest that behavior-based control is associated with favorable behavioral outcomes among salespeople, and that it is related to lower levels of extrinsic motivation (Oliver and Anderson, 1994). The relationship between sales management control systems and potentially less ethical behaviors has also been studied in this context. In examining this relationship Robertson and Anderson (1993) based their hypotheses on the assumption that under outcome-based control salespeople had the opportunity to gain personal utility by using less ethical selling tactics. Verbeke, Ouwerkerk, and Peelen (1996) built their propositions on the models of Hunt and Vitell (1986) and Ferrell and Gresham (1985), which hypothesize that individual ethical decision-making is influenced by organizational structure, the ethical climate, and individual personality traits. Róman and Munuera (2005) studied the direct effects of control systems on self-reported ethical behaviors. All of the above approaches support the view that there is a positive association between behavior-based control and ethical salesperson behaviors (Róman and Munuera, 2005) or decision-making (Robertson and Anderson, 1993; Verbeke, Ouwerkerk and Peelen, 1996).

2.3 MARKETING CONTROL: FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTROLS

Conceptualization. Jaworski found that previous studies on marketing controls had centered on marketing activities, and he directed his efforts towards developing a theory to capture the management and control of marketing personnel. Thus, the aims of this stream are in line with Anderson and Oliver's (1987) approach, i.e. studying the control systems related to people. The main difference is that Anderson and Oliver (1987) focused on sales management, whereas Jaworski (1988) was aiming at a general theory of marketing control. Jaworski (1988) based his concept of the control system on Ouchi's (1979) organization theory and view of control in

management accounting. The management-accounting view was based mainly on the assertion in contingency theory that the choice of appropriate control-system characteristics is dependent on the organizational circumstances (see e.g., Otley, 1999). Jaworski (1988) identified two dimensions of control: the formal, which included input, process, and output controls, and the informal, which included self control, social control, and cultural control. Jaworski, Stathakopoulos and Krishnan (1993) used these dimensions later to cluster four types of control systems (see Figure 4.).




Figure 4. Jaworski's control-system conceptualization

Table 3 summarizes the definitions of these controls. The formal controls include three dimensions: input, process, and output. Subsequent studies, however, have mainly concentrated on process and output controls and have largely neglected input controls (e.g., Agarwal, 1996; 1999; Ramaswami, 1996). Jaworski's (1988) conceptualization was published with Merchant's (1988) commentary and critique. Merchant questioned the usability of the degree of formality as

a relevant control dimension, but nevertheless, it was empirically verified in its original form by Jaworski and MacInnis (1989).

Table 3. Dimensions of control in Jaworski's (1988) conceptualization

Class of control	Dimension of control	Definition
Formal controls	Input controls	"measurable actions taken by the firm prior to implementation of an activity"
	Process controls	"attempts to influence the <i>means</i> to achieve desired ends"
	Output controls	"performance standards are set, monitored, and the <i>results</i> evaluated"
Informal controls	Self-control	"individual establishes personal objectives, monitors their attainment, and adjusts behavior if off course"
	Social control	"the prevailing social perspectives and patterns of interpersonal interactions within subgroups in the firm"
	Cultural control	"Broader values and normative patterns that guide worker behavior within an entire organization"

The control dimensions were, however, treated as separate controls (i.e. input, process, output, self, social and cultural). Soon this stream of research also combined the dimensions in order to study controls as systems rather than isolated entities. Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan (1993) presented a typology of systems (Table 4) based on different combinations of formal and informal controls: high, low, bureaucratic, and clan. Here again, the same conceptualization was used regardless of the unit of analysis (e.g., senior marketing executives, marketing executives, AMA members in sales positions, and industrial salespeople).

Table 4. A typology of control systems (Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan, 1993)

		Extent of reliance on informal controls	
		Low	High
Extent of reliance on formal controls	High	Bureaucratic system	High control system
	Low	Low control system	Clan system

Consequences. The studies that followed Jaworski's (1988) control conceptualization focused on salesperson variables, such as role stress, job tension or dysfunctional (opportunistic) behavior (Baldauf et al., 2005). Jaworski's (1988) idea of control consequences differed from that of

Anderson and Oliver (1987) in that he hypothesized that the efficacy of a control system was defined by a fit between contingency factors and the control in question. Jaworski and MacInnis (1989) found that process controls marginally predicted job stress, dysfunctional behaviors were reduced by self-control, and generally the use of formal controls reduced information asymmetry between superiors and subordinates. Ramaswami (1996; 2002) found that both process and output controls were associated with dysfunctional behavior, even though they both reduced information asymmetry and role ambiguity. In another study Ramaswami et al. (1997) found that control systems and salespeople's perceived information asymmetry had an interaction effect on dysfunctional behaviors: outcome control reduced them when information asymmetry was perceived as high, whereas process control had the opposite effect. However, contingency hypotheses on the control - environment fit have not gained empirical support (Jaworski and MacInnis, 1989; Ramaswami, 1996). The research findings concerning typologies of controls relate high-control systems to the most beneficial consequences, such as high levels of job satisfaction (Jaworski et al., 1993; Cravens et al., 2004).

2.4 OUTPUT, ACTIVITY, AND CAPABILITY CONTROL

Conceptualization. After the two other streams had developed to the point of combining the control dimensions, either into an index of behavior-based control (Anderson and Oliver, 1994) or into a typology of control systems (Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan, 1993), Challagalla and Shervani (1996) published their conceptualization. Drawing from inconsistencies in the studies at that point of time, Challagalla and Shervani (1996; 1997) identified two distinct behavior-based controls: activity control and capability control (see Figure 5).

Challagalla & Shervani's (1996) control system




Figure 5. Challagalla and Shervani's (1996) control system

Activity control refers to “the specification of the activities a person is expected to perform on a regular basis, the monitoring of actual behavior, and administering of rewards and punishments on the basis of the performance of specified activities” (Challagalla and Shervani, 1996, p.90). Capability control, on the other hand, refers to the development of individual skills and abilities (ibid.). The three dimensions of output, activity, and capability control are further subdivided into the aspects of information, rewards, and punishment (Table 5). These authors made a considerable contribution to the research on sales and marketing management control systems by taking into account the facts that (1) systems need to be re-specified and (2) the indirect effects (i.e. individuals’ perceptual differences) need to be examined in order to further understanding of the salesperson consequences of sales and marketing management control systems. This stream of research has, perhaps due to its infancy, also been consistent in its unit of analysis, i.e. the salesperson (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani, 1996; 1997; Challagalla, Shervani and Huber, 2000; Fang, Evans, and Landry, 2005; Fang, Evans, and Zou, 2005). However, the control dimensions

found by Challagalla and Shervani (1996; 1997) were never studied in combination, and until now they have been treated separately in the studies.

Table 5. Dimensions and types of supervisory control (Challagalla and Shervani, 1997)

Dimensions of control				
Types of control		Information	Contingent rewards	Contingent punishments
	Output	Output information	Output rewards	Output punishments
	Activity	Activity information	Activity rewards	Activity punishments
	Capability	Capability information	Capability rewards	Capability punishments

Consequences. Challagalla and Shervani (1996) based their hypotheses concerning the salesperson consequences of control systems mainly on House's (1971) Path Goal theory of effective leadership. They also discussed the potential effects on intrinsic motivation in the light of Deci and Ryan's (1985) cognitive evaluation theory, but related controls directly to performance. Since Challagalla and Shervani's (1996) conceptualization includes three types of control (i.e. activity, capability, and output), which are each divided into the dimensions of information, reward, and punishment, it incorporates nine different control elements, and consequently it is difficult to summarize these findings (see Table 6).

Table 6. Salesperson consequences of control (Challagalla and Shervani 1996; 1997)

	Activity	Capability	Output
Information	Reduces supervisor and customer role ambiguity Increases job tension	Reduces supervisor and customer role ambiguity Increases satisfaction with supervisor Reduces job tension	Reduces supervisor role ambiguity
Rewards	Reduce supervisor and customer role ambiguity, and job tension. Increase satisfaction with supervisor	Decrease supervisor role ambiguity and increase satisfaction with supervisor	Negative association with performance and satisfaction with supervisor
Punishments	Increase supervisor and customer role ambiguity	Increase job tension, and reduce customer role ambiguity, performance, and satisfaction with supervisor.	-

Some authors (e.g., Fang, Evans and Landry, 2005; Fang, Evans and Zou, 2005) have approached Challagalla and Shervani's (1996; 1997) conceptualization by focusing only on the activity, capability and output types of control, and combining the information, reward, and punishment dimensions. Fang, Evans and Landry (2005) studied the effect of control on the attributional processing of salespeople, and found that moderately difficult goals facilitated the positive effects of outcome control on outcome performance, and that the positive effects of capability and activity control on sales performance were stronger when goal difficulty was low. Challagalla, Shervani and Huber (2000) also studied managerial orientation (end-results, activity, and capability orientation), which is closely related³ to output, activity and capability control. They found that the relationship between managerial orientation or control and salesperson consequences was moderated by the location. An end-results orientation was associated with satisfaction with the supervisor when salespeople were co-located, whereas this relationship did not exist with remote salespeople. An activity orientation was negatively associated with satisfaction with the supervisor among co-located salespeople, and positively associated among remote salespeople. A capability orientation had positive effects on supervisor satisfaction in the full sample, while an activity orientation was associated with performance in the full sample and an end-results orientation was not related to performance at all. A capability orientation had a positive effect on performance only among co-located salespeople.

2.5 A COMPARISON OF THE MAIN APPROACHES

The four main approaches to control system research in the literature on marketing and sales management differ in terms of philosophical perspective (i.e. whether the system aims at motivating performance or controlling undesired behaviors), conceptualizations of control (i.e. on what is meant by a management control system), the theories used (i.e. the relationship between control and its antecedents or consequences), the domain of control (i.e. sales management or general marketing), and the outcome variables (i.e. what kind of consequences are studied). This section discusses the differences and similarities in the four approaches reviewed in terms of

³ The measurement items used in Challagalla, Shervani, and Huber's (2000) supervisory orientations are identical to those used for the information control dimension in Challagalla and Shervani (1996), i.e. they measure the same construct.

conceptualization issues, the theory-base applied, the level of analysis, the consequences of control, and finally the domain of control.

Conceptualizations

Conceptualizations of control in previous studies differ in their level of detail and in their dimensions (Figure 6). The broadest one is the division into formal and informal controls (Jaworski, 1988). Jaworski also identified more accurate dimensions of control systems (i.e. input, process, output, self, social, and cultural control mechanisms), but the stream based on his work has evolved in that the main control dimensions are used in order to present a typology of systems, as discussed in section 2.4. Anderson and Oliver (1987) take one more step towards a more detailed description of management control systems, distinguishing between outcome-based and behavior-based control. They implicitly assume⁴ that informal control mechanisms are related to behavior-based control, and consequently barely touch on issues to do with informal control. They thus force control systems into a single dimension, the appropriateness of which has been questioned in empirical assessments (e.g., Cravens et al., 1993). Furthermore, in its original form Anderson and Oliver's system of field sales management control was conceptualized as perceived by salespeople. The empirical research in this stream has not been consistent on this issue, however, since it has used samples from chief sales executives, sales managers, and salespeople (see Appendix 1). Challagalla and Shervani's (1996; 1997) conceptualization distinguishes between activity and capability types of behavior-based control, and therefore is a yet more detailed description. They present a typology comprising three types (activity, capability, output) and three dimensions (information, rewards, punishment) of control, resulting in nine different control mechanisms. This makes the findings difficult to interpret and does not allow researchers to examine the joint effects of the separate elements. As in Anderson and Oliver's approach, the control system is conceptualized as it is perceived by salespeople, and in this stream this has held across studies. The conceptualization adopted by Futrell et al. (1976) differs significantly from the other approaches. It also takes the salespeople's perspective, but the dimensions of the construct do not describe the control mechanisms per se, focusing instead on salespeople's perceptions of the system characteristics, i.e. its clarity, how much the salespeople

⁴ It seems that this assumption is based on the view that managers exerting behavior-based control focus more on training and directing than managers relying on outcome-based control.

can influence their objectives, and its instrumentality in terms of rewards. These dimensions allow researchers to relate the control-system characteristics to theories of motivation, but provide little help for system designers or managers.




Figure 6. Different conceptualizations of control systems

It is also worth mentioning that a further conceptualization was presented by Darmon (1998), but it has mainly remained in isolation and has not developed into a separate stream of research. Even though Darmon relates his system to the works of Anderson and Oliver (1987), Jaworski (1988), and Challagalla and Shervani (1996), his approach is somewhat different and his presentation is quite detailed. According to him, a sales-force control system is made up of three parts:

- a knowledge base of sales-force governance
- control levers that can be directly manipulated by managers

- a dashboard on which managers can observe different indicators signaling whether the objectives are likely to be met.

He distinguishes the different control systems along three dimensions:

- centralized vs. decentralized
- outcome- / behavior-based
- quantitative vs. qualitative

Darmon's presentation is conceptual and it has not been assessed empirically. Therefore it is not treated as an independent stream of research in this dissertation, but some of his valuable notions are used in the discussion.

Theories applied

When these control-system conceptualizations are viewed in the light of the theoretical tradition that they build on, it becomes more and more clear that those in the upper half of Figure 6 (i.e. Jaworski, 1988; Anderson and Oliver, 1987) are mainly based on organization-level theories, such as principal-agent theory, transaction cost economics, and organization theory (see e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Stathakopoulos, 1996), while those in the lower half (i.e. Challagalla and Shervani, and Futrell, Swan, and Todd) are based on individual-level theories, such as theories of motivation, role theory, and the path-goal theory of effective leadership⁵.

If we look at the theory base of each literature stream separately, we can see that the theoretical discussion in the one based on Futrell et al.'s (1976) work stemmed from sales-management literature and motivation theories. The control system is seen in the light of the central constructs of motivation theories, such as perceived performance-reward linkage, perceived control over objectives, and perceived feedback. The main theories in Anderson and Oliver's (1987) stream of research are transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, organization theory, and

⁵ The path goal theory of effective leadership (House, 1971) is mainly an adapted version of the expectancy theory of motivation (Vroom, 1964).

cognitive evaluation theory, the first three of which focus on the organizational level. Transaction cost economics (e.g., Anderson, 1985) mainly concerns the issue of organizational boundaries, and whether a company should perform a function itself or buy it from the markets. Principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) was originally presented as the theory of company ownership structures, and it also describes the nature of the firm. The sales management applications (e.g., Basu et al., 1985) aim at finding an optimal compensation plan under certain assumptions concerning the firm's internal and external environments. Organization theory in Anderson and Oliver's (1987) article mainly refers to William Ouchi's (1979) writings on mechanisms of clan control, which was identified as a third organizational alternative alongside traditional market and hierarchy mechanisms. All of the above-mentioned theories focus on the organizational level, and on the organization's relationship with its environment and the task to be performed. Cognitive Evaluation Theory, on the other hand, is an individual-level theory of motivation, which is based on the view that people have an innate need to be competent and self-determined (see e.g., Deci, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985). However, the role of this theory in the development of the propositions in Anderson and Oliver's (1987) work is not as strong as economics and organization theories. Jaworski (1988) based his propositions and theory development heavily on the literature on management accounting, and Stathakopoulos (1996) organized the research reported in this stream of literature in terms of agency theory, organization theory, and transaction cost economics. The focus in Challagalla and Shervani's (1996) work has remained more clearly on the individual's response to control, and their theories also lean heavily on individual-level theories of motivation, such as Deci and Ryan's (1985) Self-determination theory⁶. They also discuss at some length House's (1971) Path Goal theory of Effective Leadership, which in fact builds on Victor Vroom's (1964) Expectancy theory of motivation. Consequently, the theory base again has an influence on the conceptualization of the control system, and new dimensions of information provision, rewards and punishments are included in it.

⁶ Cognitive Evaluation theory, which was also present in Anderson and Oliver's (1987) work, is in fact a sub-theory of Self-Determination theory

Level of analysis

Futrell et al.'s (1976) work, and the stream of research based on it, focus on the salesperson level, and on perceptions of organizational factors and the impact of such perceptions on psychological and behavioral outcomes. Anderson and Oliver (1987; 1994) discuss salespersons' perceived control system with a view to relating it to their psychological and behavioral responses. However, several of the studies that followed up their notion of a single control dimension used sales-executive and sales-manager samples, while others (e.g., Kraft, 1999) have focused on the relationship between organizational characteristics/environment and management control. The work done by Challagalla and Shervani (1996) is clearly focused on the salesperson level of analysis, since it studies the relationship between salespersons' perceptions of the management control system and psychological outcomes (mainly role ambiguity). Jaworski (1988) aimed to link controls simultaneously to both environmental variables and employee responses.

Thus, the research on sales and marketing management control systems has unfortunately failed to be consistent in terms of the level of analysis. Some of the streams mix the levels, and even build propositions and hypotheses on theories that were developed for different levels altogether. This is not surprising, since research on the effects of management control systems on employees is, in fact, a two-level phenomenon involving the organizational or managerial level, and the employee level.

Responses to control

Studies adopting Futrell et al.'s (1976) conceptualization of control systems have produced quite consistent results. The more salespeople perceive the control system to be clear, to have a strong link between performance and rewards, and to allow participation in the goal setting, the more satisfied and high performing they will be (Futrell, Swan and Todd, 1976; Futrell and Schul, 1978). In addition, Leigh, Lucas and Woodman (1988) found that the perceived control system (and organizational culture) moderated the relationship between role stressors and performance. Salesperson responses in studies based on Anderson and Oliver's (1987) conceptualization refer to different types of motivation and behavioral strategies. The strategies in question include adaptive selling and team work as desired outcomes, and less ethical behavior as undesired

outcomes. Generally the results suggest that perceived behavior-based control is related to lower levels of extrinsic motivation (Oliver and Anderson, 1994) and ethical behavior (Robertson and Anderson, 1993; Róman and Munuera, 2005; Verbeke, Ouwerkerk, and Peelen, 1996). However, as discussed above in section 2.2, the theory base on individual-level responses to control is not very extensive, and perceptions of the control system have been described on a single dimension.

Research based on Jaworski's (1988) conceptualization of control has concentrated on felt stress, role perceptions and potential opportunistic, dysfunctional behaviors. The fit between situational issues and the control system has also been studied as one predictor of employee responses in this context. Generally, the results suggest that both process and output controls are negatively related to information asymmetry (Jaworski and MacInnis, 1989; Ramaswami, 2002), and positively related to dysfunctional behaviors (Ramaswami, 1996; 2002). Furthermore, according to the studies conducted by Agarwal (1996) and Ramaswami, Srinivasan, and Gorton (1997), process control increases dysfunctional behaviors when information asymmetry is high or procedural knowledge is low, and in the context of high information asymmetry output control helps to prevent such behaviors. When the formal and informal controls are combined in the control-system typology, findings suggest that high control has the most favorable consequences (Cravens, Lask, Low, Marshall, and Moncrief, 2004; Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan, 1993). The research conducted within this stream focuses mainly on responses on the sales executive and manager level, however, whereas studies following Challagalla and Shervani's (1996) control system have pinpointed the psychological responses of salespeople, and more specifically role ambiguity, satisfaction with supervisors, and job tension.

Consistent interpretation of these results is difficult since the conceptualization of control distinguishes nine different mechanisms. Some general conclusions could be made, however. First, it seems that each of the control types (i.e. activity, capability, and outcome control) does help in reducing role ambiguity. However, not all psychological responses are clear-cut. The different control types and dimensions do have differential effects on perceived job tension, however. For example, Challagalla and Shervani (1997) found that the effect of activity and capability information on job tension was of the opposite sign, and that activity information and activity rewards had opposite effects. Secondly, the effects of the control system may vary

depending on situational factors: Challagalla, Shervani, and Huber (2000) found that location (co-located vs. remote salespeople) moderated the relationship between control orientations and salesperson consequences, while Fang, Evans, and Zou (2005) found that goal difficulty was also a moderator of the system's effects on performance.

The domain of the control system concept

It should also be noted that there is variation in domain in the various concepts. Anderson and Oliver (1987) refer to field sales management control systems, whereas the others are more general marketing controls. While some researchers argue that it does not matter whether the control system is examined in the sales or in a more general marketing context (Baldauf et al., 2005), it is argued here that the domain should be more accurately defined. The justification for this is to be found in a body of sales management literature emphasizing the fact that sales-force management is particularly demanding due to the special characteristics of field sales jobs, including the independent nature of the work (i.e. working in the field) and its boundary-spanning role (i.e. as a link between organizations). The study conducted by Challagalla, Shervani, and Huber (2000), which indicated that the control-system effects were different for co-located salespeople than for remote salespeople, also supports this argument.

2.6 CONCLUSION

The issue of sales and marketing management control systems and their effects on marketing and sales employees has been the subject of rigorous research over the last couple of decades. The cumulated results clearly indicate that the use of control systems generally reduces perceived role ambiguity and information asymmetries, and is related to employee motivation and behavioral responses. However, there seems to be a lack of consensus in terms of conceptualization and operationalization. The different control conceptualizations and research following these conceptualizations were reviewed in this chapter.

The review and comparison of past conceptualizations of control revealed inconsistencies on the following issues:

- 1) dimensions/types of control

- 2) level of analysis (employee perceptions vs. manager's self-reported control)
- 3) theories used
- 4) domain (marketing vs. sales)
- 5) consequences.

It is argued here that a major proportion of these inconsistencies derive from the neglect of level-related issues in the theory-building and hypothesis development. As the literature review revealed, the conceptualizations that are theoretically based on different levels lead to different conceptualizations of control, whereas there are similarities when theories operating on the same level are used. These issues should be considered in the theory building, especially in areas in which the research topic entails multiple levels of analysis (see Klein, Dansereau, and Hall, 1994; Yammarino, Dansereau, and Kennedy, 2001), and unfortunately the research on marketing and sales management control systems has failed in this task. Thus it is posited that before we can hope to understand the consequences of such systems, we should revise the whole concept of control, and clearly specify it in accordance with the level of analysis. The next chapter attempts to do this by means of:

- 1) identifying the appropriate levels of analysis from the sales management literature
- 2) organizing the theory base of the literature on marketing and sales management control systems by the level of analysis, and reviewing them
- 3) building a multilevel framework based on the theory review.

3 A MULTI-LEVEL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE INFLUENCE OF MARKETING AND SALES MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS ON EMPLOYEE RESPONSES

Klein, Dansereau, and Hall (1994) argue that organizational research (especially in the field of compensation systems) is characterized by controversy in terms of level. According to DeNisi (2000, p.121), previous research directed at improving performance-appraisal/management processes has not been clear on the fact that these processes are both multilevel and cross-level phenomena. This means that appraisal and subsequent performance-management activities take place on different levels of analysis. In addition, activities that occur on one level of analysis often have effects on other levels. The literature review presented in the previous chapter confirms that this lack of attention to level also characterizes the literature on marketing and sales management control systems⁷. Multilevel theorists (Klein et al., 1994) suggest that constructs should be defined with regard to the level of analysis, and suggest three alternative assumptions that underlie the specification of levels of theory:

1. homogeneity within higher-level units
2. independence from higher-level units
3. heterogeneity within higher-level units

In research on management control systems these assumptions are related to questions such as:

- Are the salespeople within a sales unit exposed to the same control activities by their managers, or do the managers adapt their control behaviors for each manager-subordinate dyad?
- Are the salespersons' control perceptions strongly related to the sales manager's exercised control activities, or are they determined by other factors (e.g., possibly social controls)?
- Do the salespeople within a sales unit respond similarly to exercised control, or are their motivations and behaviors independent of the sales manager's exercised control activities?

⁷ Darmon (1998) also expressed his concern about such assumptions in the literature, but this notion has mainly been left without recognition.

The need for a multi-level approach to marketing and sales management is not a new idea. Hersey (1938) discussed the elements of marketing control systems back in the 1930's, proposed a sub-division of management duties into the administrative (i.e. long-range policies and plans) and the executive (i.e. the responsibility to make the policies and plans of the administrative group effective). This approach was followed in Anthony's (1965) work on control systems, which separated strategic and operational controls from each other. Later, Ryans and Weinberg (1981) presented a multilevel framework for analyzing sales management. Unfortunately, issues to do with level have not been carefully considered in the literature on marketing and sales management control systems, and consequently the cross-level nature of the inherent problems has not been taken into consideration in previous studies.

The present chapter discusses theories of marketing and sales management control from the multilevel perspective, and builds a conceptual model with research propositions for studying the relationship between field sales management control and salesperson responses to it. The first section discusses the levels of analysis in sales management research. The following sections review the theories used in the literature on sales and marketing management in the light of the levels identified in the first section. The final section concludes this review by presenting a conceptual model with research proposals.

3.1 IDENTIFYING LEVELS IN SALES MANAGEMENT

It is useful to start the discussion on the salesperson consequences of sales management control with a look at the organizational levels. As noted in the literature review in Chapter 2, the same conceptualizations and operationalizations of the control-system concept has been used regardless of whether the samples comprised sales executives, managers or salespeople. Phenomena in business studies involve several different conceptual levels. However, as suggested by Hersey (1938) in his discussion on the elements of marketing-control systems, the sub-division of management duties into the administrative (i.e. policies and long-range plans) and the executive (i.e. with the responsibility to make the policies and plans of the administrative group effective) promoted increased efficiency in a large organization. A more detailed division

of sales-management tasks and decisions is presented by Ryans and Weinberg (1981), who distinguish three decision-making levels : the strategic, the tactical, and the operational (see Figure 7).




Figure 7. Levels of sales management (Ryans and Weinberg, 1981)

The management decisions on the strategic level are concerned with defining the desired role for personal selling (Figure 8), which is in line with the marketing strategy and action plans. These, in turn, are based on a situational analysis of the internal and external environment of the organization. The tactical level is concerned with defining policies, procedures and organizational issues, and the unit of analysis is the field sales manager (Figure 9). Finally, the operational level covers implementation, and the unit of analysis is the salesperson. Donaldson (1998) also discusses the role of the first-line manager on the operational level, whose concern is to get people do the job in the correct way. According to Donaldson (1998), the time allocation to different sales-management skills is as presented in Table 7.




Figure 8. Strategic-level decisions in sales management (Ryans and Weinberg, 1981)




Figure 9. Tactical-level decisions in sales management (Ryans and Weinberg, 1981)

Table 7. The percentage allocation of time to sales-management skills (Donaldson, 1998, p.13)

	<i>Planning</i>	<i>Organizing</i>	<i>Staffing</i>	<i>Directing</i>	<i>Controlling</i>
Top level – strategic	40	30	10	10	10
Middle level – tactical	10	30	20	30	10
1 st line – operational	10	10	10	30	40

It is argued here that as the sales-management tasks differ across the hierarchical levels⁸, it is also likely that the way how managers conceptualize the control systems also differ.

Given these issues of level in theory building, the main problem with Jaworski's (1988) seminal paper is that he intended to relate management control systems simultaneously to environmental- and situation-specific factors (i.e. strategic-level decisions/phenomena), and to personnel responses (i.e. tactical-operational-level decisions/phenomena). Similarly, Anderson and Oliver's (1987) conceptualization was heavily based on principal-agent theory, transaction cost economics, and organization theory, which are strategy/organization-level theories, even though they only presented propositions concerning the form of control system and its relationship with salespeople consequences. Thus the theory base of the sales and marketing management control systems in these conceptual papers is a mix of strategy/organization-level (principal-agent theory, transaction-cost economics, organization theory) and individual-level theories (cognitive evaluation theory, role theory, expectancy theory), even though the emphasis is heavily on the former.

⁸ It should be noted that the levels can also be combined, so that one manager may be responsible for both managerial and tactical issues, for example.

3.2 ORGANIZATION-LEVEL THEORIES

3.2.1 The principal-agent theory

Agency theory is an economic theory “directed at agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), which performs that work” (Eisenhardt, 1988; 1989). The approach focuses on the issues of compensation and monitoring, and was originally introduced as a theory of ownership structures of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).

According to the theory, two kinds of problems may occur in agency relationships: the agency problem, which arises when (a) there is a conflict between the principal’s and the agent’s goals and desires and (b) the principal cannot verify what the agent is actually doing, and the problem of risk sharing, which arises when the principal’s and the agent’s attitudes toward risk are different (Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory suggests that in cases in which the principal cannot verify the agent’s actual behavior, the former should either invest in an information system or use an outcome-based contract in order to ensure that the agent’s performance serves the principal’s interest (*ibid.*). The choice between the appropriate control types is based on a comparison of their relative costs and the selection of the least expensive alternative (Figure 10, Eisenhardt, 1985).

Control strategy = F(costs of information systems, uncertainty)

1. Compare costs of: Behavior vs. outcome control



2. Choose least expensive alternative

Assumptions:

- Uncertain outcome and risk averse agent
- Divergent preferences between principal and agent for agent's behavior (i.e. effort averse agent)

Figure 10. The logic of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1985)

In sales-management applications the agency-theoretic approach seeks a mathematically optimal compensation plan (see Coughlan and Sen, 1989 for a review) or a combination of compensation and control (Joseph and Thevaranjan, 1998). The findings or implications of this approach as far as the sales manager is concerned is that firms increase the level of salary versus commission when uncertainty in the environment increases by an exogenous factor, and increase the proportion of commission when uncertainty in the environment decreases (Basu et al. 1985). Joseph and Thevaranjan (1998) suggested that monitoring might prove useful when internal activities are important and the level of incentives is low. Lal and Staelin (1986) concluded that if (1) a firm believes that its sales force varies in ability or risk aversion and (2) the salespeople have some private information about their environment or behavior, then the firm's best interest is to offer self-selecting multiple contracts.

Analyses within this approach are based on the assumption that the firm's sole objective is profit maximization (e.g., Basu et al., 1985), and this goal is approached by seeking an optimal compensation system for the agent. The utility functions for both the firm and the agent are formed in order to find this optimal compensation plan. The basic assumptions, in addition to profit maximization, are that

- a) The agent's performance will contribute to the company profits
- b) The agent's performance is dependent on the level of effort and external factors.

The firm's problem is then to maximize its expected utility (i.e. profits), while taking into account the fact that the agent must be guaranteed a minimum level of expected utility from the job (Basu et al., 1985). In the traditional principal-agent models the agent aims to maximize the expected utility function for his/her income. This function normally comprises the expected income that can be achieved with a vector of effort t , and disutility for increasing effort. It is often assumed in sales-force applications of principal-agent models that the salesperson behaves in accordance with the utility function, and aims to maximize his or her expected utility. The basic idea is that if the principal cannot monitor the agent's effort, he/she should align the interests of the agent with his/her own interests by using commission-based compensation. According to the traditional formulations of principal-agent theory, the utility function seems to be based on process theories of motivation, such as reinforcement theory, goal theory, and expectancy theory.

Principal-agent theory has been criticized for some of the background assumptions inherent in it. First, the very utility function of the agent has been said to deal only with extrinsic rewards (e.g., Frey and Bentz, 2005; Holmström and Milgrom, 1991): in other words, it is implicitly assumed that an agent (i.e. a salesperson) aims to maximize his/her income and to minimize his/her effort. As Frey and Bentz (2005) and Holmström and Milgrom (1991) note, this assumption does not hold in real life: people may, in fact, enjoy certain aspects of their work, and therefore the assumption of effort minimization is not necessarily valid.

The second major criticism of the traditional principal-agent model is the single task assumption. The classical concept of motivation, at least in Vroom's expectancy theory, treats human motivation as the level of effort, and this is also the case in principal-agent theory. The basic principal-agent model further assumes that the job assigned to the agent is a single-task activity, where effort refers to effort expended towards the completion of that particular task. However, most jobs today, such as sales positions, include multiple tasks, and therefore the effort must be allocated to the different activities. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) introduced a multi-task principal-agent model, which actually also used an employees' utility function, and this in turn relaxed the assumption of effort minimization. The agents in this model were school teachers and the authors' conclusion was that using performance-contingent incentives in the multitask context was not efficient.

The third major criticism is that the basic principal-agent model cannot predict various unintended consequences, such as fraud (Frey and Bentz, 2005). Kurland (1991) also presented a model of two principals in the sales context, in which both the employer and the customer are treated as principals. According to this kind of model an opportunistic agent may act unethically towards the second principal (i.e. the customer) in order to maximize his or her personal utility.

3.2.2 Transaction cost economics

Transaction cost economics (also known as transaction cost analysis, e.g., Anderson, 1985) was originally based on Ronald Coase's (1937) seminal article entitled "The Nature of the Firm", in which he aimed to explain why organizational and hierarchical controls existed as alternatives to market (price) mechanisms. Williamson (1979) built his ideas on Coase's (1937) work, and theorized that organizations existed because of their superior abilities to reduce opportunism in individuals through the use of hierarchical controls that were not accessible to markets.

Theories based on transaction cost economics seek a fit between the context and the control mechanism. Generally speaking, it is the market mechanism that is the most efficient, except in certain contexts. In sum, the "general implications" of Williamson's (1979, p. 259) theory are:

1. Nonspecific transactions, either occasional or recurrent, are efficiently organized by markets.
2. Occasional transactions that are nonstandardized stand most to benefit from adjudication.
3. A transaction-specific governance structure is more fully developed where transactions are (1) recurrent, (2) entail idiosyncratic investment, and (3) are executed under greater uncertainty.

This framework has been applied to sales management by Anderson (1985). Her principal conclusions were that the greater the difficulty in evaluating a salesperson's performance, the more likely the firm will be to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism. She assumed that the use of a direct (internal) sales force went with the payment of a salary, whereas commission compensation was used for representatives on contract. Anderson also found that direct sales forces were associated with complex, hard-to-learn product lines and with territories that required considerable non-selling activities. Later John and Weitz (1989) concluded that the transaction-cost approach worked in terms of explaining the usage of salary, but in the case of incentive payment it seemed limited.

Although transaction cost economics has assumed increasing significance as an analytic approach to strategic and organizational issues, it has also been criticized. For example, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) discuss the limitedness of Williamson's (1979) approach in practical applications. They acknowledge the merits of transaction cost economics as a positive theory, but they criticize its normative implications by presenting their model of a "self-fulfilling prophecy" (Figure 11, Ghoshal and Moran, 1996, p. 22). They discuss the nature of opportunism, distinguishing between opportunism as an attitude and opportunistic behavior, and build their model on Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) theory of reasoned action. According to Ghoshal and Moran (1996), hierarchical governance mechanisms such as fiats and monitoring work in two different ways. As Williamson (1979) states, they increase the costs of opportunistic behavior by means of sanctions, which in turn attenuate the opportunistic behaviors of the transaction partner. However, if the attitudinal concept of opportunism (which refers to the proclivity to behave opportunistically) is added into the model, there is a different, contradictory mechanism at work. The authors propose that the use of hierarchical governance mechanisms reduces feelings of entity experienced by the transaction partner, which in turn works as an attenuator of the proclivity to behave opportunistically. The logic behind this is that the use of rational control, such as surveillance, adversely affects the feelings of both the controller and the controlled. On

the part of the controller, the use of control leads to distrust: controllers begin to expect the adverse behaviors that they are trying to attenuate. For the controlled, its use leads to feelings of not being trusted, and of being controlled. A similar phenomenon was proposed by Ramaswami (1996) when he found that both output and process controls were positively related to opportunistic behaviors. He suggested that this phenomenon might be explained as a feeling of not being trusted and of lowered levels of perceived job discretion. According to Ghoshal and Moran (1996), this is based on the implicit assumptions of Williamson's (1979) transaction-cost economics. Finally, the authors suggest that the net effect of hierarchical control on opportunistic behavior will depend in part on the relative strengths of these two opposing influences. While this discussion seems to support the use of the market mechanism, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) point out that organizational advantage over markets should not be seen as a matter of control over opportunism. According to them (p. 32):

What really differentiates markets and firms, we believe, is that they are able to achieve efficiency and facilitate adaptation in different ways, following different institutional logics.




Figure 11. The Cycle of the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy (Ghoshal and Moral, 1996, p.22)

These institutional logics refer to adaptation in markets: firms operating a market mechanism adapt autonomously as a response to market signals, i.e. prices. According to Ghoshal and Moran (1996), the process of autonomous adaptation has two distinctive features:

1. prices must be known or predictable
2. autonomous adaptation is biased toward static efficiency.

It is this bias towards static efficiency that makes market mechanisms disadvantageous over organizational mechanisms. Organizational logic is based on purposive adaptation, which allows the pursuit of dynamic efficiencies even in the absence of prices or markets (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). A shared purpose among the members of an organization allows it to pursue long-term

efficiency by pursuing innovative activities and creating institutional contexts that influence the values and ambitions of its members (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).

3.2.3 Organization theory: William Ouchi's clan control

Ouchi (1979) introduced the concept of clan control, which was based on professional control among workers. Basically this theory is an extension of the transaction cost analysis framework. Ouchi suggested that it was effective in situations in which neither the inputs, nor the processes, nor the outcomes were easily measurable, and when goal incongruity was low (Figure 12).




Figure 12. The logic of organization theory (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1985)

This control mechanism is based on people, their preferences, and the use of informal mechanisms to build their motivation and commitment (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). Social control or clan control has often been integrated into the transaction cost analysis framework

(e.g., Anderson, 1985; Darmon, 1998; Stathakopoulos, 1996), and with the logic of finding a fit between the context and the control mechanism, and carries some implications for managers. However, it is difficult to design since it is based on goal congruence and a strong socialization process. Ouchi (1979) suggests that such socialization cannot be achieved unless the right persons are selected at the recruitment stage. This means that the company must be able to find people who are accustomed to the rituals and ceremonies that are present in the organization too. Apparently it is also a difficult system to manage.

3.2.4 Conclusion

Organizational-level theories predict and explain the use of different control mechanisms, i.e. in relating the control systems to their environments. If we look at the levels in sales-management decisions, we see that these theories operate on the strategic level, at which the decisions revolve around linking the company's internal and external environments and defining the desired role for the personal selling function. These decisions include the choice of relative emphasis on the internal sales force versus contracted partners. The value and insights of these theories have been recognized, and some authors, such as Stathakopoulos (1996) and Darmon (1998), have even summarized their logics in a unified framework, presented in Tables 8 and 9 below.

Table 8. Stathakopoulos' (1996) presentation of the antecedents of control-system characteristics

			Task programmability	
			Certain/High	Uncertain/low
High outcome observability	High behavior observability	High TSA	Behavior	Behavior
		Low TSA	Outcome or behavior	Behavior
	Low behavior observability	High TSA	Behavior	Behavior
		Low TSA	Outcome	Outcome
Low outcome observability	High behavior observability	High TSA	Behavior	Behavior
		Low TSA	Behavior	Behavior
	Low behavior observability	High TSA	Behavior or clan	Behavior or clan
		Low TSA	Clan	Clan

The choice of control-system design in Stathakopoulos' (1996) presentation is dependent on:

- whether the job outcomes are easily observable,
- whether the job behaviors are easily observable,
- whether the job is characterized by transaction-specific assets (TSA, for example valuable knowledge about processes or customers that cannot easily be obtained),
- and whether the task to be performed is programmable or not.

The alternatives in Stathakopoulos' presentation are behavior control, outcome control and clan control. Thus, this model relates the design of the control system to the characteristics of the job and the environment.

Table 9. Darmon's (1998) presentation of the antecedents of control-system characteristics

Situational characteristics				Characteristics of the control system
Entity involved in the selling objective	Knowledge level of territory response functions	Knowledge level of salesperson reaction functions	Outcome vs. Behavior predictability / observability costs*	
Easily observable and Objectively measurable	High	Low	O > B	Centralized Outcome-based Quantitative
			B > O	Centralized Behavior-based Quantitative
		Some	O > B	Moderately Cent. Outcome-based Quantitative
			B > O	Moderately Cent. Behavior-based Quantitative
	Low	High	O > B	Decentralized Outcome-based Quantitative
			B > O	Decentralized Behavior-based Quantitative
Not easily observable and not objectively measurable	High	Low	O > B	Centralized Outcome-based Qualitative
			B > O	Centralized Behavior-based Qualitative
		Some	O > B	Moderately Cent. Outcome-based Qualitative
			B > O	Moderately Cent. Behavior-based Qualitative
	Low	High	O > B	Decentralized Outcome-based Qualitative
			B > O	Decentralized Behavior-based Qualitative

* O = outcome predictability / observability costs
B = behavior predictability / observability costs

Darmon's (1998) presentation is more detailed and the system characteristics are determined along three different dimensions: a) behavior- vs. outcome-based control, b) centralized vs. decentralized control, and c) quantitative vs. qualitative control measures. Here there are four key determinants of the control-system design:

- whether the entity involved in the selling objective (e.g., a salesperson) is easily observable
- whether the management has knowledge of the territory response functions
- whether the management has knowledge of the salesperson reaction functions
- whether the costs of observing outcomes are higher than costs of observing behaviors

Thus, Darmon's (1998) model also aims at predicting the characteristics of a control system, or even helping managers to design their own, so that they fit into their operating environments.

Both models are valuable in the strategic-level decisions of sales management. However, one should remember that organization-level theories often adopt a very simple, deterministic view of human nature. This is most commonly expressed in the form of a utility function, which is assumed to be the same for each individual: human behavior is seen simply as utility-maximizing behavior. The main criticism that these theories attract is based on insufficient understanding of human nature, as mentioned in the previous sections. As we move to the tactical level of decision-making in sales management, the decisions involve linking the strategic-level definitions to the firm's internal environment by forming policies and designing control and reward systems. In this task the individual-level theories and models are assumed to be better since they can more accurately explain employee responses to the controls.

3.3 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL THEORIES

3.3.1 Motivation theories

The word "motivation" is somewhat controversial in that it has been conceptualized and defined in several different ways. Generally speaking, there are two types of approaches: process theories (also mechanistic theories, Deci and Ryan, 1985) and content theories (also organismic theories, Deci and Ryan, 1985). Process theories concern the cognitive processes behind human behavior, i.e. decision-making and thinking about whether or not to perform an action, while content theories consider humans as organisms who have internalized needs and wants, i.e. people have intrinsic needs that have to be fulfilled. The latter make a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. The two approaches take very different perspectives on motivation and its

relationship with managerial activities. Perhaps the most frequently applied process theory in the sales-management literature is Victor Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory⁹, a framework that has been used by Walker et al. (1977), Oliver (1974), and Teas (1981), for example. Of the content (or organismic) theories, Deci and Ryan's (1985) self-determination theory¹⁰, and its sub-theory of cognitive evaluation, are frequently cited (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987). The two approaches are discussed briefly in the remainder of this section in order to promote understanding of the nature of motivation.

The process view of motivation: expectancy theory

Vroom (1964, p. 9) views "the central problem of motivation as the explanation of choices made by organisms among different voluntary responses". In other words, expectancy theory is a process theory, which seeks to explain the cognitive process behind motivation by examining the interactions between motivational constructs. The underlying assumption is that behavior is voluntary, and consequently motivated. It is also assumed that people choose their behavior in a way that maximizes their subjective utility. The central motivational constructs in Vroom's expectancy theory are valence, instrumentality, expectancy, and force towards performing an action (= motivation). Valence refers to affective orientations toward particular outcomes, and instrumentality refers to the link between performance and the attainment of a desired outcome or consequence. Expectancy means the perceived probability that an act will be followed by the desired performance. Kopf (1992) discussed the different interpretations of force, stating that Vroom's expectancy model had been applied in two different ways: motivation had been understood either as a force to perform a single behavior or as a choice of the most attractive behavior. Kopf's (1992) suggestion was that both conceptualizations were complementary, and should be used together.

According to the theory, a person's motivation or force to perform an act (F) is a function of the sum of the products of the valences (V) of all outcomes and the strength of his or her expectancies (E) that the act will be followed by the attainment of these outcomes (Equation 1.).

⁹ Other process theoretical approaches are also used in sales management : reinforcement theory (e.g., Scott et al., 1986) and goal-setting theory (e.g., Wotruba, 1989)

¹⁰ Hertzberg's dual-factor theory has also been used in sales management (e.g., Shipley and Kiely, 1986).

$$F_i = f_i \left[\sum_{j=1}^n (E_{ij} V_j) \right] \quad (1)$$

$(i = n + 1 \dots m)$

The valence (V) of an outcome to a person is a function of the sum of the products of the valences of all other outcomes and his or her conceptions of its instrumentality for the attainment of these other outcomes (Equation 2.).

$$V_j = f_j \left[\sum_{k=1}^n (V_k I_{jk}) \right] \quad (2)$$

$(j = 1 \dots n)$

According to Walker et al. (1977), the instrumentalities and valences of a salesperson may be influenced by a manager with a compensation plan, for example. In sum, motivation, or the force towards performing an action, is determined by both feeling that increased effort will produce the desired outcomes and valence for performance, which may be affected by managerial activities.

The content view of motivation: self-determination theory

Self-determination theory (hereafter SDT) is framed in terms of the social and environmental factors that facilitate or undermine intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Deci and Ryan (1985) proposed that SDT consisted of three mini-theories: Cognitive Evaluation Theory, Organismic Integration Theory, and Causality Orientations Theory. Cognitive Evaluation relates external events to intrinsic motivation, Organismic Integration distinguishes between intrinsic motivation and different types of extrinsic motivation, and finally Causality Orientation identifies different orientations towards interpreting external events. These mini-theories are briefly presented in the following discussion, which is then concluded in a summary.

Cognitive Evaluation Theory (hereafter CET), as presented by Deci and Ryan (1985), comprises four propositions covering people's intrinsic need for being self-determined and competent, and the fact that people perceive the different aspects of external and internal events differently. These four propositions are listed below:

Proposition I

“External events relevant to the initiation or regulation of behavior will affect a person’s intrinsic motivation to the extent that they influence the perceived locus of causality for that behavior. Events that promote a more external perceived locus of causality will undermine intrinsic motivation, whereas those that promote a more internal perceived locus of causality will enhance intrinsic motivation.” (p. 62)

Proposition II

“External events will affect a person’s intrinsic motivation for an optimally challenging activity to the extent that they influence the person’s perceived competence, within the context of some self-determination. Events that promote greater perceived competence will enhance intrinsic motivation, whereas those that diminish perceived competence will decrease intrinsic motivation.” (p.63)

Proposition III

“Events relevant to the initiation and regulation of behavior have three potential aspects, each with a functional significance. The informational aspect facilitates an internal perceived locus of causality and perceived competence, thus enhancing intrinsic motivation. The controlling aspect facilitates an external perceived locus of causality, thus undermining intrinsic motivation and promoting extrinsic compliance or defiance. The amotivating aspect facilitates perceived incompetence, thus undermining intrinsic motivation and promoting amotivation. The relative salience of these three aspects to a person determines the functional significance of the event.” (p.64)

Proposition IV

“Intrapersonal events differ in their qualitative aspects and, like external events, can have varied functional significances. Internally informational events facilitate self-determined functioning and maintain or enhance intrinsic motivation. Internally controlling events are experienced as pressure toward specific outcomes and undermine intrinsic motivation. Internally amotivating events make salient one’s incompetence and also undermine intrinsic motivation.” (p. 64)

In sum, CET postulates that external events that are perceived as controlling or that promote the reduction of felt competence over action are likely to diminish intrinsic motivation, and that people differ in their perceptions of such external events. However, Ryan and Deci (2000) remind us that the principles of CET hold only for activities that are intrinsically motivated, i.e. they have the appeal of novelty, challenge or aesthetic value. Thus, it should not be used in the work

context without further consideration, since “the word work, in fact, carries the connotation of ‘having to’ and is often used to describe difficult or stressful activities” (Deci and Ryan, 1985, p. 293). More should be known about the nature of extrinsic motivation, which is discussed next in terms of the Organismic Integration Theory.

Organismic Integration Theory (hereafter OIT). OIT acknowledges that motivation can be divided into two *separate* elements: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is based on inherent satisfactions rather than on separable consequences, and extrinsic motivation (in contrast) pertains whenever an activity is carried out in order to attain some separable outcome. Whenever a person attempts to foster behaviors in others (as is the case in sales management), the others’ motivation for the behavior can range from amotivation, or unwillingness, to passive compliance, to active personal commitment (Ryan and Deci, 2000). OIT was introduced in order to present the different forms of extrinsic motivation, which according to the theory (see Figure 13 for a taxonomy of motivational types), lie along a continuum (see Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000). On the left end of the continuum is amotivation, when an individual lacks any intention to act, after which the forms are presented from left to right in terms of the degree to which the motivations are self-determined.




Figure 13. A taxonomy of forms of extrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci 2000)

The extrinsically motivated behaviors that are least autonomous are called *externally regulated*, and are performed in order to satisfy an external demand or reward contingency. Next, there is *introjected regulation*, which involves taking in regulation but not fully accepting it as one's own. The third form is *identified regulation*, which means the conscious valuing of a behavioral goal or regulation, and the action is accepted or owned as personally important. The form of extrinsic motivation that is closest to intrinsic motivation is *integrated regulation*, meaning that regulations are fully assimilated to the self, i.e. they have been brought into congruence with one's other values and needs. Ryan and Deci (2000) stress that the continuum is not necessarily developmental, and that an individual can actually move "backward" towards less autonomous extrinsic motivation. The more thorough internalization of motivation appears to be related to more behavioral effectiveness, greater volitional persistence, enhanced subjective well-being, and better assimilation of the individual within the social group (Ryan and Deci, 2000).

According to Ryan and Deci (2000), the integration of extrinsic motivation can be facilitated by supporting feelings of relatedness, perceived competence, and experience of autonomy. External regulation can be achieved when there are salient rewards or threats, and when the person feels competent enough. Introjected regulation is achievable when a relevant reference group endorses the activity and when the person feels competent and related, but autonomous regulation is only attainable if the managerial activities are supportive of autonomy. Sometimes even rewards may be perceived as a method of control (e.g., Jordan 1986), and thus they may hinder the integration process of extrinsic motivation. This motivation-undermining effect of rewards has been called the "over-justification effect" in studies on intrinsic motivation (see e.g., Pinder, 1984).

Finally in the SDT context, *Causality Orientations Theory* (hereafter COT) distinguishes between three types of causality orientations, which are individual-specific tendencies to make interpretations of external events and include autonomy orientation, control orientation, and impersonal orientation. This dissertation concentrates on the first two sub-theories of SDT, however, although it is acknowledged that causality orientations regarding controls-in-use might provide promising research avenues in the future.

Even though SDT was developed first in the field of education, and could be seen as a theory of learning motivation, it has been put forward as a general content theory of motivation and therefore is applicable to the work context due to its OIT component. Deci and Ryan (1985, p.301-311) presented the results of research on self-determination in work organizations. They found a significant correlation between the orientations of both managers and employees and employees' perceptions of their job security and satisfaction, which are motivationally relevant variables. The general assertion that an autonomy-supportive work climate predicts the satisfaction of intrinsic needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness, which in turn predicts task motivation, has gained support in cross-cultural research (Deci, Ryan, Gagné et al., 2001). However, the content view of motivation has been discussed only occasionally in the literature on marketing and sales management control. Anderson and Oliver (1987) referred to Cognitive Evaluation Theory (see the discussion in Chapter 2) in their seminal paper, but they interpreted it as supporting behavior-based control, which they assumed means that the manager encourages and directs his/her subordinates. However, as Challagalla and Shervani (1996) observed, activity control and capability control are separate dimensions, which may even have opposite effects on employees, and this assumption therefore does not necessarily hold. Eisenhardt (1985) also referred to Deci and Ryan's work, but she abandoned this "humanist-attributionist" approach, because its (p.147)

... key point is that humanists/attributionists see motivation as a problem of boredom in simple jobs. However, when a dull job is made more interesting, motivation problems do not disappear. Rather, they change to problems of performance evaluation under uncertainty as suggested by control theorists. Thus, the motivation of salesmen, engineers, and university professors is not a problem of boredom, but rather one of direction and evaluation under uncertainty as suggested by control theories.

Eisenhardt (1985) unfortunately failed to understand the importance of the feeling of being self-determined in motivation, which is clearly related to control problems. Challagalla and Shervani (1996) also referred to Deci and Ryan's (1985) work, and suggested that there was a positive association between capability information and intrinsic motivation and performance, due to supporting feelings of competence. However, they did not include motivational variables in their model. Thus, in sum, the content view of motivation has been almost totally neglected in the research on sales management control systems.

Summary

Studies on managerial influence on work motivation usually rely on mechanistic process theories (such as expectancy theory), which link managerial activities to subordinates' extrinsic motivation. Work motivation is seen as a cognitive response to stimulus. However, according to the content or organismic view, these mechanistic theories fail to take into consideration people's innate need for being self-determined. Within the self-determination theory this view brings an additional aspect to the study of work motivation, suggesting that motivation can only be "enhanced" up to a certain point under the mechanistic approach (i.e. rewards and penalties) . Feelings of belonging, being competent, and being autonomous must also be supported, and a continuous increase in managerial control over employees is likely to dampen such feelings.

3.3.2 Role theory

Role stress (i.e. role conflict and role ambiguity) has also been widely studied in the sales-management literature in the context of performance antecedents (e.g., Walker, Churchill, and Ford, 1977). Consequently, it has also been a central employee-response variable in the literature on marketing and sales management (see Appendix 1).

The theory base behind role stressors as performance determinants is role theory, which posits that the behavior of an individual is guided by expectations held by that individual and other people. Such expectations correspond to roles people have in their everyday lives, such as the professional role of a salesperson. Sometimes role ambiguity and role conflict arise in complex organizations when people face inconsistent expectations and lack the necessary information about their tasks and responsibilities (Rizzo et al., 1970).

Kahn et al. (1966) described the development process of role stress in their model of role episodes (see Figure 14), which shows how role conflict and ambiguity are related to social and psychological processes between and within role senders and focal persons.




Figure 14. A model of role episodes (Kahn et al., 1966)

According to the model, role senders (e.g., field sales managers, customers) have expectations about a focal person (a salesperson) and his/her behavior, and such expectations often lead to role pressures. When pressures from different associates (role senders) are strong and directed toward changes in the behavior of the focal person, or when they are contradictory to one another, the focal person is likely to experience role conflict and ambiguity, and as a result to feel tension, anger, or indecision. Finally, when a focal person is confronted with role conflict, he/she must respond to it by means of coping efforts. Kahn et al. (1966) identify (1) direct attempts to resolve conflict through compliance or by persuading role senders to modify incompatible demands, (2) attempts to avoid the sources of stress, and the use of defense mechanisms that distort the reality, and finally, (3) focal persons may form affective or physiological symptoms of coping with the pressures. In sum, sent pressures (II) lead to experienced conflict (III), which leads to coping responses (IV), and these responses are perceived and evaluated in relation to role expectations (I), and then the cycle resumes. People who are working in boundary-spanning positions (e.g., with different departments) are often faced with conflicting role pressures because their role set consists of persons in separate units, all of which have their own goals, objectives and norms (Kahn et al. 1966). Pruden (1969) identifies salespeople as “interface managers who link their employer with their customers” (p. 339). Thus, there generally seems to be a consensus that sales positions are characterized by exposure to role stress.

According to Kahn et al. (1966), the role episode model represents events only at a given point of time, and they expand it to include enduring states of the organization, the person, and the interpersonal relations between the focal person and the role senders (Figure 15).




Figure 15. A theoretical model of factors involved in adjustment to role conflict and ambiguity (Kahn et al. 1966)

It is acknowledged in this extended model that *organizational factors* (A), such as organizational structure, functional specialization, the division of labor and formal reward systems, dictate what people are supposed to do (Arrow 3 in the model). Previous research in sales management suggests that individual perceptions of role conflict and ambiguity can nevertheless be reduced by giving performance feedback and allowing participation in decision-making (Teas, Wacker, and Hughes, 1979).

Personality factors (B) have an influence on the role pressures imposed by the role senders (Arrow 4), on the focal person's experience of such pressures (Arrow 5), and on the focal

person's reactions to pressure (Arrow 8). Examples of personality influences are discussed in the sales-management literature. For example, Lee and Cadogan (2002) have suggested that sales managers, who are relativistic, may pressurize salespeople even into engaging in unethical behaviors in order to maximize sales revenues. Behrman and Perreault (1984), in turn, found that perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity were higher among salespeople with a more external locus of control, and among people with a lower need for achievement.

The *characteristics of the interpersonal relationship* between the role sender and the focal person also have an influence on the role pressures exerted by the sender (Arrow 6) on the focal person's experience of such pressures (Arrow 7), and on the focal person's reactions to pressure (Arrow 9). The interpersonal relationships studied in this work involve the manager-subordinate relationship.

Generally, the research findings concerning role stressors and organizational control support the view that exercised control reduces role stress (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani, 1997; Jaworski, Stathakopoulos and Krishnan, 1993; Ramaswami, 2002).

3.3.3 The path-goal theory of effective leadership

The path-goal theory of leadership (House, 1971) has been used in the literature on marketing and sales management control for establishing a link between the control system and employee responses to it (e.g., Futrell, Swan and Todd, 1976; Challagalla and Shervani, 1996). Basically, however, it is built on Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory of motivation (Wofford and Liska, 1993).

House's (1971) path-goal theory of leader effectiveness aims to explain the effects of leader behavior on subordinate satisfaction, motivation, and performance. It identifies different leader behaviors and relates them to subordinate responses by means of variables (such as instrumentality and valence) from the expectancy theory of motivation. The individual makes probability estimates with respect to two linking points (i.e. *path-instrumentality* of his/her behavior with work-goal accomplishment and *valence* of outcome connecting the behavior with

its outcomes) between the behavior and its outcomes. House presented his formulation as follows:

$$M = IV_b + P_1 \left[IV_a + \sum_{i=1}^n (P_{2i} EV_i) \right] \quad (\text{Equation 3})$$

$i = 1, \dots, n$

where:

M = the motivation to work;

IV_b = intrinsic valence associated with goal-directed behavior;

IV_a = intrinsic valence associated with work-goal accomplishment;

EV_i = extrinsic valence associated with work-goal accomplishment;

P_1 = path instrumentality of behavior for work-goal attainment;

P_{2i} = path instrumentality of work goals for extrinsic valence.

He also links leadership behaviors to the antecedents of motivation (see Equation 3), suggesting that:

- the leader determines the extrinsic rewards that are associated with work-goal accomplishment (EV_i)
- the leader can increase the subordinate's path instrumentality concerning the rewards forthcoming as a result of work-goal accomplishment (P_2)
- the leader can provide support for the subordinate's efforts and thereby influence the probability that this effort will result in work-goal achievement (P_1)
- the leader influences the intrinsic valences associated with goal accomplishment (IV_a) by delegating and assigning tasks to subordinates (allowing subordinates to participate in goal setting)
- the leader can increase the net intrinsic valence associated with goal-directed behavior (IV_b) by reducing frustrating barriers and being supportive.

In his retrospective article, House (1996) describes the evolution of the formulation of leader behaviors, which are the independent variables of the path-goal theoretical models, briefly summarized in the following discussion. His original work (House, 1971) identified two general

classes of leader behavior: path-goal clarifying behavior and behavior directed toward satisfying subordinate needs. These were tested by means of constructs of leader-initiating structure and consideration. House and Mitchell (1974) gave a more specific definition of leader behaviors, and identified (1) directive path-goal clarifying behavior, (2) supportive behavior, (3) participative behavior, and (4) achievement-oriented behavior. In the same retrospective article House (1996) presents a reformulation of the theory in the form of the path-goal theory of work-unit leadership, and further specifies leader behaviors in the following eight categories: (1) path-goal clarifying behaviors, (2) achievement-oriented behavior, (3) work facilitation, (4) supportive leader behavior, (5) interaction facilitation, (6) group-oriented decision processes, (7) representation and networking, and (8) value-based leader behavior.

While the path-goal theory of effective leadership has been discussed in the literature on sales and marketing management control (Challagalla and Shervani, 1996), it is important to note that, according to this theory, leaders can adjust their own behaviors to adapt to contingencies (Silverthorne, 2001), which may be derived from the task environment (e.g., ambiguous role demands, see House, 1996) or from follower characteristics (e.g., locus of control, see Mitchell, Smyser, and Weed, 1975). If the management control system is defined as the organization's set of procedures for monitoring, directing, evaluating, and controlling its employees (Anderson and Oliver, 1987), the control behaviors of the manager should be defined by the control system and not the individual salesperson-manager dyads. DeIVecchio (1996) studied whether the control behaviors of managers were determined by interpersonal factors (leadership approach) or the control-system characteristics (control-system approach), and her findings supported more the leadership approach. If such findings hold in other empirical settings too, the reliability of the implications drawn from the studies using subordinate perceptions of the control system as independent variables could be questioned. At worst, they might only reflect the effects of interpersonal relationship qualities.

3.3.4 Conclusion

On the individual level of analysis the theories circle around constructs that are related to the perceptions, feelings, needs and wants of individuals, while on the organizational level the

control-system dimensions or characteristics are related only to the tasks to be performed, their measurability, and the operating environment. Theories of motivation suggest that people want to fulfill their needs, which may be either extrinsic (earning a livelihood) or intrinsic (being competent, self-determined, and belonging). The propositions that come from role theory suggest that salespersons in boundary-spanning positions may be susceptible to role stress (i.e. role ambiguity or role conflict), which may be alleviated through communication and clear objectives. The management control system might well enhance employee motivation and reduce role stress if it can both help individuals in fulfilling their needs and provide clarity in terms of role perceptions. However, these theories also suggest that exercising too much control may have deleterious effects on motivation and role stress.

As far as individual-level theories are concerned, the use of very broad control-system dimensions, such as formal vs. informal control or behavior vs. outcome control, is not justified for studying the effects on individual responses because they do not match with the theoretical constructs related to motivation and role stress. It is argued here that on the field-sales-management level conceptualizations of the management-control system should involve more detailed dimensions, which should be comparable with the relevant constructs of the individual-level theories. In other words, the field sales managers who implement the strategies on the operational level are likely to conceptualize control systems with somewhat different (i.e. more detailed) dimensions than sales executives, who are more familiar with the strategic-level decisions.

3.4 CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYSTEMS OF FIELD SALES MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE SALESPERSON'S RESPONSES TO IT

The first section of this chapter aimed at identifying and describing the levels in the hierarchy of sales management decisions. It was acknowledged that at the strategic level (usually occupied by sales executives) the decisions deal with the desired role of personal selling that is in line with marketing strategies and plans of action. The emphasis is on planning and organizing the sales force, and the key elements in decision-making on these activities concern situational analysis of organizations internal and external environments. As the focus of analysis shifts to implementing

the plans (tactical and operational levels), also the emphasis of the managers' activities shifts to directing and controlling the members of sales organization. The decisions concerning these activities are based on understanding the expected responses of the sales force. As the decisions at these levels are based on different issues (i.e. situational analysis vs. understanding of the employees' response function), it is asserted here that one should also apply different theories.

The next two sections reviewed the theories applied in the past research on sales management control systems, first the ones that deal with strategic level decisions (i.e. unit of analysis is organization), and then the ones that deal with tactical/operational level decisions (i.e. unit of analysis is employee or employee-manager relationship). These sections revealed that the constructs that describe the nature of control at strategic level are not comparable with constructs that describe the nature of control at tactical/operational level. At the strategic level theories, the control system characteristics are designed by evaluating whether

- the behaviors and/or outcomes are measurable or not,
- the tasks to be performed are programmable or not,
- whether the job is characterized by transaction-specific assets or not.

Consequently the control system characteristics are examined with broad descriptions, such as control over outcomes vs. control over behaviors, or reliance on social controls (i.e. clan control). At the individual-level theories, the control system characteristics are related to examination of how employees perceive the control: is the control system

- rewarding,
- clearly communicated,
- in conflict with other role expectations,
- autonomy-supporting?

When these theories are applied in examining the control system characteristics, it should into studying perceptions of control (e.g. are the controls clearly perceived, how strong is the perceptual link between performance and rewards, see Futrell, Swan and Todd, 1976) or/and conceptualizing control with more detailed descriptions (e.g. does the behavioral control emphasize observation of activities or supporting capabilities).

Based on the above mentioned findings of the literature review, a general multilevel framework for sales management control system research is proposed (Figure 16). It builds on the multilevel view of organization (see e.g. Klein, Dansereau, and Hall, 1994; Yammarino, Dansereau, and Kennedy, 2001), which asserts that constructs should be defined with regard to the level of analysis and when doing this the issues of independence and homogeneity within higher-level units should be taken into consideration. The presented framework is divided into three sequential research gaps, proceeding from issues of conceptualization of control to examining its consequences.

The first research gap is related to the conceptualization of systems of field sales management control. Its importance is highlighted in a study carried out by DeIVecchio (1996) suggesting that sales managers' control behaviors can be better explained in terms of leadership theories rather than control-system theories. The managers' control behaviors were unique in each manager-salesperson dyad, and therefore relating the results to the literature on control systems, which assumes constant and stable control behaviors across manager-salesperson dyads, is not justified. Moreover, according to the individual-level theories, employees form perceptions of instrumentalities, expectancies, role expectations concerning the managers' exercised control. It is asserted here that the control system should be conceptualized and operationalized by taking into consideration the level issues and the underlying assumptions on within-group homogeneity and heterogeneity. This means that the congruence between the sales manager's self-reported control behaviors and salespersons' control perceptions within an organization should be assessed. Doing this assessment will reveal, which of the managers' activities really are determined by control system, and which are adapted to each dyad. In addition, it will reveal, how well salespersons' control perceptions are in line with exercised control.

The second gap deals with salespersons' psychological responses to the manager's control behaviors. Given that Gap I has not yet been studied in the literature, findings on the effects of the control system should not be trusted without further examination. It is proposed here that before any implications of the results can be presented, one should investigate whether the psychological responses to control are stable across all the salespeople under that same system,

and whether this effect also holds across different sales organizations. The examination of individual-level theories also revealed that individual differences also play an important role in the formation of psychological responses. These should be controlled for before studying the effects of exercised control on salespeople.

The third gap is of similar logic, but it focuses on behavioral responses to the control. It is treated as a separate gap because behaviors are often guided by one's psychological state of mind. As the review of motivation theories reported in the previous section revealed, work-related behaviors are purposeful, i.e. motivated. Perceived role stress, on the other hand, may lead to different coping behaviors. Thus, it is asserted here that when the behavioral responses to exercised control are under examination, psychological variables should also be included in the model, and their relationship with controls-in-use should be known first.




Figure 16. A framework for studying the relationship between systems of field sales management control and salespersons' responses to it

4 THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

The previous chapter derived a general multilevel framework for studying field sales management control and its relationship with salesperson consequences. This framework serves as a base for the present chapter, which develops a detailed conceptual framework and research propositions to be assessed empirically. More specifically, it derives the research propositions concerning the nature of these systems, and their relationship with salesperson consequences. The propositions are allocated to the three research gaps in the framework.

4.1 GAP I – CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM

The levels of analysis in sales management were identified in Chapter 3, and the theory base used in the literature on systems of sales and marketing management control was reviewed in accordance with the multilevel approach. The conclusion was that the theories on the strategic level of sales management offered a different perspective on controls than those on the tactical/operational level. The strategic-level decisions related the construct of the management control system to the operating environment and tasks in order to define the desired role of the personal selling function, whereas on the tactical/operational levels the management activities were related to the employee's need fulfillment (e.g., the provision of income, autonomy, and feedback). Thus, the first question to be answered concerns the perceptual control-system dimensions and their congruence on the field-sales-management and the salesperson levels. It is suggested that, in accordance with the ideas presented in Futrell, Swan and Todd's (1976) and Challagalla and Shervani's (1996) control-system conceptualizations, the dimensions perceived by the salespeople are related to motivation and role-theoretical constructs, such as expectancy, instrumentality, the provision of autonomy, the provision of feedback, and control-system clarity. In the terms used in the literature on sales and marketing management, such dimensions are as presented in Table 10.

Table 10. Control-system dimensions based on individual-level theories

Futrell et al. (1976)	Challagalla and Shervani (1996)
Perceived clarity Perceived performance-reward link Perceived feedback	Capability information Capability rewards Capability punishments Activity information Activity rewards Activity punishments Output information Output rewards Output punishments

It is proposed here that the appropriate dimensions of the control system depend on the respondent's position in the sales-management hierarchy. Those who are working with strategic-level decisions are likely to conceptualize the firm's sales management control system with dimensions derived from strategic-level theories, e.g., input, process, or output control. On the other hand, those who are working with tactical- or operational -level decisions are more likely to conceptualize the control systems with dimensions based on individual-level theories (Table 10). Thus:

P1: Tactical/operational-level sales managers conceptualize control systems with dimensions comparable to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions), rather than broad formal/informal dimensions that are derived from organization-level theories.

This dissertation focuses on the effects of a control system on salespersons' motivation and behavior, and therefore the managerial level represented in the sample in the empirical assessment is on the tactical/operational level, i.e. it consists of first-line managers. Since the field sales managers are the closest superiors for field sales people, it is assumed that their perceptual dimensions of the control systems are in congruence with those of salespeople. Thus:

P2: Field salespersons conceptualize control systems with dimensions comparable to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions), rather than broad formal/informal dimensions that are derived from organization-level theories.

Another important question that arises from the multilevel approach adopted is whether the control perceptions are identical across the salespeople under the same control system, i.e.

whether the field sales management control behaviors are determined by the management control system or by the manager-salesperson dyad relationship. It is proposed here that field sales managers may adapt their behaviors along dimensions of subjective control (e.g., feedback provision) when the individual manager-salesperson dyad needs it, but more formal or objective control dimensions (e.g., the link between performance and rewards) are stable across the sales force. Therefore the third research proposition is:

P3:

- a) Formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are homogeneously perceived by subordinates (i.e. defined by the control system), whereas informal and qualitative-based dimensions are perceived heterogeneously (i.e. defined by the leadership style)*
- b) Salespersons' perceptions of the formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are clearly determined by managers' reported behaviors, whereas this link is weaker on the informal and qualitative-based dimensions.*

4.2 GAP II – PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO CONTROL

The different streams of research in marketing and sales management control have emphasized the different psychological consequences of control. The research based on Anderson and Oliver's (1987) conceptualization concentrates on explanatory variables used in traditional studies on sales performance such as motivation, behavioral strategies, and organizational commitment, whereas that based on Jaworski's (1988) conceptualization focus on variance in job tension and job/role stress. Studies based on Challagalla and Shervani's (1996; 1997) ideas are limited to the effects of role ambiguity and satisfaction with the supervisor. In the present dissertation, the constructs of motivation and role stress are studied as psychological responses for three reasons:

- 1) There is a substantial body of theory underlying the constructs;
- 2) These variables have a central role in various models explaining differences in salesperson performance (e.g., Behrman and Perreault, 1984; Churchill et al. 1979; Plank and Reid, 1994);
- 3) These are the main psychological consequences under scrutiny in different streams of research on marketing and sales management control .

These constructs and their assumed relationship with systems of field sales management control are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.

4.2.1 Motivation

The different approaches to motivation were discussed in Chapter 3, and two general approaches to human motivation were identified, the process and content approaches. Organizational research and also the literature on sales and marketing management have often concentrated on the process view. Content theories of motivation complement the process theories in several different ways, and the complementary view of combining both approaches has been adopted in research on systems of marketing and sales management control (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Oliver and Anderson, 1994; 1995; Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy, 2001). However, some adjustments should be made. The theoretical discussion in these studies is based on Cognitive Evaluation Theory, but as discussed in Chapter 3, behavior cannot be intrinsically motivated if the initiating force behind it comes from a world that is external to individual cognition (see Cognitive Evaluation Theory, Deci and Ryan, 1985). Thus, work motivation is, by nature, always extrinsic. However, as Organismic Integration Theory suggests, there are different forms of extrinsic motivation ranging from pure compliance to integrated regulation, which is the closest to intrinsic motivation. Researchers in the field of marketing and sales management previously used the two motivational constructs – extrinsic and intrinsic motivation (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Oliver and Anderson, 1994; 1995) – separately. In accordance with the writings of Ryan and Deci (2000), however, it is proposed here that studies of work motivation should adopt

Organismic Integration Theory instead of Cognitive Evaluation Theory, and should focus on *different forms of extrinsic motivation in work contexts*.

Oliver and Anderson (1994; 1995) and Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy (2001) have conducted empirical studies on the relationship between control systems and motivation. In their original conceptual formulation Anderson and Oliver (1987) suggested a positive relationship between behavior-based control and intrinsic motivation, since they assumed that it was characterized by support and feedback¹¹. In other words, they assumed that such systems satisfied salespeople's needs for feeling competent by providing support. They reported no support for this hypothesis in their empirical study a few years later (Oliver and Anderson, 1994) however, even though they found that outcome-based control was positively associated with extrinsic motivation. A year later (Oliver and Anderson, 1995) they reported that intrinsic motivation was higher under "hybrid form" control systems than in either of the extreme types. Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy (2001) found a positive relationship between behavior-control and intrinsic motivation in their UK sample, but not in their Austrian sample. Furthermore, the empirical evidence of relationships between control-system characteristics and motivation is from studies that have focused on either salespeople's perceptions of control and their motivation (e.g., Oliver and Anderson, 1994; 1995) or sales executives'/managers' perceptions of aggregated employee motivation and the control system (e.g., Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy, 2001; Cravens et al. 1993).

In accordance with the logic of Anderson and Oliver (1987), and Deci and Ryan's (1985) self-determination theory of motivation, it is suggested here, that more integrated forms of motivation can only be achieved in a competence- and autonomy-supporting work environment. While Anderson and Oliver (1987) assumed that behavior-based control systems provided such environments, Challagalla and Shervani's (1996) work has indicated that this assumption does not hold: they found that the two types of behavior-based controls, i.e. activity and capability control, were actually very different. It seems that their capability-control types and information-control dimensions are the only controls that could be described as competence- and autonomy-supporting. Thus:

¹¹ This assumption can be questioned, since Challagalla and Shervani (1996) identified two different types of behavior control, capability and activity control.

P4: The control systems that are characterized by capability support and information provision (i.e. entail training, support, and competence development) are predict more integrated types of extrinsic motivation.

According to the same logic, it is suggested that output and activity controls are perceived more as external regulation, which reduces perceived self-determination, and consequently moves motivation more towards pure compliance. Thus:

P5: The control systems that are more focused on controlling specific activities and/or outputs predict less integrated types of felt extrinsic motivation.

It is posited in the literature (Anderson and Oliver, 1987, Jaworski et al. 1993) that the control system should be examined as an entity, rather than as separate controls in isolation. Therefore, it is further suggested that the more the sales manager uses different types of control (i.e. uses high control), the more the salespeople will perceive external regulation, and consequently will have less integrated forms of extrinsic motivation.

P6: The control systems that consist of several different types of control predict less integrated forms of extrinsic motivation.

4.2.2 Role stress

Previous research on the relationship between marketing and sales management control systems and role stressors has mainly concentrated on streams based on Jaworski's (1988) and Challagalla and Shervani's (1996) conceptualizations of control. The general hypothesis has been that the use of management control will decrease employees' felt role conflict and role ambiguity, and this has mainly been supported. Studies based on Jaworski's (1988) conceptualization have found that the reduced role ambiguity has been most strongly related to high control, while those based on Challagalla and Shervani (1996; 1997) suggest that role ambiguity is negatively associated with the information and reward dimensions. The only form of control that has been found to have a positive relationship with role ambiguity has been activity punishment. The present dissertation adopts these general hypotheses:

P7: Extensiveness of control (of any type) is negatively related to salespersons' felt role conflict and role ambiguity.

4.2.3 Individual differences that influence the response to control

As acknowledged in the path-goal theory of effective leadership and in role theory, individuals may have different responses to the various control-system characteristics. Mitchell, Smyser, and Weed (1975) found in their path-goal theory-based study that the locus of control has an influence on the efficacy of different leadership styles. Locus of control refers to the degree to which an individual believes that reinforcements are controlled by his or her own behavior (see e.g., Chung and Ding, 2002). The concept was developed by Julian Rotter (1966), who observed that individuals differed in their expectancies of job outcomes. Locus externals believe that reinforcements following an action are a consequence of external or unpredictable factors such as luck, fate or chance, while locus internals believe that the same reinforcements are dependent on their own actions and behaviors. Mitchell, Smyser, and Weed (1975) found that internally controlled subjects were more satisfied with a participative leadership style, and that locus externals were more satisfied with a directive style.

Similarly, perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity are likely to be dependent on personality factors, as proposed in Kahn et al.'s (1966) theoretical model: a highly sensitive person may experience more stress under mild pressure than a "thick-skinned" person. In the context of sales management, Behrman and Perreault (1984) suggest that perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity might be higher among salespeople with an external locus of control. Thus:

P8: Locus internals will experience higher levels of integrated motivation and lower levels of role conflict and ambiguity than locus externals.

4.3 GAP III – BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO CONTROL

According to the results of research on marketing and sales management control, in terms of behavioral response the use of an adaptive/customer-oriented selling approach has been an

intended outcome of the control system, and less ethical or dysfunctional behavior an unintended consequence (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Jaworski and MacInnis, 1989; Oliver and Anderson, 1994; Ramaswami, 1996; Robertson and Anderson, 1993). The psychological mechanism behind these behavioral outcomes has been assumed to be pure utility maximization. Superiors exercising behavior-based control are assumed to encourage salespeople and to train them to behave in an adaptive or customer-oriented way, whereas salespeople under outcome-based control are assumed to maximize their short-term utility by either

1. maximizing their effort and sales, *potentially* using less ethical selling tactics (e.g., Robertson and Anderson, 1993), or
2. reporting the sales results opportunistically (i.e. behaving in a dysfunctional manner).

The research propositions in the present dissertation are based on these assumptions and tests, and on whether they hold in empirical tests based on the adopted multilevel approach. Thus:

P9: Salespeople working under a control system based on capability support and feedback are likely to adopt a more customer-oriented approach to their jobs than those under outcome-based control.

P10: Compared to salespeople working under a control system based on capability support and feedback, those under outcome-based control are more likely to either
a) adopt less ethical selling tactics or
b) use dysfunctional reporting to the employer.

4.4 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS: CONCEPTUAL MODEL

The general framework developed in the previous chapter has served as a basis for this chapter, which has specified detailed research propositions for empirical assessment. The presented research propositions are summarized in Table 11.

Table 11. The research propositions

GAP I
<p>P1: Tactical/operational-level sales managers conceptualize control systems with dimensions comparable to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions), rather than broad formal/informal dimensions that are derived from organization-level theories.</p> <p>P2: Field salespersons conceptualize control systems with dimensions comparable to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions), rather than broad formal/informal dimensions that are derived from organization-level theories.</p> <p>P3:</p> <p>a) Formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are homogeneously perceived by subordinates (i.e. defined by the control system), whereas informal and qualitative-based dimensions are perceived heterogeneously (i.e. defined by the leadership style)</p> <p>b) Salespersons' perceptions of the formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are clearly determined by managers' reported behaviors, whereas this link is weaker on the informal and qualitative-based dimensions.</p>
GAP II
<p>P4: The control systems that are characterized by capability support and information provision (i.e. entail training, support, and competence development) are predict more integrated types of extrinsic motivation.</p> <p>P5: The control systems that are more focused on controlling specific activities and/or outputs predict less integrated types of felt extrinsic motivation.</p> <p>P6: The control systems that consist of several different types of control predict less integrated forms of extrinsic motivation.</p> <p>P7: Extensiveness of control (of any type) is negatively related to salespersons' felt role conflict and role ambiguity.</p> <p>P8: Locus internals will experience higher levels of integrated motivation and lower levels of role conflict and ambiguity than locus externals.</p>
GAP III
<p>P9: Salespeople working under a control system based on capability support and feedback are likely to adopt a more customer-oriented approach to their jobs than those under outcome-based control.</p> <p>P10: Compared to salespeople working under a control system based on capability support and feedback, those under outcome-based control are more likely to either</p> <p>a) adopt less ethical selling tactics or</p> <p>b) use dysfunctional reporting to the employer.</p>

The propositions are organized according to the three research gaps, which motivated the theoretical multilevel framework for studying the relationship between management control systems and employees' responses to them. Figure 17 depicts the conceptual model of the present dissertation, in which the research propositions are located within the theoretical framework. The sequential nature of the model suggests that before studying the effects of a management control system on employee responses, one must first recognize the control dimensions and assess

whether they reflect the stable system, or whether they are characteristics of individual manager-employee dyads (GAP I). The next step is to evaluate the psychological responses to the control system, and to assess whether these responses are constant among employees under the same one, and whether there are individual patterns of responding to that control (GAP II). Having reached understanding on the psychological effects of the control system, one can proceed to study the behavioral responses of the employees (GAP III). A more detailed presentation of the research strategy for the empirical assessment of the propositions is provided in the next chapter.




Figure 17. The specified conceptual model and the research propositions

5 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

The theoretical framework for studying the effects of systems of field sales management control on salespersons' psychological and behavioral outcomes developed in Chapter 3 was based on the notion that the phenomenon of interest entails multiple levels of analysis. This multilevel aspect also requires methodology that takes questions of level into consideration. This chapter describes and discusses the methodological issues that arise from the adopted multilevel approach. The first section reviews the multilevel framework and the characteristics of the phenomenon of interest, and identifies the data requirements. The second section then describes the research design used in the present dissertation, and presents the sampling and measurement issues. The third section focuses on the methodology for testing the theory-based research propositions (see Chapter 4).

5.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHENOMENON OF INTEREST, AND DATA CONSIDERATIONS

Previous studies on systems of marketing and sales management control and their consequences were reviewed in Chapter 2, and some of the inconsistencies were identified. It was also posited that these inconsistencies were mainly due to neglect of level-related issues in the research. These issues were taken into consideration in the development of the theoretical framework and the conceptual model in the present dissertation, and should also be noted in the research design. The relationship between the management control system and employees' responses to it is a phenomenon that involves at least two levels: that of the manager and that of the employee. *Consequently, the research design should ensure that data is gathered from both levels.* The majority of previous studies have failed to do this, or they have been limited to either employee perceptions of control (e.g., Oliver and Anderson, 1994) or managers' perceptions of employees' responses (e.g., Cravens et al. 1993).

Another characteristic of the phenomenon that has been neglected in previous studies is the domain of the control-system concept. While some researchers suggest that it is not important to separate sales management control systems from marketing controls (e.g., Baldauf et al. 1996),

the empirical review (Chapter 2) does not support this notion. The sales management literature highlights the difference between sales jobs and other marketing jobs, and field sales in particular differs from many others because of its (e.g., Johnston and Marshall, 2006)

- independent nature (i.e. working in the field)
- boundary-spanning nature (i.e. role as a link between organizations).

This also influences the relationship between the management control system and employee responses. The study conducted by Challagalla, Shervani, and Huber (2000) showed that the control-system effects were different for co-located than for remote salespeople, which also supports this argument. Agarwal's (1996) study also revealed several significant differences between sales and non-sales marketing personnel in terms of their responses to control. *It is asserted here that the domain of the control-system concept should also be controlled for in the sampling.*

5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The data issues discussed in the previous section were taken into consideration in the research design. Special attention was given to the aim of obtaining data on both levels of interest, so the manager-level constructs were measured on the management-level respondents and the employee-level constructs were measured on the field salespeople.

5.2.1 Sampling

This dissertation delimited itself into studying field sales organizations in Finland, and used a Kompass database as a sampling frame. As it was not possible to search only field sales organizations from the data-base, the search for sales managers in Finland was conducted. This resulted in 4,664 hits. The first step was to approach a random sample of 1,370 of these managers by telephone in order to confirm their eligibility (i.e. that they had a field sales force) and to obtain their consent to participate in the study (see Table 12). Fifty-seven of them were not contacted, either because the contact information in the database was incorrect, or because they

were on vacation, or because no one answered the telephone despite several attempts. Thus 390 of the sales managers were eligible for the study, which is 28.5% of the total sample. Of these, 923 (67.4%) said that they had no field salespeople. Several of these companies were small firms in which only the entrepreneur was responsible for selling. Furthermore, several of them were subcontractors, selling only on the basis of bidding requests. A total of 302 sales managers, which was 22% of the total sample and 77.4% of those who were eligible, agreed to participate in the study, and 93 were not willing to participate. In addition, nine of those contacted were, in fact, sales directors, and wanted to participate with the managers of their different divisions, and therefore the number of questionnaires sent to sales managers rose to 316. Some of those who were not willing to participate were willing to give a reason: thirteen (14.8%) of the companies were in the process of organizational change, and therefore did not feel able to participate; in three (3.4%) of the companies the field sales force control system was considered a strategic issue and the top management had forbidden them to give any information about it outside the company; five (5.7%) of the sales managers considered their organizations not suitable for this kind of study, even though they had a small field sales force; one (1.1%) company had gone bankrupt; and fifteen (17%) said that they were too busy at the moment. The rest (58%) were either just not interested, or did not give a reason for their refusal.

Table 12. The companies approached by telephone.

Status	N	%
Agreed to participate	302	22
Not willing to participate	88	6.4
Not eligible	923	67.4
Not reachable	57	4.1
Total	1370	100

Additionally, those who agreed to participate were asked to distribute questionnaires to up to five field salespersons under their supervision. The questionnaires were number-coded, which enabled the matching of the supervisor-employee relationships. The number of questionnaires for field salespersons (ranging from one to five) sent to each manager depended on his or her choice and the size of the sales team.

A questionnaire was sent to all those willing to participate. A package was sent to 316 sales managers, and a reminder letter was sent with the questionnaire to the sales managers 10 days (two working weeks) after the first submission. The original submissions included 1,255 questionnaires for field salespersons. Completed responses were obtained from 154 sales managers, which was 48% of those sent out, and 257 from field salespeople, 20% of those sent. Previous studies utilizing field sales manager samples have reported response rates ranging from 19.5% to 51% (Babakus et al., 1996; Baldauf, Cravens and Piercy, 2001; Grant and Cravens, 1996). Although the response rate of the salespeople was rather low, it can be considered satisfactory taken the fact that the questionnaire was long (see Appendix 2) and no reminder letter was sent. When the datasets were combined, a total of 87 field sales managers and 187 field salespeople could be used for testing cross-level propositions.

5.2.2 Questionnaire development

Since the data was collected from both field sales managers and field salespersons, two different questionnaires (see Appendix 2) had to be developed. The one for field sales managers was based on a questionnaire used in a survey conducted in the United Kingdom by Lee, N.J. and Cadogan, J.W.¹², but some additional measures were added. The salesperson questionnaire was developed for this dissertation. Both were based mainly on established measures, which were translated into Finnish. Both questionnaires, as well as the data-collection method, were pre-tested. Eighteen sales managers agreed to participate in the pre-testing by first filling in the questionnaire and then being interviewed by telephone so that corrections could be made. They also handed a salesperson questionnaire to one of their salespeople, who similarly first filled it in and then was interviewed. Suggested corrections were made before the real data-collection phase started.

¹² There are no publications from this dataset to date.

5.2.3 Measurement

Field-sales-manager-level measures

The sales managers' self-reported control system were assessed on a multi-item measure developed by Babakus et al. (1996), which consists of 25 items covering a wide range of sales-management-control behaviors. The scale was selected for the present purposes since it focuses especially on sales management control systems and it has been applied before on different levels of analysis, such as among chief sales executives (Babakus et al., 1996), field sales managers (Babakus et al., 1996), and salespersons (Piercy, Lane, and Cravens, 2002). The same measure was also used in the field salesperson questionnaire.

Salesperson-level measures

The salesperson-level concepts used in the present dissertation were assessed on established measures found in the literature.

Salespersons' perceptions of the control system were assessed on a multi-item measure developed by Babakus et al. (1996), which consists of 25 items covering a wide range of sales-management-control behaviors. The scale was selected for the present purposes since it focuses especially sales management control systems. The same measure was also used in the field sales manager questionnaire.

Salespersons' motivational state was measured on a scale consisting of six items, drawn from the measures of intrinsic motivation devised by Oliver and Anderson (1994) and Tyagi (1981). While the original measures were developed for measuring intrinsic motivation, the term used in the present dissertation is the level of integration of motivation, which is in accordance with Organismic integration theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985).

Salespersons' role conflict was measured on a shortened version of Rizzo, House and Lirtzman's (1970) original scale. The measure used consisted of eight items.

Salespersons' role ambiguity was also measured on a shortened version of Rizzo, House and Lirtzman's (1970) original scale, which consisted of four items.

Salespersons' use of less ethical selling tactics was measured on an adapted version of the scale of less ethical behavior, developed by Robertson and Anderson (1993). The original scale consisted of 12 vignettes and the respondent was asked to state whether the person facing the dilemma presented in the vignette should or should not perform a certain act. The salesperson respondents were asked to state how likely it was that an average salesperson in the company would behave as described in the vignette. The present study also sought to measure the use of less ethical selling tactics, meaning that the salesperson behaves in a less-than-ethical way in order to increase his/her own sales, whereas the original vignettes also included situations not directly related to selling. The vignettes that were directly related to selling were therefore selected for the analyses.

Salespersons' use of dysfunctional behaviors was measured on a six-item scale developed by Jaworski and McInnis (1989) and also used in the studies conducted by Ramaswami (1996; 1997; 2002).

Salespersons' customer and selling orientations were measured on a shortened version of the original scale developed by Saxe and Weitz (1982), proposed by Thomas, Soutar, and Ryan (2001) and cross-validated by Periatt, LeMay, and Chakrabarty (2004). The shortened version consists of 10 items, five measuring customer-oriented selling behaviors and five measuring selling-oriented selling behaviors.

Salespersons' locus of control was measured on the sales locus of control scale developed by Chung and Ding (2002), which is a three-dimensional measure. The three dimensions are: internal locus of control, external locus of control based on chance, and external locus of control based on powerful others.

Measure validation for the salesperson consequence variables

The measurement items used for the constructs concerning salespersons' response to the management control system were subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in order to verify their unidimensionality (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000). The sample used in the CFA consisted of one salesperson from each sales organization studied, in order to verify that the assumption of independence of observations was met. Amos 6 software, which allows full information maximum likelihood estimation with missing values, was used for the CFA. Two separate analyses were conducted, one for the psychological constructs and one for the behavioral constructs. The standardized factor loadings obtained were used for the calculation of composite reliability (CR, Equation 4) and average variance extracted (AVE, Equation 5).

$$\rho_c = \frac{(\sum \lambda)^2}{[(\sum \lambda)^2 + \sum (\theta)]} \text{ Equation 4.}$$

, where ρ_c = composite reliability
 λ = indicator loadings
 θ = indicator error variances
 Σ = summation over the indicators of the latent variable

$$\rho_v = \frac{(\sum \lambda^2)}{[\sum \lambda^2 + \sum (\theta)]} \text{ Equation 5.}$$

, where ρ_v = average variance extracted
 λ = indicator loadings
 θ = indicator error variances
 Σ = summation over the indicators of the latent variable

The standardized factor loadings, composite reliabilities, extracted variances, and model-fit indexes for the two CFAs are presented in Tables 13 and 14. The tables include item name for each variable and the actual item wordings in English are presented in Appendix 3.

Table 13. Confirmatory factor analysis results: field salespersons (n = 127¹³), psychological variables

Construct	Item	Loading	Composite reliability	Average variance extracted
Motivation	Mot1	0.537	.865	.527
	Mot2	0.787		
	Mot3	0.656		
	Mot4	0.868		
	Mot5	0.883		
	Mot6	0.600		
Role ambiguity	Ramb1	0.565	.814	.526
	Ramb2	0.777		
	Ramb3	0.767		
	Ramb4	0.771		
Role conflict	Rc1	0.552	.842	.401
	Rc2	0.662		
	Rc3	0.517		
	Rc4	0.502		
	Rc5	0.719		
	Rc6	0.749		
	Rc7	0.741		
	Rc8	0.596		
Internal locus of control	ILoc1	0.661	.671	.463
	ILoc2	0.956		
	ILoc3	0.194		
External locus of control: chance	ELocc1	0.446	.530	.224
	ELocc2	0.588		
	ELocc3	0.375		
	ELocc4	0.460		
External locus of control: others	ELoco1	0.486	.603	.339
	ELoco2	0.611		
	ELoco3	0.638		
$\chi^2=447.568$; df = 335 (p = .000) CFI = .900 ; TLI = .878 ; IFI = .906 RMSEA = .052				

¹³ One salesperson per organization was selected in order to meet the independence of observations condition for confirmatory factor analysis.

Table 14. Confirmatory factor analysis results for field salespersons (n = 127¹⁴), behavioral variables

Construct	Item	Loading	Composite reliability	Average variance extracted
Less ethical selling behavior	Lesb1	0.477	.736	.329
	Lesb2	0.599		
	Lesb3	0.616		
	Lesb4	0.402		
	Lesb5	0.795		
	Lesb6	0.464		
Dysfunctional behavior	Dfb1	0.317	.687	.283
	Dfb2	0.459		
	Dfb3	0.593		
	Dfb4	0.360		
	Dfb5	0.601		
	Dfb6	0.739		
Selling orientation	So1	0.457	.742	.370
	So2	0.553		
	So3	0.705		
	So4	0.666		
	So5	0.631		
Customer orientation	Co1	0.701	.827	.489
	Co2	0.682		
	Co3	0.668		
	Co4	0.772		
	Co5	0.669		
$\chi^2=258.186$; df = 203 (p = .005) CFI = .911 ; TLI = .889 ; IFI = .918 RMSEA = .046				

The Root Means Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is clearly under the recommended threshold of 0.08, and the other fit indexes (CFI, TLI, and IFI) circle around 0.9, indicating an acceptable overall model fit, and thus consistency of measures (Ping, 2004). The CRs of each construct also exceed the threshold of 0.6 (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000), except one of the locus of control dimensions. However, the AVEs mainly fall short of the recommended threshold of 0.5 (see Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000; Ping, 2004), except for motivation and role ambiguity. In practice this means that more than 50% of the variance in the construct indicators is due to error variance, which raises the question of the validity of the measure¹⁵. Ping (2004) discussed measure-validity issues concerning the measurement of latent variables with survey

¹⁴ One salesperson per organization was selected in order to meet the independence of observations condition for confirmatory factor analysis.

¹⁵ The measures used were based on established measures that have proved reliable and consistent, but unfortunately the AVEs are not reported in the sources.

data, and raised the question of whether the cutoff values of the AVEs or the reliabilities should be changed. As Ping (2004) states, the final itemization could be a tradeoff between measure consistency/unidimensionality, reliability and AVE. Thus, given their consistency, unidimensionality, and reliability, the measures are used in the subsequent analyses, but the results should be confirmed in future studies based on more valid measures.

5.3 METHODS OF ANALYSIS

5.3.1 Data considerations

Data from two levels of analysis

This section presents the methodology used for testing the research propositions set out in Chapter 4. They all concern cross-level relationships, and require appropriate analytical methods. The data collected for the present study includes responses from two different levels: sales managers and salespersons. In the terminology of multilevel analysis, this type of data is clustered, so that the salesperson respondents are nested in sales organizations under a field sales manager's supervision. Basically there are three ways of treating such clustered data:

- 1) Aggregation
- 2) Disaggregation
- 3) Multilevel analysis

Aggregation means that the group means are calculated from the individual salespersons' responses, and the analyses are based on them (i.e. on the group level). This would be appropriate if one was interested in studying group effects¹⁶, i.e. the effects of the field sales management control systems on the sales organization as a whole. However, when the focus is on cross-level relationships (e.g., between the field sales management control system and salesperson consequences), aggregation would lead to erroneous results (Snijders and Bosker, 1999).

Disaggregation means that the analyses are conducted on the individual level. According to Snijders and Bosker (1999), there are two situations that suit such data treatment:

¹⁶ The reliability of aggregated variables depends, however, on the group sizes (see e.g., Snijders and Bosker, 1999).

- 1) One has a measure of a variable on the group level (e.g., the control system used by managers), next to the measures on the individual level;
- 2) One only has measures of individual-level variables.

The first situation leads to a “miraculous multiplication of the number of units” (ibid., p.15). This means that the sample size is exaggerated, which leads to biased standard-error estimates and a serious risk of committing type-I errors (i.e. erroneously rejecting null hypotheses). The authors suggest that the second alternative is the preferred one, if one remembers to take into account the fact that the observations might be correlated. This approach is only suitable for studying individual level constructs, however.

Multilevel analysis refers here to the analysis of data with nested sources of variability, which takes account of the variability associated with each level of testing (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Since the aim of the present dissertation is to study the relationship between field-sales-manager-level constructs and salesperson-level constructs on a clustered data set, the methodology used is multilevel analysis, including intra-class correlation and hierarchical linear modeling¹⁷. These are discussed in more detail in the next section.

5.3.2 Multilevel analysis

Intra-class correlation (ρ_I) is a measure of association designed for assessing the level of heterogeneity within a higher-level unit. Its strength over Pearson’s product moment correlation, for example, is that it is suitable for occasions on which within-group units of analysis are interchangeable. The intra-class correlation can be calculated by applying Equation 6 below (see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Snijders and Bosker, 1999):

$$\rho_I = \frac{\tau_0^2}{\tau_0^2 + \sigma^2} \quad \text{Equation 6.},$$

¹⁷ Also known as multilevel modeling.

In the Equation 6, where τ_0^2 stands for population variance between macro-level units (i.e. sales organizations in the present study), and $\tau_0^2 + \sigma^2$ represents total variance (σ^2 being the variance within macro-level units). High values of intra-class correlation indicate that a high proportion of the variance in the explained variable can be explained in terms of group differences, not differences between individuals within the groups.

Hierarchical linear models represent a type of regression model that is particularly suitable for clustered data. The basic idea is that the outcome variable Y has an individual as well as a group aspect (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). At its most simple it is a random intercept model, while random coefficient models are a little more complex. Hierarchical linear modeling allows the researcher to analyze data on small groups of unequal size, even when there is only one respondent (ibid.).

Random intercept models are regression models that allow the intercepts of the individual-level regression model to vary between groups. In its most basic form it is an empty model (Snijders and Bosker, 1999) or a One-Way Anova with random effects (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992), which includes no explanatory variables. It can be formulated as presented in Equations 7.1 and 7.2, or alternatively combined in a single Equation (7.3).

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 7.1 (individual-level)}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j} \quad \text{Equation 7.2 (group-level)}$$

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j} + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 7.3 (combined)}$$

In the above Equations Y_{ij} refers to the value of individual i in group j on the variable Y, R_{ij} means the random effect on the individual level, and β_{0j} refers to the intercept of a group j, which could also be expressed as the sum of general means (γ_{00}) and the random effect at group level (U_{0j}). The importance of an empty model lies in its ability to partition the variability of the data into two levels of analysis: $\text{var}(Y_{ij}) = \text{var}(U_{0j}) + \text{var}(R_{ij}) = \tau_0^2 + \sigma^2$. These variance components can then be used in calculating the intra-class correlation, ρ_1 (see Snijders and Bosker, 1999).

If an *individual-level independent* variable is introduced into the model, the new model could be expressed as:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}x_1 + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 8.1 (individual-level)}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j} \quad \text{Equation 8.2 (group-level)}$$

or

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j} + \beta_{1j}x_1 + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 8.3 (combined)}.$$

If a *group-level independent* variable is introduced, the new model could be expressed as:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 9.1 (individual-level)}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}z_1 + U_{0j} \quad \text{Equation 9.2 (group-level)}$$

or

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}z_1 + U_{0j} + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 9.3 (combined)}.$$

Such models are called Means-as-Outcomes models (see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992).

Random coefficient models are a bit more complex than random intercept models. They are regression models, which allow the regression coefficients of the individual-level model to vary between groups. It can be formulated as presented in Equations 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992).

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_{.j}) + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 10.1 (individual-level)}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j} \quad \text{Equation 10.2 (group-level)}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + U_{1j} \quad \text{Equation 10.3 (group-level)}$$

In the above model, each group has its own regression model, with intercept β_{0j} and slope β_{1j} . The individual-level predictor is centered on its group mean, and therefore the intercept β_{0j} is the group mean outcome. The parameters β_{0j} and β_{1j} vary across groups as a function of a grand mean (γ_{00} = average of group means on the Y variable; γ_{01} = average of group slopes of X) and

random error (U_{0j} and U_{1j}). This type of model can be used to assess how much the slopes or regression equations vary across the groups.

If group-level predictors are added into the model, it could be expressed as:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(x_{ij} - \bar{x}_{.j}) + R_{ij} \quad \text{Equation 11.1 (individual-level)}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}z_{1j} + \gamma_{02}z_{2j} + U_{0j} \quad \text{Equation 11.2 (group-level)}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}z_{1j} + \gamma_{12}z_{2j} + U_{1j} \quad \text{Equation 11.3 (group-level)}$$

These models are called Means-and-Slopes-as-Outcomes models, and they provide help in understanding why some groups have higher means than others in variable Y, and why there are stronger associations between variables X and Y in some groups than in others (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992).

5.3.3 Estimation and hypothesis testing

Hierarchical linear modeling uses Generalized Least Squares estimation for fixed effects (i.e. γ 's) and the Maximum Likelihood function with EM algorithm for random effects (i.e. $\text{var}[U_{0j}]$ and $\text{var}[R_{ij}]$) (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997). Maximum Likelihood estimation can be applied in two slightly different ways (Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998:

- either with *full maximum likelihood (FML)*, which assumes the y variable to be normal with a mean depending on the regression coefficients, and a dispersion depending on the variance components
- or with *restricted or residual maximum likelihood (REML)*, which applies the principle of maximum likelihood to the least-squares residuals.

With small samples and an unbalanced design (i.e. when the group sizes are not equal) hypothesis tests related to variance components under FML will not be seriously biased, as they may be under REML (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992, pp.223). Furthermore, FML incorporates a likelihood-ratio test for comparing two models (ibid., p.58-59). FML is therefore used in the present study for the estimation of the variance components.

A sample of about 10 level-2 observations for each level-2 predictor is sufficient for models that include only one randomly varying regression coefficient (e.g., random intercept models) (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992), but the sample-size requirements are greater for models with more randomly varying coefficients. Due to the limited sample size of the present study, the analyses are limited to random intercept models, i.e. Means-as-Outcomes models.

5.3.4 Predictor variable metrics

The scaling of level-1 predictor variables is an important decision in hierarchical linear modeling, since the 0 points of the level-1 predictors determine the value of β_0 (Cohen et al., 2003). In the present study all of the level-1 predictors are centered around the grand mean, which suits the purpose of assessing the impact of level-2 characteristics on the outcome variable (ibid., p. 565). Moreover, the level-2 predictors are centered on the grand mean, as recommended by Bryk and Raudenbush (1992, p. 29).

Having discussed the multilevel data considerations and appropriate multilevel methods of analysis, I now turn in the subsequent sections to the logic of the empirical testing of the research propositions.

5.3.5 GAP I: Conceptualization of the field sales management control system

The research propositions of the conceptual model that concern the first research gap are presented in Table 15.

Table 15. The research propositions concerning the first research gap

GAP I
<p>P1: Tactical/operational-level sales managers conceptualize control systems with dimensions comparable to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions), rather than broad formal/informal dimensions that are derived from organization-level theories.</p> <p>P2: Field salespersons conceptualize control systems with dimensions comparable to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions), rather than broad formal/informal dimensions that are derived from organization-level theories.</p> <p>P3:</p> <p>a) Formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are homogenously perceived by subordinates (i.e. defined by the control system), whereas informal and qualitative-based dimensions are perceived heterogeneously (i.e. defined by the leadership style)</p> <p>b) Salespersons' perceptions of the formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are clearly determined by managers' reported behaviors, whereas this link is weaker on the informal and qualitative-based dimensions.</p>

Propositions 1 and 2

The first two propositions deal with dimensions of the control system. P1 concerns the dimensions with which the sales managers conceptualize the control system and P2 deals with salespersons' perceptual control system dimensions. These propositions were tested with examination of factor structures in the data. The dimensions of the management control system were explored first by means of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with maximum likelihood extraction and promax oblique rotation. Maximum likelihood extraction allows the researcher to examine the goodness of fit indexes (Fabrigar et al., 1999). As Fabrigar et al. suggest, the distributions of the measured variables were examined before the EFA, and no severe non-normalities were detected. The post-EFA factor solution was subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), which allows the researcher to examine a wider range of fit indexes. Composite reliabilities (CR) and average variances explained (AVE) by the scales were also calculated from the CFA loadings.

The same procedure was followed for the sales managers' and the salesperson's responses. One respondent per each firm was selected in the analyses of the latter in order to guarantee that the observations used in the analyses were independent. The measurement solution was then further validated by means of CFA with the responses of different salespersons than in the EFA.

Proposition 3.

The first part of the third proposition (i.e. P3a) dealt with the issue of homogeneity in the control perceptions of the field salespersons under the supervision of the same sales manager. This was tested by studying intra-class correlations (ρ_I). For the calculation of these correlations a null model was estimated for each of the salespersons' perceptual dimensions of control. In order to see whether their perceptions were determined by the sales manager's use of a particular control mechanism (P3b), a model with sales managers' control behaviors as level-2 predictors was estimated, and the improvement in the model fit was assessed by means of a likelihood ratio test. The strength of the relationship between the field sales manager's control usage and the salespersons' perceptions of control was assessed by calculating an index of the proportional reduction in variance of β_{0j} by level-2 predictors. The formula for this calculation is presented in Equation 12 (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992, p. 65).

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Proportion} \\ \text{variance} \\ \text{explained in} \\ \beta_{0j} \end{array} = \frac{\hat{\tau}_{00}(\text{random ANOVA}) - \hat{\tau}_{00}(\text{Level-2 predictor})}{\hat{\tau}_{00}(\text{random ANOVA})}, \text{ Equation 12}$$

, where $\hat{\tau}_{00}(\text{random ANOVA})$ is variance of β_{0j} in the null model and

$\hat{\tau}_{00}(\text{level-2 predictor})$ is variance of β_{0j} in the model with level-2 predictors.

5.3.6 GAP II: The psychological consequences of the field sales management control systems

The research propositions of the conceptual model that concern the second research gap are presented in Table 16.

Table 16. The research propositions concerning the second research gap

GAP II
P4: The control systems that are characterized by capability support and information provision (i.e. entail training, support, and competence development) are predict more integrated types of extrinsic motivation.
P5: The control systems that are more focused on controlling specific activities and/or outputs predict less integrated types of felt extrinsic motivation.
P6: The control systems that consist of several different types of control predict less integrated forms of extrinsic motivation.
P7: Extensiveness of control (of any type) is negatively related to salespersons' felt role conflict and role ambiguity.
P8: Locus internals will experience higher levels of integrated motivation and lower levels of role conflict and ambiguity than locus externals.

The propositions concerning the second research gap deal with the effect of the management control system on the salespersons' psychological outcomes (*P4-7*), and therefore focus on the relationship between manager-level and salesperson variables, controlling for individual differences (*P8*). The procedure follows the logic of the guidelines presented by Hox (1995), in that the modeling proceeds from the simple to the more complex, and the improvement in model fit is tested by means of likelihood ratio. The procedure followed for testing the research propositions was as follows:

- 1) First, an empty model using psychological outcomes separately as a Y variable was run, and intra-class correlation was calculated from the estimated variance components in order to check whether the variance in these outcome variables should be attributed to between-group differences.
- 2) The individual-level predictors (namely the locus of control variables) were then entered into the model and improvement of fit was tested.
- 3) Thirdly, the first set of level-2 predictors, namely the control-system-type dummies, was entered into the model and the improvement of fit examined.
- 4) Finally, the more detailed control-system dimensions were entered, and the improvement of fit assessed as compared to the model in step 2.

5.3.7 GAP III: The behavioral consequences of the field sales management control systems

The research propositions of the conceptual model concerning the third research gap are presented in Table 17.

Table 17. The research propositions concerning the third research gap

GAP III
P9: Salespeople working under a control system based on capability support and feedback are likely to adopt a more customer-oriented approach to their jobs than those under outcome-based control.
P10: Compared to salespeople working under a control system based on capability support and feedback, those under outcome-based control are more likely to either a) adopt less ethical selling tactics or b) use dysfunctional reporting to the employer.

Propositions 9 and 10 suggest the presence of direct effects of the management control system on the salespersons' behavioral responses, and they were tested by means of Means-as-Outcomes models, and by calculating conditional intra-class correlations. The procedure for testing these propositions was as follows:

- 1) First, an empty model using psychological outcomes separately as a Y variable was run, and intra-class correlation was calculated from the estimated variance components, in order to check whether the variance in these outcome variables should be attributed to between-group differences.
- 2) The individual-level predictors (namely motivational state, role stress) were then entered into the model and the improvement of fit was tested.
- 3) Thirdly, the first set of level-2 predictors (namely the control-system-type dummies) were entered into the model and the improvement of fit was examined.
- 4) Finally, the more detailed control-system dimensions were entered, and the improvement of fit assessed as compared to the model in step 2.

5.4 SUMMARY

This chapter has presented the research strategy used in empirical assessment of the research propositions developed in the previous chapter. The first section discussed the general

characteristics of the phenomenon of interest, and methodological issues that arise from these characteristics. The second section presented the research design, including issues on sampling and measurement. The third section provided a detailed description of how each research proposition was assessed in the empirical study. The results of empirical assessment are presented in the next chapter.

6 THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

6.1 SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVES

6.1.1 Sales organizations

The firms in the sample were from various fields of industry (Table 18), although chemical products and metal products in the form of both machines and electronic devices were strongly represented. Some service companies were also included.

Table 18. The industries represented in the sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Food, beverages, cigarettes	7	3,7	4,6
Textiles and clothes	6	3,1	8,5
Wood or wood products	3	1,6	10,5
Pulp, paper, paper products	9	4,7	16,3
Chemicals or chemical products	16	8,4	26,8
Rubber and plastic products	14	7,3	35,9
Metals or metal products	17	8,9	47,1
Machines and devices	20	10,5	60,1
Electronic and optical equipment	19	9,9	72,5
Other industrial goods	13	6,8	81,0
Agricultural or forestal products	1	,5	81,7
Electricity, gas, water	2	1,0	83,0
Buildings, land, construction	1	,5	83,7
Trade, hotell or restaurant services	3	1,6	85,6
Communications	3	1,6	87,6
Business services	4	2,1	90,2
Other services	15	7,9	100,0
Total	153	80,1	
Missing System	38	19,9	
Total	191	100,0	

The mean number of salespeople in the sales team was 10.7, with a standard deviation of about 18.7 while the mean number of salespeople employed in field sales was 7.5 with a standard deviation of 13.8. Thus it seems that the choice of collecting data from between one and five salespersons per firm was appropriate in terms of providing a sample that represented the population.

The compensation schemes used in the sales organizations also varied significantly, as shown in Figure 18. A large proportion of these organizations relied on a straight salary. The mean proportion of variable income to total pay was 23%, with a standard deviation of 20.7.




Figure 18. Estimated average proportion of variable income among salespeople under supervision

6.1.2 Sales managers

The mean age of the field sales managers was 46.1 with a standard deviation of 8.3. The vast majority (about 90.1%) of the respondents were male. On average they had about 20 years of experience in sales positions (standard deviation of about nine years), and they had worked for

their current organization for 12 years on average (standard deviation of 8.6 years). About a half of them had an institute level of education, and almost a quarter had a higher-level university degree (Table 19). Unfortunately the sample descriptions for sales managers could not be compared to known population values, in order to evaluate sample's representativeness. However, in order to assess the magnitude and direction of potential non-response bias, a test for non-response error was conducted. Following the logic presented by Armstrong and Overton (1977), it was assumed that the late respondents were similar to non-respondents. Thus, the respondents were categorized into early and late respondents by using a median-split of the response length¹⁸. The comparison of these respondent groups revealed no serious differences (see Appendix 4), which would indicate that the non-response bias is not severe.

Table 19. The educational levels of the sales managers

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Comprehensive school	4	2,1	2,7	2,7
High-school diploma	5	2,6	3,3	6,0
Trade school or secondary education	11	5,8	7,3	13,3
Institute/training center	77	40,3	51,3	64,7
Lower university degree	15	7,9	10,0	74,7
Higher university degree	36	18,8	24,0	98,7
other	2	1,0	1,3	100,0
Total	150	78,5	100,0	
Missing System	41	21,5		
Total	191	100,0		

6.1.3 Field salespeople

The salesperson respondents were also mainly men (84%), with a mean age of about 42 years (standard deviation of about ten years). On average they had 15 years of experience in sales positions (standard deviation ten years), and had been working for their current organization for about nine years (standard deviation of nine years). Almost half had an institute level of education (Table 20). The characteristics of the sample are very similar to the description of an

¹⁸ This was measured as days from initial submission of questionnaire to receiving the filled questionnaire.

average Finnish salesperson provided by a study conducted by Taloustutkimus for SMKJ¹⁹ (Haapakoski, 2006a), which indicates that despite the relatively low response rate, the sample seems to be relatively free from non-response bias. This was also confirmed with the results of the estimation of non-response error (Appendix 4.).

Table 20. Level of education of the salesperson respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Comprehensive school	30	11,7	11,9	11,9
High-school diploma	10	3,9	4,0	15,8
Trade school or secondary education	45	17,5	17,8	33,6
Institute/training centre	123	47,9	48,6	82,2
Lower university degree	23	8,9	9,1	91,3
Higher university degree	20	7,8	7,9	99,2
other	2	,8	,8	100,0
Total	253	98,4	100,0	
Missing System	4	1,6		
Total	257	100,0		

6.2 GAP I – CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM

The dimensions with which the field sales managers conceptualize exercised control

P1: Tactical/operational-level sales managers conceptualize control systems with dimensions related to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions). Rather than broad formal/informal dimensions.

The items with extremely low communalities (i.e. below 0.200) were excluded from the EFA of the sales-manager data. Items that cross-loaded above 0.4 or did not load over 0.4 on any factor were also excluded. In the final factor solution, six factors were extracted (the decision on the number of factors was based on a scree test), and these factors accounted for 55.4% of the variance in the items. The factor loadings are presented in Table 21. The benefit of using Maximum likelihood as an extraction method is that it allows examination of the goodness of fit

¹⁹ SMKJ is a Finnish association for marketing and sales professionals.

of the solution (Fabrigar et al., 1999). The Chi-square statistic was 48.020 (df = 60, Sig. 0.867), indicating that the extracted solution fitted the data well.

Table 21. Factor loadings for the control-system dimensions: sales manager responses

	Factor						Communality
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Observe the performance of salespeople in the field	,740						0,501
Evaluate the number of sales calls made by salespeople	,673						0,440
Regularly review call reports form salespeople	,622						0,421
Monitor the day-to-day activities of salespeople	,546						0,470
Use incentive compensation as the main means for motivating salespeople		,778					0,593
Reward salespeople based on their sales results		,776					0,733
Compensate salespeople based on the quantity of their sales activities		,574					0,375
Make incentive compensation judgments based on the sales achieved by salespeople		,503					0,295
Make joint calls with salespeople			,995				0,999
Spend time with salespeople in the field			,735				0,586
Use non-financial incentives to reward salespeople for their achievements				,695			0,417
Regularly spend time coaching salespeople				,495			0,531
Evaluate the professional development of salespeople				,487			0,509
Provide performance feedback to salespeople on a regular basis				,465			0,546
Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts					1,012		0,999
Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel					,496		0,410
Evaluate the profit contribution achieved by each salesperson						,678	0,545
Evaluate the sales results of each salesperson						,453	0,602

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.

This factor solution was then subjected to CFA in order to examine the fit of the measurement models more rigorously. The results confirmed an excellent fit on several different indices (Chi-Square =148.249; df=120; p=0.041; RMSEA = .035²⁰; CFI=.964; TLI=.949²¹; IFI=.966; NFI=.846). All of the factor loadings (Table 22) were significant at a risk level of 0.01.

²⁰ The upper boundary of a two-sided 90% confidence interval for the population RMSEA was .053.

²¹ Also known as the Non-normed fit index (NNFI).

Table 22. CFA factor loadings for the sales managers' control dimensions

Control dimension	Variable	Standardized loading	Scale quality
Activity monitoring	Observe the performance of salespeople in the field	.644	CR = 0.74 AVE = 0.42
	Evaluate the number of sales calls made by salespeople	.614	
	Regularly review call reports from salespeople	.608	
	Monitor the day-to-day activities of salespeople	.714	
Performance-contingent rewarding	Use incentive compensation as the main means for motivating salespeople	.714	CR = 0.74 AVE = 0.42
	Reward salespeople based on their sales results	.786	
	Compensate salespeople based on the quantity of their sales activities	.572	
	Make incentive compensation judgments based on the sales achieved by salespeople	.486	
Capability control / Support	Use non-financial incentives to reward salespeople for their achievements	.440	CR = 0.73 AVE = 0.42
	Regularly spend time coaching salespeople	.649	
	Evaluate the professional development of salespeople	.697	
	Provide performance feedback to salespeople on a regular basis	.752	
Closeness of supervision	Spend time with salespeople in the field	.772	CR = 0.87 AVE = 0.78
	Make joint calls with salespeople	.979	
Cost control	Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts	.826	CR = 0.76 AVE = 0.61
	Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel	.732	
Outcome evaluation	Evaluate the profit contribution achieved by each salesperson	.590	CR = 0.71 AVE = 0.56
	Evaluate the sales results of each salesperson	.877	

Salespersons' perceptions of control-system dimensions

P2: Field salespersons conceptualize control systems with dimensions related to motivation and role-theoretic constructs (i.e. detailed control dimensions). Rather than broad formal/informal dimensions.

In this analysis a single salesperson informant was selected for each company in order to ensure that the observations used were independent. As in the case of sales managers, exploratory factor analysis (maximum likelihood extraction, and promax oblique rotation) was used to identify the perceptual dimensions. The initial EFA produced a factor solution that performed poorly on the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test. In order to refine the solution, items that cross-loaded above 0.3 or did not load over 0.4 on any factor were excluded from the analyses. In the final solution five factors were extracted (with Eigenvalues above 1 as a cut-off value), and these accounted for

64.1% of the total variance in the items. The factor loadings are presented in Table 23. The Chi-square statistic for the solution was 104.69 (df = 86; Sig. 0.083), which suggests a good fit with the data.

Table 23. Factor loadings for the control-system dimensions. Salesperson responses

	Factor					Communality
	1	2	3	4	5	
Actively participate in training salespeople on the job	,944					0,774
Regularly spend time coaching salespeople	,927					0,753
Help salespeople develop their potential	,784					0,625
Discuss performance evaluations with salespeople	,704					0,584
Evaluate the professional development of salespeople	,595					0,551
Provide performance feedback to salespeople on a regular basis	,571					0,516
Encourage salespeople to increase their sales by rewarding them for achievement	,497					0,452
Use non-financial incentives to reward salespeople for their achievements	,419					0,243
Reward salespeople based on their sales results		,981				0,982
Use incentive compensation as the main means for motivating salespeople		,781				0,606
Make incentive compensation judgments based on the sales achieved by salespeople		,776				0,818
Compensate salespeople based on the quantity of their sales activities		,767				0,533
Evaluate the sales results of each salesperson			,895			0,844
Evaluate the profit contribution achieved by each salesperson			,814			0,743
Make joint calls with salespeople				,908		0,815
Spend time with salespeople in the field				,846		0,812
Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts					,771	0,585
Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel					,687	0,602
Pay attention to the credit terms that salespeople quote customers					,526	0,334

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
 a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

This factor solution was then subjected to CFA. The results confirmed the excellent fit of the model on several different fit indices (RMSEA = .073²²; CFI=.929; TLI=.905²³; IFI=.931). All of the factor loadings (Table 24) were significant at a risk level of 0.01.

Table 24. Standardized factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis

Control dimension	Variable	Standardized loading	Scale quality
Closeness of supervision	Spend time with salespeople in the field	.894	CR = 0.88 AVE = 0.79
	Make joint calls with salespeople	.883	
Capability control/Support	Actively participate in training salespeople on the job	.841	CR = 0.90 AVE = 0.53
	Regularly spend time coaching salespeople	.871	
	Discuss performance evaluations with salespeople	.762	
	Help salespeople develop their potential	.783	
	Evaluate the professional development of salespeople	.742	
	Provide performance feedback to salespeople on a regular basis	.705	
	Encourage salespeople to increase their sales by rewarding them for achievement	.662	
Performance contingent Rewarding	Use non-financial incentives to reward salespeople for their achievements	.488	CR = 0.91 AVE = 0.71
	Compensate salespeople based on the quantity of their sales activities	.897	
	Make incentive compensation judgments based on the sales achieved by salespeople	.737	
	Reward salespeople based on their sales results	.975	
Cost control	Use incentive compensation as the main means for motivating salespeople	.749	CR = 0.71 AVE = 0.46
	Pay attention to the credit terms that salespeople quote customers	.472	
	Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel	.701	
Output evaluation	Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts	.815	CR = 0.87 AVE = 0.77
	Evaluate the profit contribution achieved by each salesperson	.898	
	Evaluate the sales results of each salesperson	.862	

In order to further validate the measurement model the same CFA was performed for the different salespersons in the data (N=76). During the analysis an offending estimate (i.e. the Heywood case, variable "Spend time with salespeople in the field") was encountered, probably because the sample size fell under the recommended number of about 100-200. This problem was resolved by

²² The upper boundary of a two-sided 90% confidence interval for the population RMSEA was .089.

²³ Also known as the Non-normed fit index (NNFI).

fixing the offending error variance at 0.005, as suggested in Hair et al. (1998, p. 610). The obtained indices indicated a very good fit (RMSEA = .075²⁴; CFI=.941; TLI=.922²⁵; IFI=.944). All of the factor loadings (Table 25) were significant at a risk level of 0.01.

Table 25. Standardized factor loadings

Control dimension	Variable	Standardized loading	Scale quality
Closeness of supervision	Spend time with salespeople in the field	.998	CR = 0.95 AVE = 0.90
	Make joint calls with salespeople	.898	
Capability control	Actively participate in training salespeople on the job	.867	CR = 0.94 AVE = 0.66
	Discuss performance evaluations with salespeople	.880	
	Discuss performance evaluations with salespeople	.837	
	Help salespeople develop their potential	.884	
	Evaluate the professional development of salespeople	.791	
	Provide performance feedback to salespeople on a regular basis	.790	
	Encourage salespeople to increase their sales by rewarding them for achievement	.745	
Rewarding	Use non-financial incentives to reward salespeople for their achievements	.673	CR = 0.92 AVE = 0.75
	Compensate salespeople based on the quantity of their sales activities	.924	
	Make incentive compensation judgments based on the sales achieved by salespeople	.763	
	Reward salespeople based on their sales results	.962	
Cost control	Use incentive compensation as the main means for motivating salespeople	.793	CR = 0.75 AVE = 0.51
	Pay attention to the credit terms that salespeople quote customers	.552	
	Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel	.791	
Output evaluation	Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts	.779	CR = 0.82 AVE = 0.70
	Evaluate the profit contribution achieved by each salesperson	.807	
	Evaluate the sales results of each salesperson	.864	

²⁴ The upper boundary of a two-sided 90% confidence interval for the population RMSEA was .098.

²⁵ Also known as Non-normed fit index (NNFI).

Stability of perceived control across individuals under the same manager's influence

P3:

- c) *Formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are homogeneously perceived by subordinates (i.e. defined by the control system), whereas informal and qualitative-based dimensions are perceived heterogeneously (i.e. defined by the leadership style)*
- d) *Salespersons' perceptions of the formal and quantitative-based dimensions of manager activities are clearly determined by managers' reported behaviors, whereas this link is weaker on the informal and qualitative-based dimensions.*

The third research proposition was studied by forming two sequential models for each of the salespersons' perceptual dimensions of control. The first one was a null model with no predictor variables, and this was used to obtain the variance components for the calculation of intra-class correlations. The intra-class correlation was used as a measure of homogeneity of control perceptions within sales units. The second model included the sales manager's control behaviors as level-2 predictors. Comparison between the models allows the researcher to obtain the index of the proportion of the reduction in variance explained by the level-2 predictors. The results of these models are presented in Tables 26-30.

Table 26. Stability of capability control perceptions within a sales unit

Model 1: Capability control – null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	T	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.637944	0.0815 (0.0815)	32.355***	86
Random effect	Variance component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.27382	86	175.390***	0,000
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.56547			
Deviance = 481.043 (Number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Intra-class correlation = 0.326				
Model 2: Capability control – sales manager control behavior as level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average mean, γ_{00}	2.638711	0.0703 (0.0714)	37.556***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.052627	0.1020 (0.1083)	0.516	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.191344	0.0796 (0.0823)	2.403**	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.170480	0.1285 (0.1460)	1.327	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	0.142657	0.0712 (0.0734)	2.004**	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	-0.080476	0.0770 (0.0776)	-1.045	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	-0.059367	0.1013 (0.0963)	-0.586	80
Random effect	Variance comp.	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.12107	80	128.233	0.001***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.59408			
Deviance = 461.887 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 19.113$ (df = 6) p = 0.004***				

Model 1 in Table 26 is the null model for capability control. The intra-class correlation calculated from this null model was 0.326, suggesting that about 32.6% of the variance in the salespersons' perceptions of capability control was between sales units, and consequently determined by differences between organizations. Model 2 included the level-2 predictors of the salespersons' capability-control perceptions. The Chi-square test for model comparison based on deviance statistics showed significant improvement in the fit of the model when the level-2 predictors were entered. This suggests that there indeed is a relationship between salespersons' perceptions of capability control and the sales manager's control behaviors. The significant level-2 coefficients were the intercept γ_{00} (2.639), the coefficient for performance-contingent rewarding γ_{02} (0.191), and the coefficient for closeness of supervision γ_{04} (0.143). Thus, it seems that higher levels of both performance-contingent rewarding and closeness of supervision are related to higher levels of perceived capability control. The index of the proportion of the reduction in variance explained by the level-2 predictors of capability control was 0.558, indicating that about 55.8% of the between-organization variance was accounted by the sales manager's control behaviors.

Table 27. Stability in perceptions of closeness of supervision within a sales unit

Model 1: Closeness of supervision – null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.317227	0.0946 (0.0946)	24.487***	86
Random effect	Variance component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.32540	86	161.844	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.85678			
Deviance = 549.324 (Number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Intra-class correlation = 0.275				
Model 2: Closeness of supervision – sales manager control behavior as level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.311343	0.0850 (0.0861)	27.184***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.040321	0.1235 (0.1023)	0.326	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.068183	0.0965 (0.0926)	0.707	80
Support, γ_{03}	-0.003044	0.1554 (0.1463)	-0.020	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	0.332593	0.0861 (0.0792)	3.864***	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	-0.094003	0.0932 (0.0830)	-1.008	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	0.023898	0.1227 (0.1000)	0.195	80
Random effect	Variance comp.	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.18881	80	132.742	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.84352			
Deviance = 529.851 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 19.149$ (df = 6) p = 0,004***				

Table 27 presents the null model (Model 1) for closeness of supervision. The intra-class correlation for the perceptions calculated from this null model was 0.275, indicating that about 27.5% of the variance in the salespersons' perceptions of closeness of supervision was between sales organizations. Model 2 again added the level-2 predictors, and the Chi-square test for model comparison based on deviance statistics showed a significant improvement in fit. This confirms the relationship between salespersons' perceptions of close supervision and the sales manager's control behaviors. The significant level-2 coefficients were the intercept γ_{00} (2.311), and the coefficient for closeness of supervision γ_{04} (0.333). The index of the proportion of the reduction in variance explained by the level-2 predictors for closeness of supervision perceptions was 0.420, indicating that about 42% of the between-organization variance was accounted for by the sales manager's control behaviors.

Table 28. Stability in perceptions of performance-contingent rewarding within a sales unit

Model 1: Performance-contingent rewarding – null model				
<i>Fixed effect</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. e. (robust)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Approx. d.f.</i>
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.168942	0.0979 (0.0979)	22.156***	86
<i>Random effect</i>	<i>Variance component</i>	<i>d.f.</i>	<i>χ^2</i>	<i>p-value</i>
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.52500	86	262,335	0,000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.54715			
Deviance = 507,747 (Number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Intra-class correlation = 0,513				
Model 2: Performance-contingent rewarding – sales manager control behavior as level-2 predictors				
<i>Fixed effects</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. e. (robust)</i>	<i>t-ratio</i>	<i>Approx. d.f.</i>
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.176576	0.0775 (0.0786)	28.101***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	-0.156292	0.1130 (0.1237)	-1.383	80
Performance-contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.516368	0.0884 (0.0909)	5.838***	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.284203	0.1410 (0.1808)	2.016**	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	0.031266	0.0780 (0.0887)	0.401	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	-0.005330	0.0851 (0.0850)	-0.063	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	-0.252473	0.1121 (0.0992)	-2.252**	80
<i>Random effect</i>	<i>Variance comp.</i>	<i>d.f.</i>	<i>χ^2</i>	<i>p-value</i>
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.21826	80	157.663	0,000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.56338			
Deviance = 471.656 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 36.344$ (df = 6) p = 0,000***				

Model 1 in Table 28 is the null model for performance-contingent rewarding. The intraclass correlation for perceived use of performance-contingent rewards calculated from this null model was 0.513; suggesting that about 51.3% of the variance in the salespersons' perceptions of

performance-contingent-rewarding behaviors of sales managers occurred between sales organizations. Model 2 added the level-2 predictors, and according to the Chi-square test for model comparison a significant improvement in fit was detected. The significant level-2 coefficients were the intercept γ_{00} (2.177), and the coefficients for performance-contingent rewarding γ_{02} (0.516), support γ_{03} (0.284), and output evaluation γ_{06} (-0.252). Thus, it seems that higher levels of both performance-contingent rewarding and support are related to higher levels of perceived performance-contingent rewarding. Interestingly, the coefficient of output evaluation was negative, which suggests that the more the field sales managers evaluate the outputs of their employees, the less the employees feel that they are rewarded for their performance. The index of the proportionate reduction in variance explained by the level-2 predictors for capability control was 0.584, which means that about 58.4% of the between-organization variance in perceptions of the use of performance-contingent rewarding was accounted for by the sales manager's control behaviors.

Table 29. Stability of cost-control perceptions within a sales unit

Model 1: Cost control – null model				
<i>Fixed effect</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. e. (robust)</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Approx. d.f.</i>
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.301765	0.0816 (0.0816)	40.440***	86
<i>Random effect</i>	<i>Variance component</i>	<i>d.f.</i>	X^2	<i>p-value</i>
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.19941	86	137.721	0,001***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.73518			
Deviance = 509.566 (Number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Intra-class correlation = 0,213				
Model 2: Cost control – sales manager control behavior as level-2 predictors				
<i>Fixed effects</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. e. (robust)</i>	<i>t-ratio</i>	<i>Approx. d.f.</i>
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.326965	0.0773 (0.0754)	43.019***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.016247	0.1123 (0.1244)	0.145	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	-0.041750	0.0876 (0.0830)	-0.476	80
Support, γ_{03}	-0.097020	0.1415 (0.1361)	-0.686	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	-0.058435	0.0784 (0.0924)	-0.746	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	0.170226	0.0848 (0.0851)	2.007**	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	0.128454	0.1115 (0.0956)	1.152	80
<i>Random effect</i>	<i>Variance comp.</i>	<i>d.f.</i>	X^2	<i>p-value</i>
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.14340	80	123.562	0.002***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.72755			
Deviance = 498.980 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $X^2 = 11.020$ (df = 6) $p = 0,087^*$				

Table 29 presents the null model (Model 1) for cost-control perceptions. The intra-class correlation calculated from this null model was 0.213, which means that about 21.3% of the variance in salespersons' perceptions of cost control was between the sales organizations. Model 2 included the level-2 predictors, and the Chi-square test for model comparison showed a significant ($p = 0.10$) improvement in fit over Model 1. This confirms the relationship between salespersons' perceptions of cost control and the sales manager's control behaviors. The significant level-2 coefficients were the intercept γ_{00} (3.327), and the coefficient for cost control γ_{04} (0.170). The index of the proportion of the reduction in the variance explained by the level-2 predictors was 0.281, which means that about 28.1% of the between-organization variance was accounted for by the sales manager's control behaviors.

Table 30. Stability of output-evaluation perceptions within a sales unit

Model 1: Output evaluation – null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	T	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.436295	0.0849 (0.0849)	40.465***	86
Random effect	Variance component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.25657	86	157.017	0,000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.70131			
Deviance = 510.540 (Number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Intra-class correlation = 0,268				
Model 2: Output evaluation – sales manager control behavior as level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.450438	0.0794 (0.0792)	43.444**	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	-0.064887	0.1155 (0.1092)	-0.562	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.159658	0.0902 (0.0862)	1.770*	80
Support, γ_{03}	-0.023139	0.1451 (0.1478)	-0.159	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	0.029132	0.0803 (0.0774)	0.363	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	0.039971	0.0871 (0.0943)	0.459	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	0.179825	0.1146 (0.1080)	1.569	80
Random effect	Variance comp.	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.17340	80	136.545	0,000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.71628			
Deviance = 501.399 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 9.601$ (df = 6) $p = 0,142$				

Table 30 shows the results of the null model (Model 1) for output evaluation. The intra-class correlation for output evaluation perceptions calculated from this null model was 0.268, which means that about 26.8% of the variance in the salespersons' perceptions of output evaluation was between sales organizations. The Chi-square test for model comparison showed that the improvement of fit in Model 2 over Model 1 was not significant. The significant level-2

coefficients were the intercept γ_{00} (3.450), and the coefficient for performance-contingent rewarding γ_{02} (0.160). Thus, the only significant predictor for output-evaluation perceptions was the use of performance-contingent rewards. The index of the proportion of the reduction in the variance explained by the level-2 predictors for output-evaluation perceptions was 0.324, which means that about 32.4% of the between-organization variance was accounted for by the sales manager's control behaviors.

Combinations of control, i.e. control system types

Since there is no clear consensus over the issue of whether controls should be studied as single control dimensions or as combinations of control, the both approaches are used in the present study. The field-sales-management-level control system types, i.e. the control combinations, used in the Finnish field sales organizations were explored by means of cluster analysis, following the logic of Oliver and Anderson (1995). Oliver and Anderson were interested in seeing if there were a "hybrid form" of control systems, which is a combination of the two extreme types (i.e. behavior-based control and outcome-based control), and consequently decided to draw three clusters. In the present dissertation the number of different control-system types was left undefined, i.e. the aim was to determine the types in an exploratory way. Therefore hierarchical clustering was the chosen method, in which the appropriate number of clusters is defined by examining the agglomeration schedule (Hair et al., 1998). Since the aim is to recognize different control types, i.e. the relative emphasis of each control dimension in the control system, Pearson correlation was used as a distance measure, which is appropriate when the researcher is interested in the patterns in the data rather than in simple mean differences (Hair et al., 1998). The clustering method used in the analysis was average linkage, which is suitable for correlation measures of similarity between cases. The number of clusters was first determined by looking at changes in the agglomeration schedule. As depicted in Figure 18, the last substantial change in the value of the agglomeration coefficient occurred at the third cluster, and therefore a four-cluster solution was selected.




Figure 19. Agglomeration by the number of clusters: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis with average linkage (within groups) with Pearson Correlations used as a measure of distance (four clusters selected)




Figure 20. Cluster comparisons

The means of the four different control systems on each control dimension are depicted in Figure 19. As the figure shows, the first cluster is characterized by the highest emphasis on cost control. Output and input evaluation are also relatively strong, whereas the mean scores for performance-contingent rewarding and closeness of supervision are very low. The support control mechanism was used to a moderate extent. Given these characteristics, the first cluster is named the *efficiency-control system*.

The second cluster is characterized by the highest emphasis on both output and input evaluation, and the level of support is also highly emphasized. Closeness of supervision falls above the average level, and all the other controls are on the moderate level. Thus, this cluster was named the *capability-control system*.

The third cluster is characterized by a high emphasis on the closeness of supervision. Performance-contingent rewarding is at a very low level and all of the other controls moderate. This cluster was named the *activity-control system*.

The fourth cluster is characterized by a high emphasis on output evaluation and performance-contingent rewarding. Closeness of supervision is at a very low level, and all of the other controls are moderate. Thus, this cluster was named the *output-control system*.

The descriptions of the clusters of capability control and activity control are in line with the two different behavior-based control-system types proposed by Challagalla and Shervani (1996). Both of them concentrate on controlling behaviors, but capability control is characterized by an emphasis on improving the skills and abilities of salespeople and rewarding for improvements, while activity control focuses on their routine, day-to-day activities. The other control-system types identified here were output control and efficiency control. While output (or outcome-based) control is referred to in previous studies (e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Challagalla and Shervani, 1996; Jaworski, 1988), the emergence of the efficiency-control system cluster is a new finding. This system focuses on outcomes, but is clearly different from output control, which focuses on the relationship between inputs and outputs. The main difference between these

systems seems to be that output control is characterized by the highest score on performance-contingent rewarding, whereas this features less in efficiency-control systems.

It is suggested here that if these identified control-system types are examined closely, they fall along two dimensions, the traditional behavior-outcome-based dimension and the dimension related to the philosophical nature of exercised control. Is the relative emphasis on controlling or motivating for performance? At first sight this dimension may seem new in the literature, but at least implicitly it has been present in the work of Darmon (1998). He discussed the structure of sales-force governance systems, and separated dashboard use of control (i.e. assessing whether the objectives are met) and control-lever use of control (i.e. using controls that can be manipulated in order to influence salespersons' activities and behaviors). The dimension proposed here is based on this distinction. The proposed typology is presented in Figure 20.




Figure 21. A typology of field sales management control systems

6.3 GAP II: SALESPERSONS' PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO CONTROL

Following the procedure described in Chapter 5, a series of subsequent models was estimated and compared in order to examine the propositions (*P4-8*) concerning the relationship between the system of field sales management control and salespersons' psychological outcomes. The estimated models were:

- Model 1: a null model
- Model 2: a model with only level-1 predictors
- Model 3: a model with broad level-2 predictors added (the control-system types identified in GAP I).
- Model 4: a model with detailed level-2 predictors added (the control-system dimensions identified in GAP I).

The results of the models explaining the forms of extrinsic motivation are presented in Table 31.

Table 31. Salespersons' forms of extrinsic motivation (***) $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$)

Model 1: The null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	5.782	0.0546 (0.0509)	105.9***	86
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.00043	86	84.374	>.500
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.55663			
Intra-class correlation = 0.000 (n.s.)				
Deviance = 419.416 (number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Model 2: Level-1 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	5.782	0.0505 (0.0505)	114.5***	86
Intercept2 for loc_self slope, γ_{10}	0.279	0.0496 (0.0584)	5.623***	183
Intercept2 for loc_cha slope, γ_{20}	-0.103	0.0502 (0.0533)	-2.047**	183
Intercept2 for loc_other slope, γ_{30}	0.045	0.0480 (0.0487)	0.929	183
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.00574	86	92.173	0.305
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.46096			
Deviance = 386.314 (Number of estimated parameters = 6)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 32.686$ (df = 3), $p = 0.000$				
Model 3: Level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	5.738	0.1187 (0.1327)	48.327***	83
Efficiency CS dummy, γ_{01}	0.112	0.1446 (0.1487)	0.772	83
Capability CS dummy, γ_{02}	0.116	0.1555 (0.1712)	0.748	83
Activity CS dummy, γ_{03}	-0.120	0.1611 (0.1664)	-0.745	83
<i>For intercept β_1 for loc_self slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	0.270	0.0494 (0.0552)	5.468***	180
<i>For intercept β_2 for loc_cha slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	-0.099	0.0500 (0.0526)	-1.977**	180
<i>For intercept β_3 for loc_other slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.032	0.0481 (0.0480)	0.664	180
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.00151	83	89.339	0.297
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.45643			
Deviance = 382.774 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 3.226$ (df = 3), $p = 0.358$				
Model 4: Level-2 predictors (detailed)				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	5.786	0.0504 (0.0499)	114.8***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.039	0.0740 (0.0755)	0.523	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.025	0.0567 (0.0544)	0.442	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.106	0.0941 (0.0827)	1.125	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	-0.047	0.0520 (0.0480)	-0.905	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	0.046	0.0555 (0.0485)	0.826	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	-0.044	0.0728 (0.0752)	-0.604	80
<i>For intercept β_1 for loc_self slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	0.263	0.0501 (0.0569)	5.246***	177
<i>For intercept β_2 for loc_cha slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	-0.108	0.0506 (0.0568)	-2.140**	177
<i>For intercept β_3 for loc_other slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.047	0.0482 (0.0485)	0.967	177
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.00172	80	89.074	0.228
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.45632			
Deviance = 382.829 (Number of parameters estimated = 12)				
Model comparison $\chi^2 = 3.171$ (df = 6), $p > 0.500$ (Comparison on model 2)				

As Table 31 indicates, the intra-class correlation obtained from the null model was not significantly different from zero. This means that the variance in the salespersons' motivational state was on the individual and not on the organizational level. The results of the subsequent models confirm this since improvement in model fit was statistically significant only when level-1 predictors (Model 2) were introduced, which produced a reduction of 17.2% in the level-1 error variance (the index of proportional reduction in the level-1 variance component equaled 0.172). The significant coefficients in Model 2 are the intercept term γ_{00} (= 2,489), and the coefficients for the self γ_{01} (= 0,279) and chance γ_{02} (= -0,103) locus of control variables. These coefficients show that the more a salesperson is locus-internal (believes that his/her job outcomes are determined by him-/herself) the more integrated forms of motivation this salesperson will have. An external locus of control, i.e. belief that the job outcomes are determined by chance, has the opposite effect - in other words it shifts the motivation towards the more extrinsic end.

Entering level-2 predictors, either broad control system types or detailed dimensions, into the model did not improve the model fit and the level-2 coefficients were not statistically significant.

Table 32. Salespersons' experiences of role conflict (***) $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$)

Model 1: The null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.492	0.0734 (0.0735)	33.923***	86
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.19453	86	159.575	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.51962			
Intra-class correlation = 0.272				
Deviance = 455.300 (number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Model 2: Level-1 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.489	0.0696 (0.0695)	35.784***	86
Intercept2 for loc_self slope, γ_{10}	-0.121	0.0567 (0.0467)	-2.138**	183
Intercept2 for loc_chance slope, γ_{20}	0.046	0.0554 (0.0578)	0.820	183
Intercept2 for loc_other slope, γ_{30}	0.153	0.0531 (0.0736)	2.873***	183
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.16941	86	155.878	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.47664			
Deviance = 437.309 (Number of estimated parameters = 6)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 17.691$ (df = 3) $p = 0.001$				
Model 3: Level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.011	0.1585 (0.2391)	19.000***	83
Efficiency CS dummy, γ_{01}	-0.579	0.1894 (0.2570)	-3.056***	83
Capability CS dummy, γ_{02}	-0.605	0.2045 (0.2700)	-2.958***	83
Activity CS dummy, γ_{03}	-0.7423	0.2102 (0.2584)	-3.531***	83
<i>For intercept β_1 for loc_self slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.147	0.0555 (0.0469)	-2.650***	180
<i>For intercept β_2 for loc_cha slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.061	0.0546 (0.0559)	1.123	180
<i>For intercept β_3 for loc_other slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.146	0.5264 (0.0713)	2.782***	180
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.10389	83	126.258	0.002***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.48375			
Deviance = 424.805 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 12.195$ (df = 3) $p = 0.007$ ***				
Model 4: Level-2 predictors (detailed)				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.479	0.0670 (0.0649)	36.977***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.022	0.0984 (0.0903)	0.223	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.069	0.0766 (0.0853)	0.904	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.067	0.1235 (0.1056)	0.543	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	-0.171	0.0679 (0.0693)	-2.514**	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	-0.066	0.0737 (0.0716)	-0.892	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	0.020	0.0974 (0.1118)	0.204	80
<i>For intercept β_1 for loc_self slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.138	0.0563 (0.0476)	-2.454**	177
<i>For intercept β_2 for loc_cha slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.046	0.0551 (0.0589)	0.832	177
<i>For intercept β_3 for loc_other slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.146	0.0527 (0.0741)	2.774***	177
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.14188	80	143.119	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.46876			
Deviance = 428.800 (Number of parameters estimated = 12)				
Model comparison $\chi^2 = 8.200$ (df = 6) $p = 0.223$ (Comparison to model 2)				

Table 32 shows the results for perceived role conflict among the field salespersons. The intra-class correlation was 0.272, suggesting that about 27.2% of the variance in role-conflict perceptions was between the sales organizations. Adding locus of control variables as individual-level predictors improved the model fit, and the significant coefficients in Model 2 are the intercept term γ_{00} (= 2,489), and the coefficients for the locus-of-control variables self γ_{01} (= -0,121) and others γ_{03} (= 0,153). This means that the more locus-internal (believe that their job outcomes are determined by themselves) salespeople are, the less role conflict they will perceive, and the more locus-external (believing that their job outcomes are dependent on the influence of powerful others) they are, the more they will experience role conflict.

Introducing level-2 predictors, namely control-system types, into the model improved the fit significantly, as the Chi-square likelihood ratio test shows. The output control system was left as a reference type, and dummy-coded variables indicating each of the other system types were entered. The coefficients of all these dummies were statistically significant and negative in sign. This suggests that sales organizations in which sales managers rely on output control are characterized by higher levels of perceived role conflict among the field salespeople than organizations with other types of control system. The index of the proportional reduction in level-2 variance was 0.387, thus the system type explained 38.7% of the between-organization variance in role-conflict perceptions when locus-of-control differences between the field salespeople were controlled for.

Using more detailed control-system dimensions as level-2 predictors did not result in any improvement in model fit over Model 2 with only level-1 predictors. The coefficient for close supervision by the field sales manager was nevertheless significant γ_{04} (= -0,171).

Table 33. Salespersons' experiences of role ambiguity (** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$)

Model 1: The null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	1.570	0.0558 (0.0558)	28.121***	86
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.14142	86	195.690	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.23704			
Intra-class correlation = 0.374				
Deviance = 327.495 (number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Model 2: Level-1 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	1.566	0.0544 (0.0537)	28.803***	86
Intercept2 for loc_self slope, γ_{10}	-0.072	0.0410 (0.0516)	-1.767*	183
Intercept2 for loc_chance slope, γ_{20}	0.063	0.0397 (0.0453)	1.584	183
Intercept2 for loc_other slope, γ_{30}	0.018	0.0380 (0.0330)	0.483	183
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.13140	86	192.266	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.23068			
Deviance = 320.328 (Number of estimated parameters = 6)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 6.672$ (df = 3) $p = 0.082^*$				
Model 3: Level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	1.718	0.1376 (0.1248)	12.485***	83
Efficiency CS dummy, γ_{01}	-0.192	0.1627 (0.1458)	-1.179	83
Capability CS dummy, γ_{02}	-0.196	0.1762 (0.1599)	-1.111	83
Activity CS dummy, γ_{03}	-0.143	0.1802 (0.1821)	-0.793	83
<i>For intercept β_1 for loc_self slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.073	0.0411 (0.0496)	-1.776*	180
<i>For intercept β_2 for loc_cha slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.065	0.0397 (0.0448)	1.648	180
<i>For intercept β_3 for loc_other slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.021	0.0383 (0.0321)	0.547	180
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.12582	83	189.074	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.23122			
Deviance = 318.749 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 1.25$ (df = 3) $p > 0.500$				
Model 4: Level-2 predictors (detailed)				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	1.555	0.0512 (0.0489)	30.349***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	-0.006	0.0753 (0.0517)	-0.084	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.000	0.0588 (0.0762)	0.002	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.051	0.0942 (0.0991)	0.536	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	-0.047	0.0518 (0.0555)	-0.907	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	-0.102	0.0563 (0.0481)	-1.808*	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	0.064	0.0745 (0.0710)	0.865	80
<i>For intercept β_1 for loc_self slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.073	0.0413 (0.0525)	-1.754*	177
<i>For intercept β_2 for loc_cha slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.070	0.0403 (0.0450)	1.736*	177
<i>For intercept β_3 for loc_other slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.018	0.0385 (0.0343)	0.461	177
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.09686	80	170.023	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.24323			
Deviance = 315.691 (Number of parameters estimated = 12)				
Model comparison $\chi^2 = 4.399$ (df = 6) $p > 0.500$ (Comparison to model 2)				

Table 33 presents the results for role-ambiguity perceptions among the field salespeople. The intra-class correlation obtained from the null model was 0.374, indicating that about 37.4% of the variance was determined by belonging to a sales organization. Adding the locus-of-control variables into model (Model 2) improved the fit (at $p = 0.10$). The only significant coefficient at this stage was the self coefficient γ_{01} ($= -0,072$, $p < 0,1$), weakly suggesting that locus internals experience less role ambiguity than others.

Entering the level-2 predictors into model produced no statistically significant improvement in the fit. Cost control had a significant negative coefficient of γ_{05} ($= -0,102$, $p < 0,1$) in Model 4 with detailed control system dimensions as predictors, suggesting that salespersons perceive less role ambiguity in organizations in which the field sales manager controls costs. Even though the improvement in model fit was not statistically significant, an index of level-2 variance explained by the predictor variables was calculated. The value of this index was 0.263, meaning that about 26.3% of the between-organization variance in perceived role ambiguity was explained in terms of control-system dimensions.

6.4 GAP III: SALESPERSONS' BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO CONTROL

Following the procedure described in Chapter 5, a series of subsequent models was estimated and compared in order to examine the propositions concerning the relationship between the field sales management control system and the salespersons' behavioral outcomes. The estimated models were:

- Model 1: a null model
- Model 2: a model with only level-1 predictors
- Model 3: a model with broad level-2 predictors added (control-system types identified in GAP I).
- Model 4: a model with detailed level-2 predictors added (control-system dimensions identified in GAP I).

Table 34. Salespersons' use of less ethical selling behaviors (***) $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,05$; * $p < 0,10$

Model 1: The null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.308	0.1377 (0.1377)	24.017***	86
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.39164	86	111.662	0.033**
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	2.51379			
Intra-class correlation = 0.135				
Deviance = 725.536 (number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Model 2: Level-1 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.301	0.1301 (0.1301)	25.375***	86
Intercept2 for IM slope, γ_{10}	-0.137	0.1610 (0.1784)	-0.849	183
Intercept2 for RAMB slope, γ_{20}	0.632	0.2122 (0.2047)	2.978***	183
Intercept2 for RCONF slope, γ_{30}	0.425	0.1463 (0.1720)	2.902***	183
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.39199	86	116.694	0.015**
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	2.13646			
Deviance = 698.699 (Number of estimated parameters = 6)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 26.301$ (df = 3) $p = 0.000$ ***				
Model 3: Level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.074	0.3235 (0.4757)	9.503***	83
Efficiency CS dummy, γ_{01}	0.423	0.3856 (0.5040)	1.096	83
Capability CS dummy, γ_{02}	0.041	0.4162 (0.5305)	0.099	83
Activity CS dummy, γ_{03}	0.254	0.4332 (0.5335)	0.587	83
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.126	0.1623 (0.1821)	-0.840	180
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.642	0.2111 (0.2081)	3.042***	180
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.437	0.1499 (0.1568)	2.918***	180
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.34292	83	112.514	0.017**
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	2.15080			
Deviance = 696.859 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 1.141$ (df = 3) $p > 0.500$				
Model 4: Level-2 predictors (detailed)				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	3.314	0.1276 (0.1251)	25.976***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.035	0.1855 (0.1711)	0.188	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	-0.089	0.1449 (0.1471)	-0.612	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.155	0.2350 (0.2150)	0.659	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	-0.203	0.1322 (0.1321)	-1.538	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	-0.010	0.1416 (0.1100)	-0.074	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	0.233	0.1850 (0.1671)	1.258	80
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.178	0.1614 (0.1774)	-1.100	177
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.597	0.2115 (0.2044)	2.823***	177
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.378	0.1467 (0.1758)	2.577**	177
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.33627	80	110.139	0.014**
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	2.10670			
Deviance = 693.007 (Number of parameters estimated = 12)				
Model comparison $\chi^2 = 4.993$ (df = 6) $p > 0.500$ (Comparison to model 2)				

The results of the sequential model of less ethical selling behaviors are reported in Table 34 above. The intra-class correlation calculated from the null-model variance components was 0.135, meaning that about 13.5% of the total variance in perceived use of less ethical selling behaviors was due to organizational factors. When the level-1 predictors, i.e. forms of extrinsic motivation, perceived role conflict, and perceived role ambiguity, were entered into the model the fit improved significantly. The motivation coefficient was not significant, but those of role ambiguity γ_{02} (= 0,632) and role conflict γ_{03} (= 0,425) were. These results suggest that perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity increase the probability of adopting less ethical selling behaviors.

The model fit could not be improved by entering level-2 predictors into model, which means that no direct relationship between field sales management control systems and the potential use of less ethical selling behaviors could be detected. None of the level-2 coefficients was statistically significant either.

Table 35. Salespersons' use of dysfunctional behaviors (***) $p < 0.01$; **) $p < 0.05$; *) $p < 0.10$

Model 1: The null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.538	0.0749 (0.0750)	33.900***	86
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.04904	86	96.551	0.205
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.91407			
Intra-class correlation = 0.051				
Deviance = 521.414 (number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Model 2: Level-1 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.537	0.0659 (0.0660)	38.502***	86
Intercept2 for IM slope, γ_{10}	-0.086	0.0927 (0.1045)	-0.930	183
Intercept2 for RAMB slope, γ_{20}	0.226	0.1196 (0.1123)	1.893*	183
Intercept2 for RCONF slope, γ_{30}	0.364	0.0813 (0.0800)	4.477***	183
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.00334	86	86.540	0.464
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.80280			
Deviance = 488.546 (Number of estimated parameters = 6)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 32.454$ (df = 3) $p = 0.000$ ***				
Model 3: Level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.335	0.1614 (0.1489)	14.471***	83
Efficiency CS dummy, γ_{01}	0.325	0.1956 (0.1799)	1.663*	83
Capability CS dummy, γ_{02}	0.198	0.2097 (0.2037)	0.943	83
Activity CS dummy, γ_{03}	0.164	0.2202 (0.2022)	0.745	83
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.090	0.0934 (0.1025)	-0.963	180
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.229	0.1187 (0.1145)	1.930*	180
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.390	0.0841 (0.0782)	4.635***	180
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.00340	83	84.890	0.422
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.79046			
Deviance = 485.653 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 3.347$ (df = 3) $p = 0.341$				
Model 4: Level-2 predictors (detailed)				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.548	0.0655 (0.0621)	38.873***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.152	0.0952 (0.0755)	1.593	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	-0.084	0.0739 (0.0581)	-1.139	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.063	0.1220 (0.1158)	0.515	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	-0.032	0.0688 (0.0599)	-0.461	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	0.056	0.0732 (0.0759)	0.769	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	-0.060	0.0949 (0.0973)	-0.633	80
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	-0.104	0.0929 (0.1015)	-1.118	177
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.238	0.1196 (0.1098)	1.990**	177
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.379	0.0816 (0.0772)	4.638***	177
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.00139	80	82.743	0.395
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.77616			
Deviance = 481.775 (Number of parameters estimated = 12)				
Model comparison $\chi^2 = 7.2254$ (df = 6) $p = 0.300$ (Comparison to model 2)				

The results of the sequential model for dysfunctional behaviors are shown in Table 35 above. The intra-class correlation calculated from the null-model variance components was not statistically significant, meaning that the variance in the self-reported use of dysfunctional behaviors was due to individual-specific factors. When the level-1 predictors, i.e. form of extrinsic motivation, perceived role conflict, and perceived role ambiguity, were entered into the model, the fit improved significantly. The coefficient of motivation was not significant, but those of role ambiguity γ_{02} (= 0.226) and role conflict γ_{03} (= 0.364) were. These results suggest that perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity increase the probability of adopting dysfunctional behaviors.

Entering the level-2 predictors did not improve the model fit, which means that no direct relationship between the field sales management control systems and the potential use of dysfunctional behaviors could be detected. Moreover, none of the level-2 coefficients was statistically significant.

Table 36. Salespersons' use of customer-oriented behaviors (** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$)

Model 1: The null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	6.206	0.0552 (0.0552)	112.436***	86
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	X^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.10838	86	159.796	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.29663			
Intra-class correlation = 0.268				
Deviance = 394.582 (number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Model 2: Level-1 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	6.209	0.0521 (0.0518)	119.259***	86
Intercept2 for IM slope, γ_{10}	0.241	0.0553 (0.0460)	4.361***	183
Intercept2 for RAMB slope, γ_{20}	-0.161	0.0751 (0.0749)	-2.150**	183
Intercept2 for RCONF slope, γ_{30}	-0.110	0.0515 (0.0541)	-2.135**	183
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	X^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.11511	86	185.369	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.22264			
Deviance = 309.473 (Number of estimated parameters = 6)				
Model comparison: $X^2 = 40.52650$ (df = 3) $p = 0.000$ ***				
Model 3: Level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	6.268	0.1327 (0.1192)	47.245***	83
Efficiency CS dummy, γ_{01}	-0.183	0.1559 (0.1536)	-1.174	83
Capability CS dummy, γ_{02}	0.023	0.1694 (0.1522)	0.138	83
Activity CS dummy, γ_{03}	0.034	0.1748 (0.1605)	0.194	83
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	0.251	0.0554 (0.0460)	4.527***	180
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	-0.163	0.0744 (0.0736)	-2.196**	180
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	-0.106	0.0522 (0.0531)	-2.023**	180
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	X^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.10916	83	181.703	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.22033			
Deviance = 305.729 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $X^2 = 3.271$ (df = 3) $p = 0.352$				
Model 4: Level-2 predictors (detailed)				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	6.200	0.0496 (0.0498)	125.099***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	-0.048	0.0726 (0.0656)	-0.660	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.087	0.0568 (0.0552)	1.530	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.141	0.0905 (0.0692)	1.558	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	0.021	0.0508 (0.0471)	0.406	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	-0.058	0.0549 (0.0452)	0.406	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	-0.117	0.0721 (0.0731)	-1.628*	80
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	0.239	0.0547 (0.0463)	4.373	177
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	-0.174	0.0735 (0.0711)	-2.365	177
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	-0.106	0.0510 (0.0548)	-2.076	177
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	X^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.09577	80	173.256	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.21676			
Deviance = 298.041 (Number of parameters estimated = 12)				
Model comparison $X^2 = 10.959$ (df = 6) $p = 0.089$ * (Comparison to model 2)				

Table 36 presents the results of the sequential model for self-reported customer-oriented selling behaviors. The intra-class correlation calculated from the null-model variance components was 0.268, meaning that about 26.8% of the variance in self-reported use of customer-oriented selling behaviors was due to organization-specific factors.

Entering the level-1 predictors, i.e. the form of extrinsic motivation, perceived role conflict, and perceived role ambiguity into the model significantly improved the fit. The coefficients of motivation γ_{01} (= 0,241) role ambiguity γ_{02} (= -0,161) and role conflict γ_{03} (= -0,110) were significant. These results suggest that integrated forms of extrinsic motivation increase and perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity reduce the probability of using customer-oriented selling behaviors.

Adding broad control-system types as level-2 predictors did not improve the model fit, and none of the coefficients for the control-system-type dummies were significant. Entering more detailed control-system dimensions did improve the fit ($p < 0.1$), but when normal standard errors were used to test the significance of the coefficients for the level-2 predictors no significant coefficients were found. The use of robust standard errors to test the hypothesis produced a statistically significant coefficient of support γ_{03} (= 0,141). An index of the level-2 variance explained by the predictor variables was then calculated. The value was 0.168, meaning that about 16.8% of the between-organization variance in the use of customer-oriented selling behaviors was explained by the control-system dimensions.

Table 37. Salespersons' use of sales-oriented behaviors (***) $p < 0,01$; **) $p < 0,05$; *) $p < 0,10$

Model 1: The null model				
Fixed effect	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.517	0.0872 (0.0872)	28.858***	86
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.25459	86	150.484	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.77694			
Intra-class correlation = 0.247				
Deviance = 525.885 (number of estimated parameters = 3)				
Model 2: Level-1 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.511	0.0852 (0.0854)	29.460***	86
Intercept2 for IM slope, γ_{10}	0.058	0.0944 (0.0946)	0.613	183
Intercept2 for RAMB slope, γ_{20}	0.298	0.1271 (0.1038)	2.347**	183
Intercept2 for RCONF slope, γ_{30}	0.286	0.0874 (0.0875)	3.268***	183
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.27521	86	166.203	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.66941			
Deviance = 506.120 (Number of estimated parameters = 6)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 19.880$ (df = 3) $p = 0.000$ ***				
Model 3: Level-2 predictors				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.437	0.2185 (0.1967)	11.154***	83
Efficiency CS dummy, γ_{01}	0.218	0.2574 (0.2343)	0.847	83
Capability CS dummy, γ_{02}	-0.022	0.2794 (0.2645)	-0.079	83
Activity CS dummy, γ_{03}	-0.025	0.2887 (0.3059)	-0.086	83
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	0.047	0.0949 (0.0953)	0.494	180
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.300	0.1266 (0.1013)	2.371**	180
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.282	0.0891 (0.0885)	3.169**	180
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.27956	83	165.134	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.66415			
Deviance = 504.300 (Number of estimated parameters = 9)				
Model comparison: $\chi^2 = 1.700$ (df = 3) $p > 0.500$				
Model 4: Level-2 predictors (detailed)				
Fixed effects	Coefficient	Std. e. (robust)	t-ratio	Approx. d.f.
<i>For intercept β_0</i>				
Average organization mean, γ_{00}	2.509	0.0837 (0.0835)	29.970***	80
Input evaluation, γ_{01}	0.132	0.1224 (0.1190)	1.079	80
Performance contingent rew, γ_{02}	0.031	0.0958 (0.0899)	0.322	80
Support, γ_{03}	0.063	0.1531 (0.1190)	0.411	80
Closeness of supervision, γ_{04}	-0.134	0.0861 (0.0965)	-1.553*	80
Cost control, γ_{05}	0.057	0.0928 (0.0728)	0.612	80
Output evaluation, γ_{06}	-0.151	0.1217 (0.1175)	-1.240	80
<i>For intercept β_1 for IM slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{10}	0.030	0.0949 (0.0951)	0.318	177
<i>For intercept β_2 for RAMB slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{20}	0.302	0.1269 (0.1024)	2.384**	177
<i>For intercept β_3 for RCONF slope</i>				
Intercept2, γ_{30}	0.264	0.0881 (0.0893)	2.997***	177
Random effect	Var. component	d.f.	χ^2	p-value
Organization mean, u_{0j}	0.25142	80	159.736	0.000***
Level-1 effect, r_{ij}	0.66574			
Deviance = 501.946 (Number of parameters estimated = 12)				
Model comparison $\chi^2 = 4.054$ (df = 6) $p > 0.500$ (Comparison to model 2)				

The results of the sequential model of sales-oriented selling behaviors are shown in Table 37 above. The intra-class correlation calculated from the null-model variance components was 0.247 and statistically significant, meaning that about 24.7% of the variance in the self-reported use of such behaviors was due to organizational factors. Entering the level-1 predictors, i.e. the form of extrinsic motivation, perceived role conflict, and perceived role ambiguity, into the model improved the fit significantly. The motivation coefficient was not significant, but those of role ambiguity γ_{02} (= 0.298) and role conflict γ_{03} (= 0.286) were. These results suggest that perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity increase the probability of using a sales-oriented approach to selling.

Entering the level-2 predictors did not improve the model fit, which means that no direct relationship between the field sales management control systems and the potential use of sales oriented behaviors could be detected. Furthermore, none of the level-2 coefficients were statistically significant.

6.5 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

6.5.1 The concept of a field sales management control system

As proposed in the conceptual model of the present dissertation, field sales managers use more detailed dimensions when conceptualizing their controls-in-use than in the past studies. The factor analyses revealed six distinct control-system dimensions:

1. Activity monitoring
2. Performance-contingent rewarding
3. Capability control / Support
4. Closeness of supervision
5. Cost control
6. Outcome evaluation

These dimensions are consistent with those reported in the literature on sales management, which has covered differences between the subjective vs. objective and output vs. input performance measures used by sales managers (e.g., Johnston and Marshall, 2006). What is notable here is that the field sales managers' dimensions of control turned out to be more detailed than in many previous studies using data on sales executives (e.g., Cravens et al., 1993). This supports the assertion that the control system should be conceptualized differently (according to the level of detail) on different sales-management levels. In strategic sales management decisions (i.e. making decisions about control system best suited to internal and external environments of sales organization), the broad conceptualizations (e.g. process control vs. output control) are useful. However, the field sales managers, who deal with tactical/operational-level decisions and implementing the control over salespeople, conceptualize the controls with more detailed dimensions.

It was proposed that field salespeople would perceive their managers' control on the same dimensions, but this gained only partial support. The dimensions that were extracted from the salesperson data were:

1. Performance-contingent rewarding
2. Capability control / Support
3. Closeness of supervision
4. Cost control
5. Outcome evaluation

No dimension for perceptions of activity control was found for salespeople, and the "perceived support from field sales manager" dimension also included measures of non-financial rewards and encouragement by rewards, whereas for the sales managers only the measures related to capability improvement loaded on this dimension. Even though there are some slight differences with the control dimensions reported by managers, these perceptual dimensions of control are quite similar to factor structure obtained in field sales manager sample.

When the stability of control perceptions within the sales organizations was assessed by means of intra-class correlations, all of the dimensions of perceptual control turned out to be significantly correlated among the salespersons within the same organization. Over 20 % of the variance in the perceptions of control in all dimensions was due to organization-level differences. The perceptions of performance contingent rewarding had the highest level of within organization homogeneity, as over 50 % of variance in control perceptions was due to differences between organizations. This finding was expected, since it is common for firms to have equal compensation systems for employees. Second highest level of within organization homogeneity (32.6 % of variance due to differences between organizations) was found for capability control. This was contrary to the expectations, as it was proposed that capability control would be “informal” in nature, and therefore adjusted for each manager-subordinate dyad separately. One possible explanation for this finding is that sales organizations use team work as their training method (see Román and Ruiz, 2003). The proportion of variance in control perceptions due to sales organization differences for closeness of supervision was 27.5 %, 26.8 % for output evaluation and 21.3 % for cost control. Interestingly, the lowest percentages are not found for “informal” control dimensions as expected. It could be that output evaluation and cost controls are not intended for influencing the behavior of salespeople. Instead they could be *dashboard* controls (see Darmon, 1998), which are used for obtaining information about the organizational performance.

The subsequent analyses examined how well field sales managers’ reported control behaviors predicted salespersons’ perceptions of control. This was done by calculating the index of the proportion reduction in the variance explained by the 2-level predictors. The sales managers’ control behaviors accounted for 58.4 % of the variance in perceived performance contingent rewarding determined by organizational factors (which was 51.3 % of the total variance in perceptions of performance contingent rewarding). Variance in the salespersons’ perceptions of capability control due to organizational differences, was also highly dependent of manager’s control behaviors, as the index of the proportion reduction was 55.8 %. Corresponding index proportion for closeness of supervision was 42 % and 28 % for cost control. However, the perceptions of output evaluation were not significantly related to the sales managers’ self-reported controls. Also the perceptions of cost control were also only marginally related to the

field sales manager's behaviors, as the improvement in model fit was only marginal when manager behaviors were entered into the model. This might reflect the salespersons' difficulty in knowing what the supervisor was really measuring, perhaps due to a lack of communication on the part of the sales manager. Even though these control dimensions fall under the category of "objective" measures, it seems that the controls are not as visible to the field sales force as other dimensions. Thus, again cost controls and output-evaluation controls may be what Darmon (1998) refers to as *dashboard* controls, i.e. controlling that the objectives are met, in contrast to *control levers* that aim to influence the behaviors of salespeople.

For the purposes of subsequent analyses that deal with second and third research gaps, the different control-system types were assessed by subjecting the field sales managers' self-reported control behaviors to cluster analysis. Four different types were revealed, i.e. combinations of controls that emphasized different dimensions:

1. Efficiency control
2. Capability control
3. Activity control
4. Output control

The emphasis in efficiency-control systems is on evaluating both the inputs and the outputs of the sales force, and selling costs are intensively assessed. Less emphasis is directed toward performance-contingent rewarding and close supervision. Systems of capability control also emphasize input and output evaluation, but this is accompanied by close supervision and a high level of support from the field sales managers. Activity control entails close supervision of the salespeople, and practically no use of performance-contingent rewards. Finally, output-control systems focus mainly on output evaluation and performance reward, and do not rely on close supervision.

The control-system types identified here are somewhat different from those listed in previous typologies. They do not fall into the one presented by Jaworski et al. (1993), which included high, low, clan, and bureaucratic control systems based on dimensions of "formal" and

“informal” control usage: these system types are more suitable for sales managers on the strategy level, as discussed in Chapter 3. They do not correspond with the single behavior-outcome – control dimension proposed by Anderson and Oliver (1987) either, but there is some resemblance to Challagalla and Shervani’s (1996) conceptualization, which posits two distinct types of behavior-based control: capability control and activity control. In addition to output control and the two types of behavior-based control mentioned above, efficiency control was also identified as a system type in the present work. It seems that there may also be two distinct forms of output control - related to results and to efficiency. The former focuses on measuring output and rewarding results, and the latter on controlling the input-output ratio, i.e. efficiency.

The following new two-dimensional typology of control systems is proposed based on these empirical findings:

- Whether the emphasis is on controlling behaviors or outcomes
- Whether the emphasis is on motivating or controlling for performance

The first of these has featured in previous conceptualizations (see e.g., Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Challagalla and Shervani, 1996; Jaworski, 1988). The latter one is also related to some extent to Challagalla and Shervani’s (1996) conceptualization separating three dimensions of control: information, the administration of rewards and the administration of punishments, the difference being in the *level of reinforcements used*, not the *types*. Systems that emphasize control over performance (i.e. activity control and efficiency control) use relatively low levels of reinforcement, but they are characterized by an emphasis on control over measuring and meeting objectives (either behavioral or financial). Those that emphasize motivating for performance (capability control and output control) use reinforcements aimed at performance improvement, either in the form of extrinsic rewards or by supporting feelings of competence.

6.5.2 Psychological responses

Before anticipated psychological responses to control were modeled against sales managers’ control behaviors, an analysis of their variance components was performed. Examination of intra-

class correlations revealed that 27.2 % of variance in perceived role conflict and 37.4 % of variance in perceived role ambiguity were determined by differences between organizations. The variance in the form of felt motivation was, however, determined entirely by the individual-specific differences.

Subsequent analyses aimed at explaining sources of these organization-level and individual-level variances. Examination of the intra-class correlations revealed that a significant proportion of the variance in perceived role conflict is due to differences between sales organizations, even when individual differences (i.e. perceived locus of control) were controlled for. In general, results indicated that the identified control system types (i.e. combinations of control) were better in explaining the salespersons' psychological responses than the more detailed control system dimensions. Using control system dimensions as predictors did not improve the model in any of the models predicting motivation, role ambiguity or role conflict, whereas control system types significantly predicted perceived role conflict, when perceived locus of control was controlled for. The results showed that pure reliance on outcome-based control is related to higher levels of role conflict. Even though detailed control system dimensions did not significantly improve the model, there was some evidence of decreasing effect of supervision on perceptions of role conflict. Using control system types as predictors of role conflict accounted for 38.7 % reduction in the unexplained variance at organization-level. The main source of variance in role ambiguity was on the individual level, whereas some weak evidence of a negative effect of cost control could be detected. However, the variance in the salespersons' type of motivation was determined by individual differences, with locus-of-control as significant predictor, and no relationship with organizational factors could be established.

6.5.3 Behavioral responses

Also the anticipated behavioral responses to control were first analyzed with the intra-class correlations, which revealed that 13.5 % of the variance of less ethical selling behavior, 26.8 % of the variance of customer-oriented behaviors, and 24.7 % of the variance in sales-oriented behaviors were determined by differences between organizations. The variance in the use of

dysfunctional behaviors was, however, determined entirely by the differences between individuals in their perceptions of role stress.

In the subsequent analyses the anticipated behavioral responses were first modeled against felt motivation and perceptions of role ambiguity and role conflict. Perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity were positively linked to less ethical, dysfunctional and sales-oriented behaviors, and negatively associated with customer-oriented behaviors. In predicting resultant behaviors, the more detailed control dimensions proved more useful than identified control system types. Adding separate dimensions of sales managers' control into the model predicting customer-oriented behaviors improved the model significantly (output evaluation was negatively associated with customer-oriented behaviors), whereas adding control system types did not improve any of the models.

Based on model comparisons with Chi-square test revealed no direct relationship between the characteristics of the field sales management control system and the salespersons' use of less ethical selling behaviors, dysfunctional behaviors, or sales-oriented selling behaviors could be established. The variance in these behavioral-outcome variables was mainly determined by individual-level factors, such as perceptions of role conflict and ambiguity. However, examination of individual effects of control system types and dimensions revealed some weak support for the relationship between manager's control behaviors and anticipated behavioral responses. When compared to output control type, the efficiency control was related to use of dysfunctional behaviors. Closeness of supervision, in turn, was negatively associated with the use of sales oriented behaviors.

Even though there is no strong evidence of the direct relationship of sales managers' control behaviors and anticipated behavioral responses, the results raise the question of potential indirect effects, as the personal perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity played an important part in explaining these behaviors.

7 DISCUSSION

This final chapter discusses the findings of the empirical assessment of the present study. The first section focuses on the contributions of the dissertation, and the second on the research and managerial implications. Finally, the third section deals with the limitations of the study and suggests future research avenues.

7.1 CONTRIBUTIONS

It was mentioned in the introductory chapter that the aim of the dissertation was to contribute to the literature on marketing and sales management control by:

1. providing insights for appropriate conceptualization of sales management control system at the field sales management level;
2. increasing our understanding of how field sales managers control activities are perceived by salespeople;
3. empirically assessing the impact of manager's exercised control on salespersons' psychological and behavioral responses;

The contributions are discussed in detail in the following sections in terms of their theoretical, methodological and empirical aspects.

7.1.1 Theoretical contribution

The main theoretical contribution of the present dissertation is the adoption of a multilevel perspective on theory development in the context of sales management control systems. First, it was acknowledged that studying the effect of field sales management control on salespeople is a phenomenon that involves two interrelated levels of analysis. The literature review revealed that previous research (see Appendix 1) is rife with controversy about whether one should measure control systems on the executive level, or concentrate on salespersons' perceptions of exercised control. Consequently, the marketing and sales management theory has been developed without

any clear specification of the levels of the different conceptualizations, which in turn has led to a situation in which it is difficult to make generalizations about the consequences of exercised control. According to Baldauf, Cravens, and Piercy's (2005) synthesis of the relevant literature, there has been a need to revise conceptualizations of control systems, and this dissertation has taken a promising step forward by developing a multilevel framework for studying the salesperson consequences of field sales management control. It was proposed that the sales management control system at the field sales manager and salesperson levels should be conceptualized using more detailed dimensions than the past research has done. This conceptualization was also supported in the empirical assessment. The framework and conceptual model developed in the present dissertation also proposed that the congruence between field sales manager's exercised control and salespersons' perceptions of it should be assessed.

For the first time in the sales management control system research this kind of assessment was performed explicitly. The results of this assessment showed that the control systems are in deed to some extent perceived homogenously by the salespeople, and the homogeneity of perceptions was greater in performance contingent rewarding and capability control dimensions. These were also the control dimensions, where the congruence between manager's exercised control and salespersons' perceptions was highest. The perceptual homogeneity was lower for close supervision, output evaluation and cost control dimensions, and also the level of congruence between exercised and perceived control was lower (in fact there was no evidence of this congruence in the case of output evaluation). These differences in the level of congruence between exercised and perceived control could be due to different aims of control. Darmon (1998) distinguished different control purposes: dashboard (obtaining information to guide decision-making) and control levers (influencing the behavior of the sales force). It seems reasonable to expect that performance contingent rewarding and capability control dimensions are aiming at influencing behaviors of salespeople, and output evaluation and cost control dimensions are used for obtaining information about the way the organization is heading. Closeness of supervision may fall into either of these control categories, or additionally it may be a reflection of leadership style, which is adapted for each manager-salesperson dyad (i.e. are determined by interpersonal factors, see DelVecchio, 1996).

The difference between *dashboard controls* and *control levers* was observed also when combinations of control (i.e. control system types) were dealt with. The study identified a new classification of systems of marketing and sales management control, based on their control philosophy. The results of this dissertation give reason to posit that the control purpose should be part of the conceptualization: cost control and objective outcome-evaluation controls seem to belong to the dashboard type, which are not clearly communicated to individual salespeople, whereas the other dimensions could be seen more as control levers.

One additional issue that emerges from the results of empirical assessment, is that even in case of control levers, only a proportion of organization-level variance was predicted by the manager's exercised control, leaving significant proportion of this variance unexplained. It is suggested that this may be due to social influence, meaning that salespersons under same controls form *collective* perceptions of exercised control. This means that sales management control theory could benefit from taking insights from theories of social influence in social psychology.

The framework proposed here also suggested that the exercised control and salespersons' responses to it should be studied with two-level data, where controls are measured at manager-level and responses at salesperson-level, and controlling for individual differences. Adoption of this approach to studying the effect of controls on salesperson consequences revealed that the relationship between controls and its anticipated consequences is relatively weak. For example, there was no evidence of the relationship between control system and motivation. There was, however, some weak evidence of the control system's effect on perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity. The propositions concerning anticipated behavioral consequences of control were not strongly supported either. Based on this finding, the results on the consequences of control obtained in the past studies using single-level data should be interpreted with care. Individual differences, such as perceived locus of control, seem to be strong influencer on motivation and role perceptions. It is possible that locus internals also perceive the control system more favorably, and consequently the relationship between perceived control and salesperson consequences becomes overestimated.

7.1.2 Empirical contribution

The empirical contributions of the present dissertation are two-fold. First, the study is among the first to use cross-level data in assessing the consequences of marketing and sales management control systems. The data was collected on both the field-sales-manager and the salesperson level, and the cross-level hypotheses were tested in the analyses. So far, research on marketing and sales management control systems has mainly been based on single-level data (see Appendix 1), which facilitates investigation of either

1. the relationship between the control used and perceptions or anticipations of its consequences, or
2. the relationship between perceptions of control and its consequences.

The present study is among the first studies which empirically assess the congruence between exercised control and salesperson perceptions of it. Similarly, it is among the first studies which assess the effect of self-reported exercised control on self-reported psychological and behavioral consequences.

Secondly, the study has a strict focus only on the company's own sales force and only on field sales: the samples used in previous studies have mainly been a mix of company sales forces and manufacturers' representatives or sales and marketing professionals. Even though some researchers claim that the same theory is valid for marketing and sales control systems (e.g., Baldauf et al., 2005), there is some empirical evidence suggesting that employee responses to control depend on where the salespersons are located (Challagalla, Shervani, and Huber, 1997).

7.1.3 Methodological contributions

The methodological contributions of the present dissertation lie in the adoption of multilevel methodology, namely hierarchical linear modeling (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). While some researchers have taken steps towards recognizing the level aspects of the control-system concept (e.g., Babakus et al. 1996), previous studies have, at best, tested the same conceptual models *at different levels of analysis*. However, the adoption of multilevel methodology allows the

examination of *cross-level relationships*. In practice this means that one can empirically assess whether the variance in the salesperson variables (e.g., motivation, customer-oriented selling) occurs between individuals within organizations or between organizations. Obtaining this kind of information reveals the real nature of the variables, opens up new avenues for research, and offers new implications for the findings. This type of new knowledge can be especially useful for managers, as both manager and salesperson-levels can be studied simultaneously.

7.2 IMPLICATIONS

The implications of the study fall into two categories, research implications and managerial implications. These are discussed separately in the following sub-sections.

7.2.1 Research Implications

This dissertation is based on a multilevel view of the organization, and the results obtained in the empirical assessment support the central assertion that systems of field sales management control should be conceptualized differently at different levels of analysis. Thus, there is a need to specify the concept of such systems on each analytical level, based on appropriate theories. It is asserted that when dealing with tactical and operational level decisions of control, one should use control system conceptualizations that are more detailed than in the past studies.

Moreover, the distinction between control and motivation is not clear in the sales management control system literature. While some managerial activities aim at control over the implementation of selected paths of development (dashboard controls) and others aim at influencing the behaviors of salespeople (control levers), the relationship between these two types, and their joint effects on the sales force, are still unclear. The findings of the present dissertation suggest that performance contingent rewarding and capability control are control levers, whereas cost control and output evaluation are dashboard controls. Notable is, however, that *both* control levers *and* dashboard controls are related to salesperson consequences. The future studies focusing of sales management controls should try to take this issue into

consideration. In addition, it is notable that only a proportion of the organization-level variance of perceptions of control could be explained with managers' exercised control. Thus, significant proportion of the variance in control perceptions that was due to differences between organizations was left unexplained. One promising research avenue would be to examine the social influence of control perceptions. A research started from classical experiment of conformity by Solomon Asch in the field of social psychology (for a meta-analysis of 125 studies see Bond, 2005), has revealed that people change their perceptions so that their perceptions will be in line with others. It is likely that salespeople under same control system form a shared perception of the exercised control.

All in all, the empirical assessment of the present study revealed that the evidence of relationship between exercised control and salesperson consequences seems to be weaker when multi-level data is used. Major part of the variance in focal variables was due to individual differences, and clearly smaller proportion of total variance was due to differences between organizations. This means that using single-level data (i.e. exercised control and perceptions of responses, or perceptions of control and self-reported responses) the effects may be overestimated.

The empirical analyses conducted in this study confirm the need for a multilevel and cross-level approach, and consequently raise a call for more multilevel research on the phenomenon of interest. First, the results should be validated in future studies using different samples within the same population as well as in other contexts. Secondly, the relationships between strategic-level and tactical/operational-level concepts of control should be studied. Thirdly, the structural control mechanisms, which were the focus of this dissertation, should be considered alongside social controls (e.g., Jaworski, 1988; Ouchi, 1979) in future multilevel specifications of sales control.

7.2.2 Managerial Implications

The results of this study indicated that some of the exercised controls are more accurately perceived by the salespeople than other controls. It is asserted that this finding is due to different purposes of these controls. Darmon (1998) has labeled controls with different purposes as control levers and dashboard control. Control levers (e.g. use of performance contingent rewards, and capability control) are aiming at influencing the salespersons' behaviors and dashboard controls (e.g. cost control and output evaluation) are used for obtaining information for manager. Notable is, that despite the purposes of control there was evidence of the effects of control on salespersons' consequences. In practice this means, that when managers are designing their control systems, the psychological and behavioral effects of so called dashboard controls should be considered with care. The nature of these effects is not yet known, but this study provided some evidence of the decreasing effect of cost control on perceived role ambiguity, and decreasing effect of output evaluation on customer-oriented behaviors.

It should also be noted that at best managers self-reported behaviors accounted for less than 60 % of within organization variance in perceptions of control. In other words, significant proportions of the control perceptions that are homogenous within the organization are determined by factors *other* than exercised control. It is very likely that individual salespersons shape their control perceptions due to social influence, so that the control perceptions are similar within an organization. Managerially this means that the control system should be stimulating and equal for each salesperson, as the perceptions of control, both favorable and unfavorable, pass on among the salespeople.

It was also found that pure reliance on outcome control seems to increase perceptions of role conflict among salespeople, whereas exercising close supervision may help in reducing it. This finding promotes the pivotal role of field sales managers in sales organizations. Moreover, all of the studied outcome variables (except forms of extrinsic motivation and dysfunctional behaviors) were to some extent determined by the differences between organizations, and only part of this

organization effect was due to controls-in-use. It is likely that significant part of this unexplained organization effect is due to field sales managers' leadership abilities.

All in all, major part of the variance in studied consequence variables was due to differences between individuals. the primary source for variance in these variables is due to individual-specific differences. More specifically, over 60 % of the variance in all of the studied outcome variables (both psychological and behavioral) was determined by individual-level differences. The variance of motivation and dysfunctional behavior variables was entirely determined by individual differences. This finding highlights the importance of recruiting and selecting the right people to the sales force. According to the results obtained from this study, internally controlled salespeople were expressing more integrated types of motivation and perceived less role conflict and ambiguity. As selling is relatively independent work, internal locus of control (i.e. belief that job outcomes are mainly dependent on own efforts) is naturally an important characteristic. Selection of the appropriate salespeople for the organizations helps in developing performance oriented culture in the organization, which serves as a basis for clan type of control (see e.g. Jaworski, 1988; Ouchi, 1979).

Even though no direct relationship between field sales management controls and salespersons' adoption of less ethical, dysfunctional, or sales-oriented selling behaviors could be established, managers should be aware of potential indirect relationships via role stress (conflict and ambiguity) related to the use of controls. Perceptions of role conflict and role ambiguity were positively related to less ethical and dysfunctional behaviors as well as to adopting a sales-oriented selling process.

7.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The results of this dissertation need to be validated in future research, since the study had its limitations. These limitations are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections, which deal with theoretical issues, empirical issues, and methodological issues.

7.3.1 Theoretical issues

Even though the present dissertation made a considerable contribution in terms of revising the concept of field sales management control systems, more research is needed. As mentioned in the section on delimitations in the introductory chapter, the temporal dimension of control was left out of the study, even though it is highly possible that it plays a role in determining the consequences of exercised control. Moreover, this study did not assess, whether control is exercised on the basis of team performance instead of individual performance. Even though this study aimed at more detailed control conceptualization at the field sales management and salesperson levels, the control is still rather vaguely defined.

In addition to the limitations related to the very concept of a control system, the consequences of control are also likely to be more complex than modeled in this study. It is very likely that the impact of the control system on salespersons' psychological and behavioral responses is moderated by different personality (e.g., locus of control) and situational (e.g., competitive intensity) factors. Such contingency hypotheses could be tested in future studies by using Means-and-Slopes-as-Outcomes models.

7.3.2 Empirical issues

Even though the sampling design was prepared carefully and no evidence of non-response bias was detected, the representativeness of the sample cannot be taken for granted, as the rate of non-response was relatively high. While non-response rates in mail surveys often tend to be high, and the rates in this study are comparable to those in other studies, the results should be validated against other samples as well.

Moreover, while the sales organizations in the sample were selected randomly from the database, the salespersons within them were not, which is a possible source of selection bias. It is possible that sales managers select the best performing salespersons from their organizations for the study, and therefore the sample of salespersons used in this study was not representative. Thus, future

studies adopting the multilevel framework developed in the present dissertation should use a random two-stage sampling plan.

7.3.3 Methodological issues

The measures used for the outcome variables should be improved, as those used in the present study did not always fulfill the requirements for AVE values: in practice this means that the latent constructs measured on multiple-item scales contained considerable amounts of error variance. Thus, the validity of the measures used could be questioned, and researchers should put extra effort into developing valid measures in future studies.

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Appendix 1

FUTRELL, SWAN AND TODD'S CONTROL CONCEPTUALIZATION					
Authors	Journal	Controls	Treatment	Sample	Consequences
Futrell, Swan and Todd (1976)	JMR	Salesperson's perceptions of control system: Clarity perception, perception of reward-performance link, perception of control over job.	Indicators of each control system characteristic were treated separately	431 sets of matched responses consisting of the salesperson's responses and his/her supervisor's performance evaluation. Sample drawn from a national hospital supply firm.	Salespeople who were found to be high-performing and satisfied with their job perceived:(1) what was expected of them more clearly; (2) high influence and control over their sales environment; and (3) that job rewards were based on their performance.
Futrell and Schul (1978)	IMM	Salesperson's perceptions of control system: Clarity perception, perception of reward-performance link, perception of control over job.	Indicators of each control system characteristic were treated separately by calculating canonical correlations with the performance and satisfaction measures.	135 sets of matched responses consisting of the salesperson's responses and his/her supervisor's performance evaluation. Sample drawn from a national hospital supply firm.	"Salespeople, who perceived: (1) what was expected of them more clearly; (2) high influence and control over their sales environment; and (3) that job rewards were based on their performance were found to be higher-performing salespeople, as related by their immediate supervisors, and were also found to be more satisfied with their job." (p.313)
Leigh, Lucas, and Woodman (1988)	JMan.	Salesperson's perceptions of control system: Clarity perception, perception of reward-performance link, perception of control over job.	A composite scale was calculated from three control dimensions.	423 marketing professionals	Perceived management control system characteristics and organizational culture moderated the relationship between role stressors (i.e. role conflict and ambiguity) and job attitudes (i.e. job satisfaction and turnover intentions).

Appendix 1

ANDERSON AND OLIVER'S CONTROL CONCEPTUALIZATION					
Authors	Journal	Controls	Treatment	Sample	Consequences
Anderson and Oliver (1987)	JM	Behavior - outcome		Conceptual	
Eisenhardt (1989)	Manag. Science	(Behavior control Outcome control Clan control) In discussion Measure : Reward structure	Dichotomous measure indicating whether the short-term, monetary compensation was outcome-based or behavior-based (i.e. salary or hourly rate)	Store managers of 54 specialty stores. There were 21 three-informant stores, 22 two-informant stores and 11 single-informant stores	-
Cravens et al. (1993)	JM	Behavior –based control Outcome –based control	Dimensions of Field Sales Management Control and Compensation control could not be integrated in a consistent manner.	144 completed questionnaires from chief sales executives	Field sales management control was positively associated with professional competence, team orientation, risk aversion, intrinsic motivation, recognition motivation, planning orientation, sales-support orientation, customer orientation, making sales-performance presentations, and customer-satisfaction effectiveness. Compensation control was positively associated with professional competence, team orientation, planning orientation, sales-support orientation, customer orientation, providing performance information, achieving sales-performance objectives.
Robertson and Anderson (1993)	OS	Dimensions of supervision, contact with manager, subjectivity of evaluation.	Three scales combined into an index of behavior control (Note that compensation loaded on a different factor and consequently was not included in the index)	446 industrial field salespeople (salespeople N=301 and sales managers N=145)	Behavior-based control was found to be in a negative relationship with less ethical behavior. Weighting of salary did not have an effect. However, this effect was not found in the manager sample.

Appendix 1

<p>Oliver and Anderson (1994)</p>	<p>JM</p>	<p>Extent of supervision Absence of Bottom-Line Orientation Infrequent use of objective outcomes Use of paper inputs Use of subjective inputs Percent salary in compensation plan</p>	<p>Behavior-control Index</p>	<p>216 sales managers in electronic components industry 356 salespeople</p>	<p>Behavior control was positively associated with sales expertise/competence, organizational commitment, authority acceptance, cooperation acceptance, performance-review acceptance, motivation towards agency, selling smarter, sales expense control, sales planning, job satisfaction, participative decision-making, and innovative and supporting organizational culture. It was negatively associated with perceiving pay as a control mechanism, relative performance rank, extrinsic motivation and risk-seeking preference.</p>
<p>Oliver and Anderson (1995)</p>	<p>JPSSM</p>	<p>Extent of supervision Subjective evaluation methods Proportion of Salary</p>	<p>Behavioral control and outcome control index. Clustering.</p>	<p>347 salespeople</p>	<p>Generally the behavior-based control was associated with higher levels of expertise and competence, motivation and commitment to employer, and working smarter than outcome-based control. Compared to straight behavior or outcome control, hybrid control was associated with higher levels of motivation by intrinsic satisfaction, time allocated to planning, goal achievement, and perceptions of bureaucracy.</p>

Appendix 1

Babakus et al. (1996)	JRM	Monitoring Directing Evaluating Rewarding	Composite scale calculated from 4 control dimensions	Field sales managers (146) Chief Sales Executives (58)	Field sales manager sample: Control activities were associated with satisfaction with sales territory design and behavior performance. Chief sales executive sample: Control activities were associated with satisfaction with sales territory design (insignificant relation to behavior performance).
Grant and Cravens (1996)	IMM	Monitoring Directing Evaluating Rewarding	Control dimensions treated separately	146 field sales managers in 58 Australian sales organizations	The more the managers performed the four management activities, the higher they rated their salespeople in both behavior and outcome performance.
Grant and Cravens (1999)	EJM	Monitoring Directing Evaluating Rewarding (Babakus et al.'s, 1996, measure)	Separate dimensions	146 Australian sales units	Three of the four components of sales management control had an impact on the profitability dimension of effectiveness. No significance was associated with the level of customer satisfaction for any of the management-control dimensions. Three of the four management-control components were linked to differences in satisfaction with the sales organization. Sales/market-share differences were found for only one component.
Kraft (1999)	JM	Fixed salary percentage Span of control Extent of reporting Performance evaluation	Behavior-control index	270 Chief sales executives	-
Baldauf, Cravens, and Piercy (2001)	JPSSM	Behavior-based control -monitoring, directing, evaluating, rewarding Anderson and Oliver	Combined into a single construct	Sample1: Austria 79 chief sales executives Sample2: UK 70 chief sales executives	Behavior-based control was not related to outcome performance, and was related to behavior performance only in the Austrian sample.

Appendix 1

Baldauf, Cravens, and Piercy (2001)	IMR	(1987) Behavior-based control -monitoring, directing, evaluating, rewarding Anderson and Oliver (1987)	13 items representing the four dimensions were subjected to second-order confirmatory factor analysis. CFI > 0.9 Combined into a single construct	Austrian sample: 159 field sales managers from 60 companies UK sample: 142 respondents from representing sales forces in 62 different companies.	Austrian sample: Behavior control was correlated ($0.16 < r < 0.47$) with sales-unit effectiveness, satisfaction with salespeople, technical knowledge, adaptive selling, teamwork, sales planning, sales presentation, sales support, affects/attitudes, intrinsic motivation, recognition motivation, cognitions/capabilities, behavioral strategy. UK sample: the above-mentioned correlations were $0.19 < r < 0.36$ of magnitude, except that no correlation was detected between behavior control and behavioral strategy, cognitions/capabilities, or technical knowledge.
Piercy, Lane, and Cravens (2002)	WMR	Monitoring, Directing, Evaluating, Rewarding, (see Babakus et al. 1996)	Single construct (activity) Cronbach's alpha = 0.83	214 salespeople in a commercial directory publisher	Behavior control was positively correlated with civic virtue, sportsmanship, altruism, conscientiousness, courtesy, cheerleading.
Menguc and Barker (2003)	JPSSM	Incentive pay Monitoring (8-items) Cravens et al. (1993)	Monitoring was a moderator for incentive pay	102 field sales managers from 47 organizations. Canada	The positive effects of incentive pay on three performance measures (sales volume, profitability, and customer satisfaction) were moderated by monitoring, sales volatility, and complexity of purchase decision.
Rouziés and Macquin (2003)	JPSSM	Perception of management's involvement, Absence of bottom-line	Behavioral control index	232 European salespeople	Culture moderated the control system's effect on the selected behavioral strategy. Behavior control was related to smart

Appendix 1

Román and Munuera (2005)	EJM	<p>orientation</p> <p>Importance of paper inputs</p> <p>Subjectivity of performance evaluations</p> <p>Compensation</p> <p>Nine-item scale adapted from Oliver and Anderson (1994) and Verbeke et al. (1996). Measured at the level of the individual as the perception of the salesperson about the CS she/he faces.</p> <p>Additional measure of Reward system, i.e. proportion of fixed salary in the compensation plan.</p>	<p>Single dimension measuring control system. Another single dimension variable for measuring reward system</p>	<p>280 financial services salespeople</p>	<p>selling strategies.</p> <p>Both reward system and control system were in a positive relationship with ethical behavior. Ethical behavior in turn was positively related to performance and job satisfaction, whereas it was negatively related to role conflict.</p>
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Appendix 1

JAWORSKI'S CONTROL CONCEPTUALIZATION					
Authors	Journal	Controls	Treatment	Sample	Consequences
Jaworski (1988)	JM	Formal (input, process, outcome) Informal (self, social, cultural)		Conceptual	-
Jaworski and MacInnis (1989)	JMR	Output Control Process Control Professional Control Self Control	Treated separately	379 Senior Marketing executives	Process control marginally predicted job stress. Self-control was found to be negatively associated with dysfunctional behavior. Both process and output control reduce information asymmetries.
Lusch and Jaworski (1991)	JR	Self control Output control Social control	Treated separately	182 store managers of a regional, general merchandise retailer.	Self and social controls were negatively associated with role stress. Output control was not. Social control was found to decrease store manager performance.
Jaworski, Stathakopoulos and Krishnan (1993)	JM	Professional control, cultural control, output control, process control	Combined into control system typologies of High-low-bureaucratic-clan types	500 marketing executives	Clan control was associated with higher levels of job satisfaction than low control or bureaucratic control, but high control was associated with the highest job-satisfaction level. Role ambiguity is lower with managers under high control than with other types of control. No significant differences between the four control types with respect to performance. May be a result of the lack of variance in the performance measure.

Appendix 1

Agarwal (1996)	IMM	Output control Process control Professional control Self-control	Treated separately	150 sales personnel and 150 non-sales personnel from AMA members	<p>Among salespeople, output control was negatively associated with information asymmetry when procedural knowledge was low (this effect was also present in the non-sales sample). Process control was related positively to dysfunctional behavior when PK was low, and negatively related to information asymmetry when PK was high. Professional control was negatively associated with all of the negative consequence variables. Self-control was positively associated with dysfunctional behavior when PK was high.</p> <p>Among non-sales personnel, output control was negatively associated with information asymmetry when procedural knowledge was low. Process control was related positively to dysfunctional behavior and job tension when PK was low. Professional control was negatively associated with job tension and information asymmetry when PK was low. Self-control was negatively associated with dysfunctional behavior.</p>
Ramaswami (1996)	JM	Output Control Process Control Self Control Professional Control	Treated separately (i.e. separate independent variables)	318 AMA members	<p>Both process and output control were positively associated with dysfunctional behavior, whereas self-control was negatively associated with it.</p>
Stathakopoulos (1996)	JPSSM	Behavior control Outcome control Clan control	Theoretical discussion on ideal controls	Conceptual	<p>Proposes that when the control system "fits" the conditions of task programmability, outcome observability, behavior observability, and transaction-specific assets, the salesperson-customer relationships, motivation, and organizational commitment will be stronger than in non-fit situations.</p>
Ramaswami, Srinivasan, and Gorton (1997)	JPSSM	Output control Process control	Treated separately	165 salespeople in agriculture industry	<p>Both output and process controls were unrelated to information asymmetry. When information asymmetry was accompanied with output control, the use of dysfunctional behaviors was reduced, but increased when accompanied with behavioral control.</p>

Appendix 1

Agarwal (1999)	IMM	Process control Output control	Treated separately	184 salespersons from AMA membership roster	Output control moderated the negative effect of formalization on role ambiguity and its positive effect on organizational commitment. This moderating effect was not found for role conflict. Process controls did not help in reducing the negative effects of formalization.
Joshi and Randall (2001)	JBR	Output control Process control Professional control	Second-order factor structure of organizational controls. Process and output controls were highly correlated ($r=0.73$), but they were only moderately correlated with professional control ($r=0.24$ and 0.33)	151 salespeople	Organizational control was related to task clarity and affective commitment.
Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002)	JM	Output control Process control	Treated separately	Chinese sample: 138 sales employees of firms in electronics, IT, software development, biotech, or other hi-tech sectors. U.S. sample: 170 salespeople of the same types of industries.	Process control was positively associated with supervisee trust in the Chinese sample, but not in the U.S. sample (output control unrelated in both samples). Process control was directly associated with sales performance in both samples, as was the interaction of supervisee trust and output control.

Appendix 1

Ramaswami (2002)	JPSSM	Output control Process control	Treated separately	155 AMA members in sales positions	Both process and output control reduced information asymmetry and role ambiguity, but both were associated with opportunistic behaviors.
Cravens, Lask, Low, Marshall, and Moncrief (2004)	JBR	Professional control Cultural control Output control Process control (Jaworski et al. 1993)	Typologies of control: high, low, bureaucratic, clan	1042 industrial salespeople	High control was associated with higher favorable consequences of satisfaction, performance, and organizational consequence.

Appendix 1

CHALLAGALLA AND SHERVANI'S CONTROL CONCEPTUALIZATION					
Authors	Journal	Controls	Treatment	Sample	Consequences
Challagalla and Shervani (1996)	JM	Output control - type (Information, rewards, punishments - dims) Activity Control (Information, rewards, punishments) Capability Control (Information, rewards, punishment)	Treated separately	270 salespeople in five industrial product divisions of two Fortune 500 companies	Output information control was negatively associated with supervisor role ambiguity. Output rewards were negatively associated with performance and satisfaction with the supervisor. Output punishments had no significant effects. Activity information had negative effects on both supervisor and customer role ambiguity. Activity rewards had negative effects on both supervisor and customer role ambiguity, and positive effects on satisfaction with the supervisor. Activity punishments increased both supervisor and customer role ambiguity. Capability information control reduced both supervisor and customer role ambiguity, and increased satisfaction with the supervisor. Capability rewards reduced supervisor role ambiguity, and increased satisfaction with the supervisor. Capability punishments reduced customer role ambiguity, performance and satisfaction with the supervisor.
Challagalla and Shervani (1997)	JBR	Output control - type (Information, reinforcements - dims) Activity Control (Information, reinforcements) Capability Control (Information, reinforcements)	Treated separately	-4-	Supervisor role ambiguity was reduced by output information, activity information, activity rewards, capability information, and capability rewards, and it was increased by activity punishments. Supervisor role ambiguity itself was negatively associated with performance. Job tension was reduced by activity rewards and capability information, and it was increased by activity information and capability punishments. Job tension was negatively related to performance.

Appendix 1

Challagalla, Shervani and Huber (2000)	JPSSM	Supervisory orientations, based on output, activity, and capability control	Treated separately	239 salespeople from 5 divisions of 2 Fortune 500 Companies	Location moderated the effect of control orientation. End-results orientation was associated with satisfaction with the supervisor when salespeople were co-located, whereas this relationship did not exist with remote salespeople. Activity orientation was negatively associated with satisfaction with the supervisor for co-located salespeople and positively associated with remote salespeople. Capability orientation had positive effects on supervisor satisfaction in the full sample. Activity orientation was associated with performance in the full sample and end-results orientation was not related to performance. Capability orientation had a positive effect on performance only with co-located salespeople.
Fang, Evans, and Landry (2005)	JAMS	See Challagalla and Shervani (1996)	Treated separately	U.S.: 308 salespeople China: 247 salespeople	Outcome control negatively influences effort-attributional ascriptions. Activity control negatively affects strategy ascriptions. Capability control negatively influences salespeople's ability ascriptions (supported in the U.S. sample). Moderator effects were also hypothesized, but these received only partial support.
Fang, Evans, and Zou (2005)	JBR	Outcome, activity, capability controls.	Separately	U.S. and China	U.S. sample: moderately difficult goals facilitated the positive effects of outcome control on outcome performance. The positive effects of capability control and activity control on behavior performance were stronger when the goal difficulty was low. Chinese sample: moderately difficult goals facilitated the positive effects of outcome control on outcome performance.

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KYSELYLOMAKKEEN SAATTEEKSI

Arvoisa vastaanottaja,

Otin yritykseenne hiljattain yhteyttä puhelimitse. Kiitos, että päätitte osallistua väitöskirjatutkimukseeni.

Tutkimuksessani pyrin selvittämään myyntijohdon käyttämien palkkaus- ja valvontamenetelmien vaikutusta kenttämyyntihenkilöiden motivaatioon ja käyttäytymiseen, ja sitä kautta myös suoriutumiseen. Väitöskirjani on osana kansainvälistä tutkimusyhteistyötä, joka tehdään Aston Universityn (UK), Loughborough Universityn (UK) ja Lappeenrannan teknillisen yliopiston välillä.

Tämän kirjeen liitteenä olen lähettänyt yhden myynnin esimiehelle osoitetun kysymyslomakkeen, sekä 5 myyntihenkilöille osoitettua lomaketta. Jokaiselle lomakkeelle on myös oma palautuskuorensa, jonka postimaksu on jo maksettu. Olkaa hyvä ja täyttäkää itse myynnin esimiehelle tarkoitettu lomake ja antakaa myyntihenkilöille osoitetut lomakkeet palautuskuoriin alaisillenne täytettäväksi.

Vakuutan Teille, että vastaukset käsitellään luottamuksellisesti, ja että *yhtään henkilöä tai yritystä ei voida saaduista tuloksista tunnistaa*. Lomakkeiden kansisivulla oleva lomakenumero on vain sitä varten, että voimme analyysissämme yhdistää samasta yrityksestä tulleet vastaukset.

Toimitan jokaiselle osallistuvalla yritykselle tiivistelmän tutkimuksen tuloksista. Jos haluatte vastaanottaa tiivistelmän tuloksista tai välttyä uusintapostitukselta, olkaa hyvä ja liittäkää käyntikorttinne tai yhteystietonne vastauksenne mukaan. Jos Teillä on jotain kysyttävää tai kommentoitavaa lomakkeesta, voitte ottaa minuun yhteyttä.

Lomakkeen täyttämässä kulunee aikaa noin 20-60 minuuttia. Olisin erittäin kiitollinen jos Teiltä ja alaisiltanne löytyisi aikaa lomakkeen täyttämiseen. Apunne on erittäin tärkeää väitöskirjatutkimukseni loppuunsaattamisessa. Kiitos ajastanne jo näin etukäteen.

Ystävällisin terveisin,

Anssi Tarkiainen

**PALKKAUS- JA VALVONTAMENETELMIEN VAIKUTUS
KENTTÄMYNTIHENKILÖSTÖN KÄYTTÄYTYMISEEN
JA SUORITUSTASOON**

KYSELYLOMAKE MYYNNIN ESIMIEHILLE

Lomakkeen kysymyksiin ei ole olemassa oikeita tai väärä vastauksia.
Olemme kiinnostuneita vain teidän mielipiteistänne ja näkemyksistänne.

Saadut vastaukset käsitellään luottamuksellisesti.

Lomake

Yhteystiedot:

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OSA I: TE JA MYYNTIHENKILÖSTÖNNE

Kuinka monta henkilöä on myyntitimissänne?	_____
Kuinka moni näistä myyntihenkilöstä on <i>kenttä</i> myyntihenkilöitä?	_____
Kuinka moni työskentelee <i>puhelin</i> myyntityössä?	_____
Kuinka moni työskentelee muunlaisissa myyntitehtävissä?	_____
Kuinka monta prosenttia myyntihenkilöstöstänne saa pelkästään kiinteää palkkaa?	_____ %
Kuinka monta prosenttia myyntihenkilöstöstänne on palkattu pelkällä provisiolla?	_____ %
Kuinka monta prosenttia myyntihenkilöstöstänne saa palkkaa, joka on yhdistelmä provisiosta ja kiinteästä palkasta?	_____ %
Jos käytätte yhdistelmäpalkkausta, olkaa hyvä ja arvioikaa kuinka monta prosenttia palkasta on provisiiona maksettu?	_____ %
Kuinka suurella osalla myyntihenkilöstöstänne on myyntikiintiö täytettävänä?	_____ %

Tärkeää: Olkaa hyvä ja vastatkaa loppuihin kysymyksistä vain *kenttämyyntihenkilöiden* osalta, *ei* muiden myyntihenkilöiden (kuten esimerkiksi puhelinmyyjien). Jos Teillä ei ole kenttämyyntihenkilöitä, olkaa hyvä ja palauttakaa tämä lomake, jotta voimme tilastoida sen.

Seuraavat kysymykset pyrkivät selvittämään, miten ohjaatte kenttähenkilöstöänne. Kysymyksiin ei ole olemassa oikeita tai väärä vastauksia, olemme kiinnostuneita vain siitä, missä määrin käytätte eri menetelmiä myynnin esimiehenä.

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Merkitkää vastauksenne ympäröimällä sopivin vaihtoehto.

	Vahvasti eri mieltä	2	En samaa mieltä	3	4	Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Tiimini kenttämyyntihenkilöt usein:	1	2	3	4	5	
Suorittavat tehtäviä, jotka heidän mielestään tulisi tehdä toisim						
Ovat usein vailla heille annettujen tehtävien kunnolliseen suorittamiseen tarvittavia resursseja	1	2	3	4	5	
Joutuvat rikkomaan sääntöjä tai toimintaperiaatteita voidakseen suorittaa heille annetut tehtävät	1	2	3	4	5	
Työskentelevät kahden tai useamman ryhmän kanssa, joilla on erilaiset toimintatavat	1	2	3	4	5	
Saavat ristiriitaisia toimeksiantoja kahdelta tai useammalta henkilöltä	1	2	3	4	5	
Joutuvat tekemään asioita, jotka joku voi hyväksyä, mutta joku toinen ei	1	2	3	4	5	
Joutuvat ottamaan vastaan tehtäviä ilman riittäviä resursseja ja materiaaleja niiden loppuun saattamiseksi	1	2	3	4	5	
Työskentelevät tarpeettomien asioiden parissa	1	2	3	4	5	
Missä määrin Te:	Erittäm vähän		Jossam määrin		Erittäm paljon	
Vietätte aikaa kentällä myyntihenkilöidenne kanssa	1	2	3	4	5	
Teette yhteisiä myyntikäyntejä myyntihenkilöstönne kanssa	1	2	3	4	5	
Käytte säännöllisesti läpi myyntihenkilöiden asiakaskäyntiraportit	1	2	3	4	5	
Valvotte myyntihenkilöitteenne päivittäisiä aktiviteetteja	1	2	3	4	5	
Tarkkailette myyntihenkilöiden suoritusnäitä kentällä	1	2	3	4	5	
Seuraatte tarkasti myyntihenkilöiden kuluja	1	2	3	4	5	
Kiinnitätte huomiota myyntihenkilöiden matkojen määrään	1	2	3	4	5	
Missä määrin Te:	Erittäm vähän		Jossam määrin		Erittäm paljon	
Kiinnitätte huomiota myyntitimesten asiakkaalleen myöntämiin maksuehtoihin	1	2	3	4	5	
Rohkaiset te myyntihenkilöitteenne kasvattamaan myyntiään palkitsemalla heitä saavutuksistaan	1	2	3	4	5	
Osallistutte aktiivisesti myyntihenkilöiden työvalmennukseen	1	2	3	4	5	
Käytätte säännöllisesti aikaa myyntihenkilöidenne valmentamiseen	1	2	3	4	5	
Keskustelette suoritusten arvioimisesta myyntihenkilöitteenne kanssa	1	2	3	4	5	
Autat te myyntihenkilöitteenne kehittämään taitojaan	1	2	3	4	5	
Arvioitte myyntihenkilöidenne myyntikäyntien määrää	1	2	3	4	5	
Arvioitte kukin myyntihenkilön saavuttamaa osuutta tiimin myynnin katteesta	1	2	3	4	5	
Arvioitte kukin myyntihenkilön myyntituloksia	1	2	3	4	5	
Arvioitte myyntihenkilöiden tekemien myyntiesitysten laatua	1	2	3	4	5	
Arvioitte myyntihenkilöiden ammatillista kehitystä	1	2	3	4	5	
Annatte palautetta myyntihenkilön suorituksesta säännöllisesti	1	2	3	4	5	

Missä määrin Te:	Erittäin vähän		Jossain määrin		Erittäin paljon
Palkitsette myyntihenkilöitä heidän myyntityön laadun perusteella	1	2	3	4	5
Käytätte kannustepalkkaa päämenetelmänä myyntihenkilöiden motivoimisessa	1	2	3	4	5
Palkitsette myyntihenkilöitä heidän myyntimääränsä (lkm) perusteella	1	2	3	4	5
Palkitsette myyntihenkilöitä myyntitulosten perusteella	1	2	3	4	5
Käytätte muita kuin rahallisia kannusteita myyntihenkilöiden saavutusten palkitsemiseen	1	2	3	4	5
Teette kannustepalkkiopäätökset myyntihenkilön tekemän myynnin perusteella	1	2	3	4	5

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa kuinka tärkeänä uskotte **Teidän** esimiestenne pitävän seuraavia asioita arvioidessaan **Teidän** **suorittumistanne** myyntipäällikkönä.

	Ei lainkaan tärkeinä		Melko tärkeinä		Erittäin tärkeinä
Myyntihenkilöiden päivittäiset aktiviteetit	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden paperitöiden laatu (esim. raportit)	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden tuotetietous	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden kuluilien tila	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden asiakaspalvelu	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden tekemien myyntikäyntien määrä	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden saavuttama osuus katteesta	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden myyntitulokset	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden myyntiesitysten laatu	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden ammatillinen kehitys	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden saavuttama myyntivolyymi (lkm)	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilöiden saavuttama myynnin € -määrä	1	2	3	4	5

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa.

	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Yrityksemme ylin johto on antanut ymmärtää, että epäeettistä myyntikäyttäytymistä ei missään nimessä hyväksytä	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksessämme on muodolliset, kirjalliset eettiset pelisäännöt	1	2	3	4	5
Jos yrityksemme myyntihenkilön havaitaan syyllistyneen epäeettiseen käytökseen, joka on tuottanut pääasiassa <i>yritykselle</i> hyötyä, häntä muhdellaan välittömästi	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksemme vaatii ankarasti eettisten pelisääntöjen noudattamista	1	2	3	4	5
Jos yrityksemme myyntihenkilön havaitaan syyllistyneen epäeettiseen käytökseen, joka on tuottanut pääasiassa hänelle <i>henkilökohtaista</i> hyötyä, häntä muhdellaan välittömästi	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksellämme menettelytavat perustuvat eettiseen toimintaan	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksemme vaatii ankarasti eettisten menettelytapojen noudattamista	1	2	3	4	5

Olkaa hyvä ilmoittakaa, missä määrin kenttämyyntihenkilöstönne palkkio riippuu seuraavista asioista **tiimitasolla**.

Myyntihenkilöiden palkitseminen riippuu:	Ei yhtään (0%)..... Erittäin paljon (100%)									
Tiimin tekemien myyntikäyntien määrästä	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Tiimin myynnin tuomasta katteesta	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Tiimin myyntivolyymista (lkm)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Tiimin myynnin arvosta	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Kuinka suuri osa (%) myyntihenkilön kokonaispalkasta riippuu tiimin suoritus tuloksista, eikä yksilöllisistä tuloksista?										%

OSA 2: MYYNTIHENKILÖSTÖNNE TUNTEET JA KÄYTTÄYTYMINEN

Seuraavat kysymykset koskevat myyntihenkilöstöänne. Kysymyksiin ei ole olemassa oikeita tai vääriä vastauksia, olemme vain kiinnostuneita mielipiteestänne siitä, mitä uskotte myyntihenkilöittenne tuntevan ja ajattelevan työstään, sekä miten he sinä käyttäytyvät.

Yleisesti, myyntihenkilöstöni tekee yhteistyötä keskenään:	Erittäin vähän		Jossain määrin		Erittäin paljon		
Parantaakseen myyntitekniikkaansa	1	2	3	4	5		
Tukemalla toisiaan myyntiestysten aikana	1	2	3	4	5		
Huolehtimalla työtovereidensa asiakkaista sillä aikaa kun nämä ovat poissa	1	2	3	4	5		
Auttamalla toisiaan paperitöiden käsittelyssä tarvittaessa	1	2	3	4	5		
Antamalla toisilleen palautetta suorituksen parantamiseksi	1	2	3	4	5		
Käsittelemällä työtovereidensa asiakkaiden valitukset, kun nämä ovat poissa	1	2	3	4	5		
Auttamalla toisiaan asiakasdatan keräämisessä ja tallettamisessa	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenään tietoa kilpailijoista	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenään tietoa tuoteominaisuuksista	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenään tietoa potentiaalisista asiakkaista	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenään tietoa nykyisistä asiakkaista	1	2	3	4	5		
Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa myyntitiiminne tyyppinen suoritus- so seuraavissa asioissa	Tyypillisesti huono		Tyypillisesti keskitasoa		Tyypillisesti erinomainen		
Myyntipalkkio	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntipalkkion kasvatus (viimeiset 6 kk)	1	2	3	4	5		
Bruttovoitto	1	2	3	4	5		
Myytyjen tuotteiden määrä	1	2	3	4	5		
Paperitöiden tarkkuus	1	2	3	4	5		
Ajankäytön hallinta	1	2	3	4	5		
Asiakas esittelyt	1	2	3	4	5		
Hintaneuvottelut	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntitekniikat	1	2	3	4	5		
Olkaa hyvä ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä väittämien kaussa.	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä		
Myyntihenkilöstäni luultavasti usein tuntu siltä, että minä painostan heitä	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntihenkilöstäni luultavasti usein tuntu siltä, että he ovat jatkuvan tark- kailuni alaisena	1	2	3	4	5		
Yritän pitää myyntihenkilöni kiireisinä	1	2	3	4	5		
Usein suhdanteet vaikeuttavat myyntitiimin suoriutumista	1	2	3	4	5		
Luon myyntihenkilöilleni paljon suorituspainetta	1	2	3	4	5		
Maan talouden tila tekee myyntihenkilöitteni toiminnan vaikeaksi	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntihenkilöilläni on todennäköisesti tunne, että minä "kyyttään heitä"	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntihenkilöideni on vaikea saada aikaan myyntituloksia tällä toimialalla	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntihenkilöt todennäköisesti ovat sitä mieltä, että tällä yrityksellä on me- nossa "huono kausi"	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntihenkilöstöni luultavasti tuntevat olevansa paineen alla, koska tällä alalla on rankkaa	1	2	3	4	5		
Teen myyntihenkilöstölleni selväksi sen, että jos he eivät onnistu, heidän työnsä on vaakalaudalla	1	2	3	4	5		
Olen sitä mieltä että:	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä		
Myyntihenkilöitteni moraalikäsitukset ovat korkeaa tasoa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Myyntihenkilöilleni olisi harvinaista käyttää epäeettisiä myyntitekniikoita	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Myyntihenkilöni käyttäytyvät todennäköisesti joskus epäeettisesti	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Myyntihenkilöni ovat pohjimmiltaan erittäin eettisiä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Myyntihenkilöni todennäköisesti käyttäisivät epäeettisiä myyntimenetelmiä jos heidän olisi pakko	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Etikka ei ole kovinkaan merkittävää myyntihenkilöilleni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Seuraavissa tilannekuvauksissa on pääosassa myyntimies nimeltä Pekka. Olkaa hyvä ja kuvitelkaa, että Pekka on tyyppillinen yrityksessänne työskentelevä myyntiurheilija. Olkaa hyvä ja:

- (a) lukekaa seuraavat tilannekuvaukset ja vastatkaa miten uskosisitte Pekkan käyttäytyvän vastaavassa tilanteessa.
 (b) arvioikaa tilannekuvauksen tapausta oheisen asteikon avulla. Näihin kohtiin ei ole olemassa oikeita tai väärä vastauksia, olemme kiinnostuneita vain Teidän mielipiteestänne ja näkemyksistänne.

Pekalla on yksi ostaja, josta hän erityisesti pitää. Heidän vaimonsa ovat myös ystäviä ja heidän lapsensa käyvät samaa koulua. Pekka harkitsee tulisiko hänen antaa tälle ostajalle erityishintaa ja -toimitus, jollaista hän ei antaisi muille asiakkailleen.										
(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka päätyy antamaan erityisen hinnan ja toimituksen?										
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b) Arvioikaa tilannetta seuraavien väittämien avulla.										
					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni										
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin										
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni										
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa										
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin										
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin										
Pekka myy useita toimistokoneita pienelle palveluyritykselle. Kyseinen yritys on valmis ostamaan huippulaatua olevia koneita, vaikka Pekkan mielestä yrityksellä ei ole minkäänlaista tarvetta kaikille lisävarusteille, vaan se hyötyisi enemmän halvemmasta mallista. Pekka harkitsee tulisiko hänen jättää tämä kertomatta ja jatkaa kalliiden koneiden myymistä.										
(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka jatkaa kaupantekoa kertomatta asiakkaalle mielipidettään?										
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b) Arvioikaa tilannetta seuraavien väittämien avulla.										
					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni										
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin										
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni										
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa										
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin										
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin										

Pekan esimies virheellisesti uskoo, että Pekka ansaitsee kiitosta suuren asiakkaan hankkimisesta, ja on siksi ylistänyt Pekkaa henkilökohtaisesti tästä. Tosiasiassa kiitos kuuluu uraansa aloittelevalle myyjälle, joka on jo lähtenyt Pekan yrityksestä. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen ottaa kiitokset itselleen, väärinkäsityksen korjaamisen asemesta.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka päättää ottaa kiitokset itselleen?											
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä	
Teosta aiheutuva <i>kokonaisvahinko</i> on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on lähteneen myyjähenkilön henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekan pomo pitää menettelytapojen raportointia sekä suuria myyntikäyntimääriä erittäin tärkeinä. Pekka ei ole onnistunut valkuuttamaan pomoaan siitä, että hän on tehokkaampi tehdessään harvempia, mutta paremmin suunnattuja käyntejä. Pekka pohtii tulisiko hänen miellyttää pomoaan liioittelemalla tekemiensä myyntikäyntien määrää.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka liioittelee tekemiensä myyntikäyntien määrää pomolleen?											
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä	
Teosta aiheutuva <i>kokonaisvahinko</i> on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on pomon henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekka on neuvottelemassa suuren tilauksen viimeisiä yksityiskohtia. Asiakas vaatii erään pienen lisäpalvelun saamista, jota Pekka ei usko voivansa toteuttaa. Pekka tietää, että hän voi lyödä kaupan lukkoon lupaamalla lisäpalvelun nyt, tarpeen vaatiessa hän voi myöhemmin syyttää yritystä siitä, ettei se pysty toimittamaan tätä lisäpalvelua.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka lupaa asiakkaalle kyseisen lisäpalvelun?											
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä	
Teosta aiheutuva <i>kokonaisvahinko</i> on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekalla on myytävänä tuote, joka menee kuin kuumille kiville. Hän tietää, että voi myydä myös muita tuotelinjan tuotteita väittämällä asiakkaille, että "hittituote" pakataan yhteen toisen, vähemmän suosittuun, tuotteen kanssa, vaikka tämä itse asiassa on bluffausta. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen käyttää tätä strategiaa.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka käyttää tätä strategiaa?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.

	Täysin eri mieltä			En samaa eikä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Pekka on suhteellisen kokematon myyntimies, jolla on vaikeuksia tulla toimeen mielestään riittämättömän palkkansa avulla. Silloin tällöin Pekka viekin vaimonsa ulos syömään ja laskuttaa yritystä, koska hän ajattelee, että hän tekee kovasti töitä ja siksi ansaitsee yritykseltä etuja.

(a) Kuinka todennäköistä on että Pekka tekee näin?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.

	Täysin eri mieltä			En samaa eikä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Pekka myi erälle suurista asiakkaistaan suuren erän, joka toimitettiin noin kaksi viikkoa sitten. Pekka on juuri huomannut, että toimitettu tavara olikin halvempaa ja alempiarvoista kuin se, mitä asiakas oli tilannut. Tämän lisäksi asiakkaalta jäi tämä toimituksen virhe huomaamatta. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen jättää ilmoittamatta tästä toimitusvirheestä asiakkaalle.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka jättää ilmoittamatta virheestä?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.

	Täysin eri mieltä			En samaa eikä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Jos Pekka on asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Pekan esimies painostaa tätä hankkimaan erään suuren asiakkaan, joka ei ole koskaan aikaisemmin tehnyt suuria tilauksia Pekan firmalta. Pekka on tehnyt useita lähestymisyrittäksiä, mutta ne eivät ole johtaneet mihinkään. Pekka on kuitenkin kuullut, että ainoa tapa saada kyseinen asiakas, on tarjota firman ostajalle lahja. Pekka harkitsee lahjan antamista kyseiselle ostajalle.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka päättää antaa lahjan?											
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.				Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä						Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekka on havainnut, että lioittelemalla asiakkaan ongelmaa hän saattaa saada asiakkaan tekemään suuremman tilauksen. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen käyttää tätä strategiaa myyntityössään.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka lioittelee asiakkaan ongelmaa?											
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.				Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä						Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekka pohtii tulisiko hänen ottaa korkeampi hinta sellaisilta ostajilta, joille hän tietää olevansa ainoa tavarantoimittaja, kuin niiltä, jotka käyttävät useita tavarantoimittajia.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka tekee näin?											
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.				Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä						Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on tämän ostajan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Olkaa hyvä, ja ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.

Myyntihenkilöni todennäköisesti tuntevat, että:

	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä			Vahvasti samaa mieltä	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jos he eivät suoriudu, on heidän työpaikkansa vaarassa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Heidän elantonsa on suoraan suljettu heidän suorituksensa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jos he tahtovat menestyä, heillä on itsellään vastuu sen toteuttamisesta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
He ovat valtavan suorituspaineen alaisina	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Alhainen suoritusaso tarkoittaa, että heidän työpaikkansa on uhattuna	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Heidän on saavutettava tavoitteet, voidakseen huntea olevansa turvallisessa asemassa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Tavoitteet voivat nousta, mutta ne on silti saavutettava	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Heidän työnsä on erittäin paineenaista	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

OSA 3: TOIMIALANNE

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa.

	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä			Vahvasti samaa mieltä	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Toimialallamme on muodolliset eettiset pelisäännöt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sanoisin, että yleensä ottaen myyntihenkilöt tällä toimialalla ovat aika eettisiä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
On olemassa muodollinen valvontaelin, joka arvioi myyntikäyttäytymisen eettisyyttä tällä toimialalla	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Toimialamme on aika epäeettinen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Toimialamme eettisten pelisääntöjen toteuttamista valvotaan tarkasti	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Tämän alan myyntihenkilöt valmistetaan tietoisiksi alan eettisistä pelisäännöistä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Tällä alalla on omat epämuodolliset mekanisminsa, joilla varmistetaan myyntihenkilöiden eettinen käytös	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jos myyntihenkilö jäisi kiinni epäeettisestä käyttäytymisestä, siitä seuraisi paljon julkisuutta tällä alalla	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Myyntihenkilön täytyy joskus olla jokseenkin epäeettinen, jotta voi menestyä tällä alalla	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jos myyntihenkilö käyttäytyisi epäeettisesti tällä alalla, siitä saattaisi koitua suurta vahinkoa yritykselle	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä			Vahvasti samaa mieltä	
Toimialallamme kilpailu on erittäin kireää	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Toimialallamme käydään paljon "menekinedistämistelua"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Toimisipa jokin kilpailija alallamme miten tahansa, niin muut pystyvät nopeasti samaan	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hintakilpailu on tämän alan tunnusmerkki	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Toimialallamme kuulee uusista kilpailutoimenpiteistä lähes joka päivä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kilpailijamme ovat suhteellisen heikkoja	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä			Vahvasti samaa mieltä	
Asiakkaidemme markkinatietous on vahvaa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Asiakkaamme kykenevät tunkimaan kauppaehtoja	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20% asiakkaistamme vastaa 80%:sta myynnistämme	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Suuri osa asiakkaistamme voisi ostaa tuotteensa suoraan valmistajilta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Valmistajan tuotemerkki ei ole tärkeä ostokriteeri tuotteillemme	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Asiakkaalle uusien tavarantoimittajien etsimisen ja vaihtamisen kustannukset ovat alhaisia	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Tämän toimialan asiakkaat eivät pidä tärkeänä tietyn toimittajan tuotemerkin ostamista	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Asiakkaillamme on hyvä käsitys tuotteidemme meille koituvista kustannuksista	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Asiakkaillamme tuotteen laadun tärkeys ostokriteerinä on alhainen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa?	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä					Täysin samaa mieltä
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen myyntialueideni asiakasmäärään	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen myyntialueillani tehtyjen myyntikäyntien määrään	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen myyntialueillani tarvittavien työmaikkojen määrään	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen myyntialueideni markkinapotentiaaliin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mielestäni yritykseni myyntihenkilöiden alueiden vaatima työ määrä on jakautunut tasapuolisesti	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen yleisesti myyntialueiden suunnitteluun	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Millaisia tuotteita tai palveluja yrityksenne myy? Olkaa hyvä ja rastittakaa sopivimmat vaihtoehdot.

Teollisuustuotteet

Elintarvikkeet, juomat ja tupakat	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tekstiilit ja vaatteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Puutavara ja puutuotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Massa, paperi ja paperituotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kemikaalit ja kemialliset tuotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kumi- ja muovituotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Perusmetallit ja metallituotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Koneet ja laitteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sähkötekniset tuotteet ja optiset laitteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kulkuneuvot	<input type="checkbox"/>
Muu teollisuus	<input type="checkbox"/>
Maa- ja metsätaloustuotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kalataloustuotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mineraalien kaivutuotteet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sähkö, kaasu, ja vesi	<input type="checkbox"/>

Rakennustyö, rakennukset, maa	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kauppa-, hotelli- tai ravintolapalvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kuljetus tai varastointipalvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kommunikaatiopalvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Liiketoimintapalvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Maatalouspalvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kaivospalvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Valmistuspalvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yhteiskunnalliset tai sosiaaliset palvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Henkilökohtaiset palvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mnnt palvelut	<input type="checkbox"/>

Mikä on keskimääräinen kertamyynnin arvo yrityksenne tuotteilla tai palveluilla? _____ €

Kuinka monta kertamyyntiä keskimäärin myyntihenkilönne tekevät vuodessa? _____ n. _____ kpl/myyntihenkilö

OSA 4: TE ITSE JA KÄSITYKSENNE ETIIKASTA

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa.

	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä					Täysin samaa mieltä
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mikä on eettistä, vaihtelee tilanteesta ja yhteisöstä toiseen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moraalikäsitykset pitäisi nähdä yksilöllisenä; mitä toinen pitää moraalisena voi toisen mielestä olla moraalitonta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Erilaisia moraalikäsitteitä ei voida pitää "oikeudenmukaisuuden" määritteenä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kysymykset siitä mikä on eettistä jäävät aina ratkaisematta, koska se mikä on moraalista, ja mikä ei, riippuu yksilöstä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moraalikäsitykset ovat yksinkertaisesti henkilökohtaisia sääntöjä siitä, miten ihmisen tulisi käyttäytyä, eivätkä ne sovi toisten ihmisten tuomitsemiseen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Eettisen arvot henkilöiden välisistä suhteista ovat niin monimutkaisia, että yksilöiden pitäisi antaa muodostaa omat yksilölliset sääntönsä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jäykästi koodatut eettiset säännöt, jotka estävät tietynlaiset toiminnot saattavat olla hyvien ihmissuhteiden ja sovittelun esteinä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Valehtelua koskevaa sääntöä ei voida muodostaa, koska valheen hyväksyttävyyys, tai hyväksymättömyys, riippuu täysin tilanteesta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Päätös jonkin asian tekemisestä tai tekemättä jättämisestä vertaamalla tämän asian positiivisia ja negatiivisia seurauksia on moraalitonta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Valheen tuomitseminen moraaliseksi tai moraalittomaksi riippuu valehtelutilanteen olosuhteista	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä					Täysin samaa mieltä
Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa.							
Toisille koituvia riskejä ei koskaan tulisi suvaita, rippumatta siitä miten pieniä riskit ovat	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jos on olemassa mahdollisuus, että teosta koituu toisille vahinkoa, teko on mielestäni aina väärin, rippumatta eduista, joita teolla voidaan saavuttaa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kenenkään ei pitäisi koskaan vahingoittaa toista psyykkisesti tai fyysisesti	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kenenkään ei pitäisi koskaan tehdä mitään, mikä saattaisi millään tavoin uhata toisen kunniaa tai hyvinvointia	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jos jokin teko voi vahingoittaa syytöntä sivullista, sitä ei pitäisi tehdä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Henkilön tulisi varmistaa, ettei hänen tekonsa koskaan tarkoituksellisesti vahingoita toista, edes pienessä määrin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ihmisten kunnioituksen ja hyvinvoinnin pitäisi olla tärkeimpiä asioita kaikissa yhteisöissä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Koskaan ei ole tarpeellista uhrata muiden hyvinvointia	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moraaliset teot vastaavat lähimmäisen ”täydellisen” teon ihanteita	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ei ole niin tärkeitä eettisiä periaatteita, että niiden pitäisi olla osana mitään eettisiä ohjesääntöjä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Missä määrin väittämät pitävät Teidän osaltanne paikkansa.	Ei pidä lainkaan paikkansa	Pitää vain osin paikkansa	En osaa sanoa	Pitää pääosin paikkansa	Pitää paikkansa
Olen aina kohtelias, niillekin jotka ovat epämiellyttäviä	1	2	3	4	5
On ollut tilanteita, joissa olen käyttänyt muuta hyväkseni	1	2	3	4	5
Joskus yritän antaa takaisin, mieluummin kun antaa anteeksi ja unohtaa	1	2	3	4	5
Joskus tulen vihaiseksi, kun en saa tahtoani läpi	1	2	3	4	5
Olen aina hyvä kuuntelija, rippumatta keskustelukumppanistani	1	2	3	4	5

Lopuksi muutama kysymys taustatietojenne selvittämiseksi.

Ikä? _____ vuotta	Sukupuoli?
Kuinka pitkään olette työskennellyt myyntitehtävissä? _____ vuotta	<input type="checkbox"/> Mies
	<input type="checkbox"/> Nainen
Kuinka kauan olette työskennelleet tässä organisaatiossa? _____ vuotta	Mikä on koulutustasonne?
	<input type="checkbox"/> Perus- tai kansakoulu
	<input type="checkbox"/> Lukio
	<input type="checkbox"/> Kauppa- tai ammattikoulu
	<input type="checkbox"/> Opistotason tutkinto
	<input type="checkbox"/> Alempi korkeakoulututkinto
	<input type="checkbox"/> Ylempi korkeakoulututkinto
	<input type="checkbox"/> Muu, mikä? _____

Arvioikaa, mikä on yrityksenne vuosittainen kokonaisliikevaihto.....	_____ €
Arvioikaa, kuinka monta henkilöä työskentelee yrityksessänne.....	_____ henkilöä
Millä toimialalla sanoisitte yrityksenne toimivan.....	_____

KIITOS LOMAKKEEN TÄYTTÄMISESTÄ!!!

Jos teillä on kysyttävää, lisättävää tai muuten kommentoitavaa, olkaa hyvä ja käytäkää tämän sivun toista puolta.

Jos haluatte vastaanottaa tiivistelmän tutkimuksen tuloksista tai välttyä muistutuspostitukselta, olkaa hyvä ja liittäkää vastauskuoreen käyntikorttinne tai kirjoittakaa sähköpostiosoitteenne sivun toiselle puolelle.

KIITOKSIA AJASTANNE,
ARVOSTAMME SUURESTI VAIVANNÄKÖÄNNE.

**PALKKAUS- JA VALVONTAMENETELMIEN VAIKUTUS
KENTTÄMYYNTIHENKILÖSTÖN KÄYTTÄYTYMISEEN
JA SUORITUSTASOON**

KYSELYLOMAKE MYYNTIHENKILÖILLE

Lomakkeen kysymyksiin ei ole olemassa oikeita tai väärää vastauksia.
Olemme kiinnostuneita vain teidän mielipiteistänne ja näkemyksistänne.

Saadut vastaukset käsitellään luottamuksellisesti.

Lomake

Yhteystiedot:

**LAPPEENRANNAN TEKNILLINEN YLIOPISTO
KAUPPATIETEIDEN OSASTO**

Anssi Tarkiainen
PL 20, 53851 Lappeenranta

puh. 05 – 621 6985

OSA 1: TE JA TEIDÄN TYÖTEHTÄVÄNNE

Kuinka suuri osa palkastanne maksetaan kiinteänä palkkana?..... %
 Kuinka suuri osa palkastanne maksetaan provisiona tai bonuksena?..... %
 Onko Teillä täytettävänäne ennalta määrätty myyntikiintiö?..... Kyllä Ei

Mikä on keskimääräinen kertamyynnin arvo yrityksenne tuotteilla tai palveluilla?..... €

Kuinka monta kertamyyntiä keskimäärin teette vuodessa?..... n. _____ kpl/myyntihenkilö

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Uskon vakaasti, että voin yksin voittaa työssäni eteen tulevat esteet	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Minun pitäisi henkilökohtaisesti olla vastuussa, jos en yllä myyntikiintiöihin	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Myyntikäyttämiseni vaikuttaa erittäin paljon myyntituloksiini	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Myyntisuoritukseni riippuu vahvasti omista ponnistuksistani	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Loistavaksi myyntityksiksi tuleminen riippuu pääasiassa ajoituksesta ja tilaisuudesta	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Hyvä tuuri voi melkoisella todennäköisyydellä olla tärkeämpää kuin oma kyky ja innostus työhön	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Päivän myyntitulokseni on sattumanvaraista	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Tarvitaan hyvää onnea ja tuuria vieraiksi saamiseksi	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Uskon, että ne joilla on valtaa, vaikuttavat eniten myyntimenestykseen	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Myyntityö ei voi olla tehokasta ilman tärkeiden ihmisten apua	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Päteväksi myyntihenkilöksi tuleminen riippuu korkeammassa asemassa olevien ihmisten antaman avun määrästä	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Omnistumismahdollisuuteni työssäni ovat usein muiden ihmisten käsissä	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Kun suoriudun hyvin, tiedän että se johtuu omasta halustani saada aikaan tuloksia	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Tunnen syvää henkilökohtaista tyydytystä, kun teen työni hyvin	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Menestyväksi myyjäksi tuleminen on sitä mitä haluan	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Työni kasvattaa omanarvon tuntoani	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Kun teen työni hyvin, saan siitä saavutuksen tunteen	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Työssäni suoriutumiseni edistää henkistä kasvua ja kehitystäni	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Jos en saisi tästä hyvää palkkaa, en tekisi tätä työtä laisinkaan	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Myynti, koska minulle maksetaan myynnistä	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Pitkän päivän jälkeen usein mietin, että jos en saisi tällaista palkkaa, en kestäisi tällaista työtä	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Tahdon mieluummin olla varma asiasta, ennen kuin toimin	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Vältän asioita ja tekoja joihin liittyy riski	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Katson mieluummin kuin kadun	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen myyntialueeni asiakkaiden määrään	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen tekemiini myyntikäyntien määrään	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen myyntialueellani tarvittavien työmatkojen määrään	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen myyntialueeni markkinapotentiaaliin	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Suhteessa työtovereihini myyntialueeni asiakas määrä on pienempi	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Myyntialueeni markkinapotentiaali on parempi kuin työtovereillani	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Verrattuna työtovereihini minun myyntialueeni vaatii suuremman työmäärän	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Olen erittäin tyytyväinen yleisesti myyntialueiden suunnitteluun	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	

Mitä mieltä olette omasta myyntikiintiöstänne? (Jos Teillä ei ole määriteltyä myyntikiintiötä, siirrykää seuraavaan kysymykseen)	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Minulle osoitettu myyntikiintiö on erittäin vaikea täyttää	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
On helppoa saavuttaa minulle osoitettu myyntikiintiö	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	
Mahdollisuudet myyntikiintiön saavuttamiseen ovat mielestäni	Huonot	Hyvät	
	1	2 3 4 5 6 7	

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Ihminen täytyy tehdä vastapalvelus, jos työoveri ojentaa auttavan kätensä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Tuimtyön tekemisestä on vain hyötyä eikä lainkaan haittaa	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Työtoverin apu on korvaamatonta hyvien myyntitulosten saavuttamisessa	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olisin valmis vaihtamaan työpaikkaa jos uusi työ antaisi 25 % palkankorotuksen	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olisin valmis vaihtamaan työpaikkaa jos uusi työ tarjoaisi enemmän "luovaa vapautta"	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olisin valmis vaihtamaan työpaikkaa jos uusi työ tarjoaisi minulle korkeamman aseman	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olisin valmis vaihtamaan työpaikkaa jos uudessa työpaikassa olisi ystävällisempiä ihmisiä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Mikä on eettistä, vaihtelee tilanteesta ja yhteisöstä toiseen	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Moraalikäsitykset pitäisi nähdä yksilöllisenä, mitä toinen pitää moraalisenä voi toisen mielestä olla moraalitonta	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Erilaisia moraalikäsitteitä ei voida pitää "oikeudenmukaisuuden" määritteenä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Kysynykset siitä mikä on eettistä jäävät aina ratkaisematta, koska se mikä on moraalista, ja mikä ei, riippuu yksilöstä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Moraalikäsitykset ovat yksinkertaisesti henkilökohtaisia sääntöjä siitä, miten ihmisen tulisi käyttäytyä, eivätkä ne sovi toisten ihmisten tuomitsemiseen	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Eettiset arviot henkilöiden välisistä suhteista ovat niin monimutkaisia, että yksilöiden pitäisi antaa muodostaa omat yksilölliset sääntönsä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Jäykästi koodatut eettiset säännöt, jotka estävät tietynlaiset toiminnot saattavat olla hyvien ihmisuhteiden ja sovittelun esteinä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Valehtelua koskevaa sääntöä ei voida muodostaa, koska valheen hyväksyttävyyys, tai hyväksymättömyys, riippuu täysin tilanteesta	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Päätös jonkin asian tekemisestä tai tekemättä jättämisestä vertaamalla tämän asian positiivisia ja negatiivisia seurauksia on moraalitonta	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Valheen tuomitseminen moraaliseksi tai moraalittomaksi riippuu valehtelutilanteen olosuhteista	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Toisille koituvia riskejä ei koskaan tulisi suvaita, riippumatta siitä miten pieniä riskit ovat	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Jos on olemassa mahdollisuus, että teosta koituu toisille vahinkoa, teko on mielestäni aina väärin, riippumatta eduista joita voidaan teolla saavuttaa	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Kenenkään ei pitäisi koskaan vahingoittaa toista psyykkisesti tai fyysisesti	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Kenenkään ei pitäisi koskaan tehdä mitään, mikä saattaisi mullaan tavoin uhata toisen kunniaa tai hyvinvointia	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Jos jokin teko voi vahingoittaa syytöntä sivullista, sitä ei pitäisi tehdä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Henkilön tulisi varmistaa, ettei hänen tekonsa koskaan tarkoitusperäisesti vahingoita toista, edes pienessä määrin	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Ihmisten kunnioituksen ja hyvinvoinnin pitäisi olla tärkeimpiä asioita kaikissa yhteisöissä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Koskaan ei ole tarpeellista uhrata muiden hyvinvointia	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Moraaliset teot vastaavat läheisesti "täydellisen" teon ihanteita	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Ei ole niin tärkeitä eettisiä periaatteita, että niiden pitäisi olla osana mitään eettisiä ohjesääntöjä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Jätän tietyt työtehtävät tekemättä, koska johto ei valvo niiden tekemistä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Tee tarpeettomia tehtäviä, koska johto seuraa ja arvioi niiden suoritusta	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Vaikka myyntitulosteni taso vaihtelisi, pyrkisin silti esittämään ne tasaisena jatkumona	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olen nautunut myyntitietojani niin, että suoritukseni näyttäisi olevan osastoni myyntitavoitteiden mukaisia	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Kun esitän suoritustietojani myyntijohtajalle, pyrin korostamaan tietoja, jotka ovat omalta kannaltani suotuisia	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Kun esitän suoritustietojani myyntijohtajalle, pyrin välttämään huonojen uutisten esittämistä	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Olen sitä mieltä että:	Vahvasti eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Tiedän mitkä ovat velvollisuuteni tässä työssä	1	2 3 4	5
Tiedän tarkalleen mitä minulta odotetaan tässä työssä	1	2 3 4	5
Tunnen työni laajuuden	1	2 3 4	5
Tunnen tarkalleen omat valtuuteni tässä työssä	1	2 3 4	5

Seuraavissa tilannekuvauksissa on pääosassa myyntimies nimeltä Pekka. Kuvitelkaa, että Pekka on tyyppinen yrityk-
sessänne työskentelevä myyntituntinne jäsen. Olkaa hyvä ja:

- (a) lukekaa seuraavat tilannekuvaukset ja arvioikaa miten todennäköisesti Pekka käyttäytyisi kuvauksessa esitellyllä tavalla.
(b) arvioikaa tilannekuvauksen tapausta oheisen asteikon avulla. Näihin kohtiin ei ole olemassa oikeita tai vääriä vastauksia, olemme kiinnostuneita vain Teidän mielipiteestänne ja näkemyksistänne.

Pekalla on yksi ostaja, josta hän erityisesti pitää. Heidän vaimonsa ovat myös ystäviä ja heidän lapsensa käyvät samaa koulua. Pekka harkitsee tulisiko hänen antaa tälle ostajalle erityishintaa ja -toimitus, jollaista hän ei antaisi muille asiakkailleen.										
(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka päätyy antamaan erityisen hinnan ja toimituksen?										
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b) Arvioikaa tilannetta seuraavien väittämien avulla.										
					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni										
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin										
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni										
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa										
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin										
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin										
Pekka myy useita toimistokoneita pienelle palveluyritykselle. Kyseinen yritys on valmis ostamaan huippulaatua olevia koneita, vaikka Pekan mielestä yrityksellä ei ole minkäänlaista tarvetta kaikille lisävarusteille, vaan se hyötyisi enemmän halvemmasta mallista. Pekka harkitsee tulisiko hänen jättää tämä kertomatta ja jatkaa kalliiden koneiden myymistä.										
(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka jatkaa kaupantekoa kertomatta asiakkaalle mielipidettään?										
Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b) Arvioikaa tilannetta seuraavien väittämien avulla.										
					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni										
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin										
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni										
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa										
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin										
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin										

Pekka esimes virheellisesti uskoo, että Pekka ansaitsee kiitosta suuren asiakkaan hankkimisesta, ja on siksi ylistänyt Pekkaa henkilökohtaisesti tästä. Tosiasiassa kiitos kuuluu uraansa aloittelevalle myyjälle, joka on jo lähtenyt Pekkan yrityksestä. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen ottaa kiitokset itselleen, väärinkäsityksen korjaamisen asemesta.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka päättää ottaa kiitokset itselleen?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.											
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni					Täysin eri mieltä			En samaa enkä eri mieltä			Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuva vahinko, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on lähtenyt myyntihenkilön henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekka pomo pitää menettelytapojen raportointia sekä suuria myyntikäyntimääriä erittäin tärkeinä. Pekka ei ole onnistunut vakuuttamaan pomoaan siitä, että hän on tehokkaampi tehdessään harvempia, mutta paremmin suunnattuja käyntejä. Pekka poltti tulisiko hänen miellyttää pomoaan liioittelemalla tekemiensä myyntikäyntien määrää.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka liioittelee tekemiensä myyntikäyntien määrää pomolleen?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.											
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni					Täysin eri mieltä			En samaa enkä eri mieltä			Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuva vahinko, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on pomon henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekka on neuvottelemassa suuren tilauksen viimeisiä yksityiskohtia. Asiakas vaatii erään pienen lisäpalvelun saamisesta, jota Pekka ei usko voivansa toteuttaa. Pekka tietää, että hän voi lyödä kaupan lukkoon lupaamalla lisäpalvelun nyt; tarpeen vaatiessa hän voi myöhemmin syyttää yritystä siitä, ettei se pysty toimittamaan tätä lisäpalvelua.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka lupaa asiakkaalle kyseisen lisäpalvelun?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.											
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni					Täysin eri mieltä			En samaa enkä eri mieltä			Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni											
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin											
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuva vahinko, on pieni											
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa											
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin											
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin											

Pekalla on myytävänä tuote, joka menee kuin kuumille kiville. Hän tietää, että voi myydä myös muita tuotelinjan tuotteita väittämällä asiakkaille, että "hittituote" pakataan yhteen toisen, vähemmän suosittuun, tuotteen kanssa, vaikka tämä itse asiassa on bluffausta. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen käyttää tätä strategiaa.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka käyttää tätä strategiaa?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni										
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin										
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni										
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa										
Jos Pekka on kyseisen asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin										
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin										

Pekka on suhteellisen kokematon myyntimies, jolla on vaikeuksia tulla toimeen mielestään riittämättömän palkkansa avulla. Silloin tällöin Pekka viekin vaimonsa ulos syömään ja laskuttaa yritystä, koska hän ajattelee, että hän tekee kovasti töitä ja siksi ansaitsee yritykseltä etuja.

(a) Kuinka todennäköistä on että Pekka tekee näin?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni										
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin										
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni										
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa										
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin										

Pekka myi erälle suurista asiakkaistaan suuren erän, joka toimitettiin noin kaksi viikkoa sitten. Pekka on juuri huomannut, että toimitettu tavara olikin halvempaa ja alempiarvoista kuin se, mitä asiakas oli tilannut. Tämän lisäksi asiakkaalta jäi tämä toimituksen virhe huomaamatta. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen jättää ilmoittamatta tästä toimitusvirheestä asiakkaalle.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka jättää ilmoittamatta virheestä?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(b) Arvioikaa tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.					Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä				Täysin samaa mieltä
Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni										
Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin										
Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni										
Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa										
Jos Pekka on asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin										
Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin										

Pekka esinies painostaa tätä hankkimaan erään suuren asiakkaan, joka ei ole koskaan aikaisemmin tehnyt suuria tilauksia Pekka firmalta. Pekka on tehnyt useita lähestymisyrittäyksiä, mutta ne eivät ole johtaneet mihinkään. Pekka on kuitenkin kuullut, että ainoa tapa saada kyseinen asiakas, on tarjota firman ostajalle lahja. Pekka harkitsee lahjan antamista kyseiselle ostajalle.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka päättää antaa lahjan?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.

	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä						Täysin samaa mieltä	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni

Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin

Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni

Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa

Jos Pekka on asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin

Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin

Pekka on havainnut, että lioittelemalla asiakkaan ongelmaa hän saattaa saada asiakkaan tekemään suuremman tilauksen. Pekka miettii tulisiko hänen käyttää tätä strategiaa myyntityössään.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka lioittelee asiakkaan ongelmaa?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.

	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä						Täysin samaa mieltä	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni

Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin

Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni

Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa

Jos Pekka on asiakkaan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin

Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin

Pekka poltti tulisiko hänen ottaa korkeampi hinta sellaisilta ostajilta, joille hän tietää olevansa ainoa tavarantoimittaja, kum niiltä, jotka käyttävät useita tavarantoimittajia.

(a) Kuinka todennäköisesti Pekka tekee näin?

Täysin epätodennäköisesti	Erittäin epätodennäköisesti	Melko epätodennäköisesti	Se on ehkä mahdollista	Se on mahdollista	Se on melko mahdollista	Se on hyvin mahdollista	Todennäköisesti	Erittäin todennäköisesti	Melko varmasti	Aivan varmasti
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Arvioi tapausta seuraavien väittämien avulla.

	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa eikä eri mieltä						Täysin samaa mieltä	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Teosta aiheutuva kokonaisvahinko on erittäin pieni

Useimmat ihmiset olisivat sitä mieltä, että kyseinen teko on väärin

Todennäköisyys, että teosta aiheutuu vahinkoa, on pieni

Teosta ei aiheudu mielestäni mitään vahinkoa lähitulevaisuudessa

Jos Pekka on tämän ostajan henkilökohtainen ystävä, teko on mielestäni väärin

Teosta aiheutuva vahinko kohdistuu vain harvoihin henkilöihin

Olkaa hyvä ja arvioikaa myyntitiimianne. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.							Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä
Yrityksemme myyntihenkilöiden moraalikäsitketykset ovat korkeaa tasoa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Yrityksemme myyntihenkilöille olisi harvasta käyttää epäeettisiä myyntimenetelmiä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Yrityksemme myyntihenkilöt käyttäytyvät todennäköisesti joskus epäeettisesti	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Yrityksemme myyntihenkilöt ovat pohjimmiltaan erittäin eettisiä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Yrityksemme myyntihenkilöt todennäköisesti käyttäisivät epäeettisiä myyntimenetelmiä jos heidän olisi pakko	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Etikka ei ole kovinkaan merkittävää myyntihenkilölle	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Missä määrin väittämät pitävät Teidän osaltanne paikkansa.	Ei pidä lainkaan paikkansa	Pitää vain osin paikkansa	En osaa sanoa	Pitää pääosin paikkansa	Pitää paikkansa				
Olen aina kohtelias, millekin jotka ovat epämiellyttäviä	1	2	3	4	5				
On ollut tilanteita, joissa olen käyttänyt muita hyväkseni	1	2	3	4	5				
Joskus yritän antaa takaisin, mieluummin kuin antaa anteeksi ja unohtaa	1	2	3	4	5				
Joskus tulen vihaiseksi, kun en saa tahtoaani läpi	1	2	3	4	5				
Olen aina hyvä kuuntelija, riippumatta keskustelukumppanistani	1	2	3	4	5				
Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä						
Autan niitä työtovereitani, joilla on suuri työ määrä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Autan mielelläni niitä, jotka ovat olleet poissa töistä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Autan mielelläni niitä, joilla on työhön liittyviä ongelmia	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Autan ohjaamaan uusia työntekijöitä, vaikka sitä ei minulta vaaditakaan	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Mietin, miten tekoni vaikuttavat työtovereihini	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Kiinnitän huomiota siihen, miten käyttäytymiseni vaikuttaa muihin ihmisiin	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Käytän paljon aikaa yksinkertaisista asioista valittamiseen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Minulla on tapana "tehdä karpäsestä härkänen"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Keskityn aina siihen mikä on huonosti, enkä miinkään asian positiiviseen puoleen	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Moitin aina sitä mitä yritys tekee	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Osallistun kokouksiin, jotka eivät ole pakollisia, mutta joita pidetään tärkeinä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Osallistun toimintaan, jota ei minulta edellytetä, mutta joka parantaa yrityksen imagoa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Luen ja pysyn ajan tasalla yrityksen ilmoituksista, viesteistä, muistioista, jne	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Seuraan yrityksen kehitystä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	En samaa enkä eri mieltä	Täysin samaa mieltä						
Yritän työssäni selvittää asiakkaan tarpeet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Minulla on mielessäni asiakkaan etu, kun teen työtäni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Myydessäni tuotteita tai palvellessani asiakkaita käytän ongelmanratkaisun perustuvaa lähestymistapaa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Suosittelen tuotteita tai palveluita, jotka parhaiten sopivat asiakkaan ongelmanratkaisuun	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Yritän selvittää millaiset tuotteet tai palvelut auttaisivat eniten asiakkaitamme	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Pyrin myymään niin paljon kuin voin, mieluummin kuin vain tyydyttämään asiakkaan tarpeet	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Mielestäni totuuden vääristämisen on välttämätöntä myyntiesityksissä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Yritän saada asiakkaan ostamaan niin paljon kuin mahdollista, jopa yli sen määrän mitä asiakas tarvitsee	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Maalaan tuotteista tai palveluista liian ruusuisen kuvan, jotta saan ne kuulostamaan mahdollisimman hyviltä	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Perustan suositteluni siihen mitä uskon voivani myydä, enkä siihen mikä on asiakkaan pitkäaikaisen hyvödyn mukaista	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		

OSA 2: TOIMIALANNE

Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä	1	2	3	4	5	Täysin samaa mieltä
Toimialallamme on muodolliset eettiset pelisäännöt	1	2	3	4	5		
Sanoisin, että yleensä ottaen myyntihenkilöt tällä toimialalla ovat aika eettisiä	1	2	3	4	5		
On olemassa muodollinen valvontaelin, joka arvioi myyntikäyttäytymisen eettisyyttä tällä toimialalla	1	2	3	4	5		
Toimialamme on aika epäeettinen	1	2	3	4	5		
Toimialamme eettisten pelisääntöjen toteuttamista valvotaan tarkasti	1	2	3	4	5		
Tämän alan myyntihenkilöt valmennetaan tietoisiksi alan eettisistä pelisäännöistä	1	2	3	4	5		
Tällä alalla on omat epämuodolliset mekanisminsa, joilla varmistetaan myyntihenkilöiden eettinen käytös	1	2	3	4	5		
Jos myyntihenkilö jäisi kiinni epäeettisestä käyttäytymisestä, siitä seuraisi paljon julkisuutta tällä alalla	1	2	3	4	5		
Myyntihenkilön täytyy joskus olla joksenkun epäeettinen, jotta voi menestyä tällä alalla	1	2	3	4	5		
Jos myyntihenkilö käyttäytyisi epäeettisesti tällä alalla, siitä saataisi koitua suurta vahinkoa yritykselle	1	2	3	4	5		
Olkaa hyvä ja ilmoittakaa, missä määrin olette samaa mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa. Ympyröikää sopivin vaihtoehto.	Täysin eri mieltä			En samaa mieltä			Täysin samaa mieltä
Toimialallamme kilpailu on erittäin kireää	1	2	3	4	5		
Toimialallamme käydään paljon "menekinedistämistaluttia"	1	2	3	4	5		
Toimisiipa jokin kilpailija alallamme miten tahansa, niin muut pystyvät nopeasti samaan	1	2	3	4	5		
Hintakilpailu on tämän alan tunnusmerkki	1	2	3	4	5		
Toimialallamme kuuluu uusiin kilpailutoimenpiteistä lähes joka päivä	1	2	3	4	5		
Kilpailijamme ovat suhteellisen heikkoja	1	2	3	4	5		
Asiakkaidemme markkinatietoisuus on vahvaa	1	2	3	4	5		
Asiakkaamme kykenevät tinkimään kauppaehtoista	1	2	3	4	5		
20% asiakkaistamme vastaa 80%:sta myymistämme	1	2	3	4	5		
Suuri osa asiakkaistamme voisi ostaa tuotteensa suoraan valmistajilta	1	2	3	4	5		
Valmistajan tuotemerkki ei ole tärkeä ostokriteeri tuotteillemme	1	2	3	4	5		
Asiakkaalle uusien tavarantottajien etsimisen ja vaihtamisen kustannukset ovat alhaisia	1	2	3	4	5		
Tämän toimialan asiakkaat eivät pidä tärkeänä tietyn toimittajan tuotemerkin ostamista	1	2	3	4	5		
Asiakkaillamme on hyvä käsitys tuotteidemme meille koituvista kustannuksista	1	2	3	4	5		
Asiakkaillamme tuotteen laadun tärkeys ostokriteerinä on alhainen	1	2	3	4	5		
Kuinka paljon Teette yhteistyötä muiden myyntitiiminne jäsenten kanssa	Erittäin vähän			Jossain määrin			Erittäin paljon
Parantaaksenne myyntiteknikkaanne	1	2	3	4	5		
Tukemalla toisianne myyntiesitysten aikana	1	2	3	4	5		
Huolehtimalla työtovereittenne asiakkaista sillä aikaa kun nämä ovat poissa	1	2	3	4	5		
Auttamalla toisianne paperitöiden käsittelyssä tarvittaessa	1	2	3	4	5		
Antamalla palautetta toisillenne suoritustenne parantamiseksi	1	2	3	4	5		
Käsittelimällä työtovereidenne asiakkaiden valitukset, kun nämä ovat poissa	1	2	3	4	5		
Auttamalla toisianne asiakasdatan keräämisessä ja säilyttämisessä	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenämme tietoa kilpailijoista	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenämme tietoa tuoteominaisuuksista	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenämme tietoa potentiaalisista asiakkaista	1	2	3	4	5		
Jakamalla keskenämme tietoa nykyisistä asiakkaista	1	2	3	4	5		

OSA 3: TE JA ESIMIEHENNE

Missä määrin esimiehenne:	Erittäin vähän	1	2	3	4	5	Erittäin paljon
Vieittää aikaa kentällä myyntihenkilöiden kanssa	1	2	3	4	5		
Tekee yhteisiä myyntikäyntejä myyntihenkilöstön kanssa	1	2	3	4	5		
Käy säännöllisesti läpi myyntihenkilöiden asiakaskäyntiraportit	1	2	3	4	5		
Valvoo myyntihenkilöiden päivittäisiä aktiviteetteja	1	2	3	4	5		
Tarkkailee myyntihenkilöiden suoriutumista kentällä	1	2	3	4	5		

	Erittäin vähän		Jossain määrin		Erittäin paljon
Missä määrin esimiehenne:					
Seuraa tarkasti myyntihenkilöiden kulutilejä	1	2	3	4	5
Kiinnittää huomiota myyntihenkilöiden matkojen määrään	1	2	3	4	5
Kiinnittää huomiota myyntimiesten myöntämien maksuehtoihin	1	2	3	4	5
Rohkaisee myyntihenkilöitä kasvattamaan myyntiään palkitsemalla heitä saavutuksistaan	1	2	3	4	5
Osallistuu aktiivisesti myyntihenkilöiden työvalmennukseen	1	2	3	4	5
Käyttää säännöllisesti aikaa myyntihenkilöiden valmentamiseen	1	2	3	4	5
Keskustee suorituksen arvioimisesta myyntihenkilöiden kanssa	1	2	3	4	5
Auttaa myyntihenkilöitä kehittämään taitojaan	1	2	3	4	5
Missä määrin esimiehenne:					
Arvioi myyntihenkilöiden myyntikäyntien määrää	1	2	3	4	5
Arvioi kunkin myyntihenkilön osuutta koko timun myynnin katteesta	1	2	3	4	5
Arvioi kunkin myyntihenkilön myyntituloksia	1	2	3	4	5
Arvioi myyntihenkilöiden tekemien myyntiesitysten laatua	1	2	3	4	5
Arvioi myyntihenkilöiden ammatillista kehitystä	1	2	3	4	5
Antaa palautetta myyntihenkilön suorituksesta säännöllisesti	1	2	3	4	5
Palkitsee myyntihenkilöitä heidän myyntityön laadun perusteella	1	2	3	4	5
Käyttää kannustepalkkaa päämenetelmänä myyntihenkilöiden motivoimisessa	1	2	3	4	5
Palkitsee myyntihenkilöitä heidän myyntimääränsä perusteella	1	2	3	4	5
Palkitsee myyntihenkilöitä myyntitulosten perusteella	1	2	3	4	5
Käyttää muuta kuin rahallisia kannusteita myyntihenkilöiden saavutusten palkitsemisessa	1	2	3	4	5
Tekee kannustepalkkiopäätökset myyntihenkilön saavuttamien myyntien perusteella	1	2	3	4	5
Miten hyvin mielestänne seuraavat väittämät kuvaavat työssä kohtaamiinne tilanteita?					
	Täysin eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Täysin samaa mieltä
Suoritan tehtäviä, jotka mielestäni tulisi tehdä toisin	1	2	3	4	5
Olen usein vailla minulle annettujen tehtävien kunnolliseen suorittamiseen tarvittavia resursseja	1	2	3	4	5
Joudun rikkomaan sääntöjä tai toimintaperiaatteita voidakseni suorittaa minulle annetut tehtävät	1	2	3	4	5
Työskentelen kahden tai useamman ryhmän kanssa, joilla on erilaiset toimintatavat	1	2	3	4	5
Saan ristiriitaisia toimeksiantoja kahdelta tai useammalta henkilöltä	1	2	3	4	5
Joudun tekemään asioita, jotka joku voi hyväksyä, mutta joku toinen ei	1	2	3	4	5
Joudun ottamaan vastaan tehtäviä ilman riittäviä resursseja ja materiaaleja niiden loppuun saattamiseksi	1	2	3	4	5
Työskentelen tarpeettomien asioiden parissa	1	2	3	4	5
Missä määrin olette samaa tai erimielistä seuraavien väittämien kanssa.					
	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Tällä alalla asiakassuhteet ovat yleensä pitkäaikaisia	1	2	3	4	5
Asiakkaamme ostavat yritykseltämme tuotteita tai palveluja kertaaluontoisesti.	1	2	3	4	5
Asiakassuhteen kesto riippuu täysin asiakkaasta itsestään	1	2	3	4	5
Palvelumme tai tuotteemme ovat sellaisia, että asiakassuhteet ovat luonnostaan erittäin pitkäkestoisia	1	2	3	4	5
Verrattuna esimieheeni...					
	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Tiedän paremmin miten tavalliset työtehtäväni hoidetaan	1	2	3	4	5
Työhöni liittyvät päivittäiset päätökset ovat minulle turumpia	1	2	3	4	5
Minulle on kehitetty vahvempi osaamistaso työhöni liittyvissä asioissa	1	2	3	4	5
Osaan paremmin arvioida suoritukseni loppuun saattamassani tehtävässä	1	2	3	4	5
Osaan paremmin eritellä tärkeimmät tekijät, joiden avulla työtäni voidaan valvoa	1	2	3	4	5
Osaan paremmin eritellä työtehtävieni suoritustavoitteet	1	2	3	4	5

Missä määrin olette samaa tai erimielistä seuraavien väittämien kanssa.	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Yrityksemme ylin johto on antanut ymmärtää, että epäeettistä myyntikäytännistä ei missään nimessä hyväksytä	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksessämme on muodolliset, kirjalliset eettiset pelisäännöt	1	2	3	4	5
Jos yrityksemme myyntihenkilön havaitaan syyllistyneen epäeettiseen käytökseen, joka on tuottanut yritykselle hyötyä, häntä nuhdellaan välittömästi	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksemme vaatii ankarasti eettisten pelisääntöjen noudattamista	1	2	3	4	5
Jos yrityksemme myyntihenkilön havaitaan syyllistyneen epäeettiseen käytökseen, joka on tuottanut hänelle henkilökohtaista hyötyä, häntä nuhdellaan välittömästi	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksemme menettelytavat perustuvat eettiseen toimintaan	1	2	3	4	5
Yrityksemme vaatii ankarasti eettisten menettelytapojen noudattamista	1	2	3	4	5

Miten mielestänne seuraavat väittämät kuvaavat tuntemuksianne?	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Minusta tuntuu, että esimieheni painostaa meitä	1	2	3	4	5
Minusta tuntuu, että olen jatkuvan tarkkailun alaisena	1	2	3	4	5
Esimieheni yrittää pitää minut kiireisenä	1	2	3	4	5
Usein suhdanteet vaikeuttavat myyntitilini suoriutumista	1	2	3	4	5
Esimieheni asettaa minulle paljon suorituspaineita	1	2	3	4	5
Maan talous tekee myyntitoiminnan vaikeaksi	1	2	3	4	5
Esimieheni usein "kyyttää meitä"	1	2	3	4	5
Myyntihenkilön on vaikea saada aikaan myyntituloksia tällä toimialalla	1	2	3	4	5
Olen sitä mieltä, että yrityksellämme on menossa "huono kausi"	1	2	3	4	5
Tunnen olevani paineen alla, koska tällä alalla on rankkaa	1	2	3	4	5
Esimieheni on tehnyt minulle selväksi sen, että jos en onnistu, työpaikkani on vaakalaudalla	1	2	3	4	5

Missä määrin olette samaa tai eri mieltä seuraavien väittämien kanssa?	Vahvasti eri mieltä		En samaa enkä eri mieltä		Vahvasti samaa mieltä
Jos esimieheni huomaa minun parantaneen tulostani asiakkaan etujen kussannuksella...					
... näkyvät seuraukset palkassani	1	2	3	4	5
... on työpaikkani tulevaisuus vaakalaudalla	1	2	3	4	5
... siirtää hän osan asiakkaistani muiden myyntihenkilöiden vastuulle	1	2	3	4	5
... näkyvät seuraukset urakehityksessäni	1	2	3	4	5
... pienentää hän myyntialuettaini	1	2	3	4	5
... hän antaa minulle oitis huomautuksen siitä	1	2	3	4	5

Jos esimieheni huomaa, että en ama huolehdi yrityksen eduista työssäni					
... näkyvät seuraukset palkassani	1	2	3	4	5
... on työpaikkani tulevaisuus vaakalaudalla	1	2	3	4	5
... näkyvät seuraukset urakehityksessäni	1	2	3	4	5
... hän antaa minulle oitis huomautuksen siitä	1	2	3	4	5
... siirtää hän osan asiakkaistani muiden myyntihenkilöiden vastuulle	1	2	3	4	5
... pienentää hän myyntialuettaini	1	2	3	4	5

Lopuksi muutama kysymys taustatietojenne selvittämiseksi.

Ikä? ____ vuotta

Kuinka pitkään olette työskennellyt myyntitehtävissä? ____ vuotta

Kuinka kauan olette työskennelleet tässä organisaatiossa? ____ vuotta

Kuinka kauan olette työskennelleet nykyisessä tehtävässänne? ____ vuotta

Sukupuoli?

- Mies
 Nainen

Mikä on koulutustasonne?

- Perus- tai kansakoulu
 Lukio
 Kauppa- tai ammattikoulu
 Opistotason tutkinto
 Alempi korkeakoulututkinto
 Ylempi korkeakoulututkinto
 Muu, mikä? _____

KIITOS LOMAKKEEN TÄYTTÄMISESTÄ!!!

**COMPENSATION- AND CONTROL SYSTEMS' EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOR AND
PERFORMANCE OF FIELD SALESPEOPLE**

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SALES MANAGERS

**There are no right or wrong answers to the questions presented in this questionnaire.
We are simply just interested on your opinions.**

Obtained responses will be handled confidentially.

Questionnaire

Contact information:

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PART 1: YOU AND YOUR SALESPEOPLE

How many people are in your sales team?..... _____
 Of this number, how many are employed as field salespeople?..... _____
 How many are employed as telesales people?..... _____
 How many are employed in other types of sales positions..... _____
 What percentage of your salespeople are compensated on a straight salary basis?..... %
 What percentage of your salespeople are compensated on a straight commission basis?..... %
 What percentage of your salespeople are compensated by a combination of salary and commission?..... %
 If you use combination plans, please estimate an average proportion of variable income to total pay..... %
 What percentage of your salespeople are assigned a sales quota to reach?..... %

Important: Please answer the rest of this questionnaire in relation to your *field salespeople only* and *not* your other salespeople (such as telesales). If you have no field salespeople, please return this questionnaire for our records.

The following questions ask you about the ways in which you handle activities of your field salespeople. There are no right or wrong answers, we are simply interested in the extent to which you utilize various methods of sales management.

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.

Field salespeople in my team often:	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree
Have to do things which should be done differently	1	2	3	4	5
Receive assignments without the manpower to complete them	1	2	3	4	5
Have to buck a rule or policy in order to carry out an assignment	1	2	3	4	5
Work with two or more groups who operate quite differently	1	2	3	4	5
Receive incompatible requests from two or more people	1	2	3	4	5
Do things which are apt to be accepted by one person and not accepted by another	1	2	3	4	5
Receive assignments without adequate resources and materials to execute them	1	2	3	4	5
Work on unnecessary things	1	2	3	4	5
To what extent do you:	To a very Small extent		To a moderate extent		To a very great extent
Spend time with salespeople in the field	1	2	3	4	5
Make joint calls with salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Regularly review call reports from salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Monitor the day-to-day activities of salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Observe the performance of salespeople in the field	1	2	3	4	5
Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts	1	2	3	4	5
Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel	1	2	3	4	5
To what extent do you:	To a very Small extent		To a moderate extent		To a very great extent
Pay attention to the credit terms that salespeople quote customers	1	2	3	4	5
Encourage salespeople to increase their sales by rewarding them for achievement	1	2	3	4	5
Actively participate in training salespeople on the job	1	2	3	4	5
Regularly spend time coaching salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Discuss performance evaluations with salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Help salespeople develop their potential	1	2	3	4	5
Evaluate the number of sales calls made by salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Evaluate the profit contribution achieved by each salesperson	1	2	3	4	5
Evaluate the sales results of each salesperson	1	2	3	4	5
Evaluate the quality of sales presentations made by salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Evaluate the professional development of salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Provide performance feedback to salespeople on a regular basis	1	2	3	4	5

To what extent do you:	To a very Small extent	To a moderate extent	To a very great extent		
Compensate salespeople based on the quality of their sales activities	1	2	3	4	5
Use incentive compensation as the main means for motivating salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Compensate salespeople based on the quantity of their sales activities	1	2	3	4	5
Reward salespeople based on their sales results	1	2	3	4	5
Use non-financial incentives to reward salespeople for their achievements	1	2	3	4	5
Make incentive compensation judgments based on the sales achieved by salespeople	1	2	3	4	5

Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which you believe your superiors place importance on the following factors when evaluating your performance as a sales manager.

	To a very Small extent	To a moderate extent	To a very great extent		
The day-to-day activities of your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The quality of your salespeople's paperwork (e.g. reports, projections)	1	2	3	4	5
The product knowledge of your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The state of your salespeople's expense accounts	1	2	3	4	5
Your salespeople's customer service	1	2	3	4	5
The number of sales calls made by your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The profit contribution achieved by your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The sales results of your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The quality of sales presentations made by your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The professional development of your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The sales volume achieved by your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
The sales in € achieved by your salespeople	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.

	Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly agree		
Top management in my company has let it be known in no uncertain terms that unethical sales behaviours will not be tolerated	1	2	3	4	5
My company has a formal, written code of ethics	1	2	3	4	5
If a salesperson in my company is discovered to have engaged in unethical behaviour that results primarily in corporate gain (rather than personal gain), she or he will be promptly reprimanded	1	2	3	4	5
My company strictly enforces a code of ethics	1	2	3	4	5
If a salesperson in my company is discovered to have engaged in unethical behaviour that results primarily in personal gain (rather than corporate gain), she or he will be promptly reprimanded	1	2	3	4	5
My company has policies with regard to ethical behaviour	1	2	3	4	5
My company strictly enforces policies regarding ethical behaviour	1	2	3	4	5

Please use the following scale to evaluate the extent to which your salespeople's remuneration depends on their team's level of the following things, rather than depending on individual levels.

Salespeople's remuneration depends on	Not at all (0%)..... To an extreme extent (100%)									
Number of sales calls made by the team	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Team's profit contribution	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Team's sales volume	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Team's sales value	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Typically, what proportion of salespeople's total income would depend on team performance outcomes, rather than individual performance outcomes	_____ %
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PART 2: YOUR SALESPEOPLE'S FEELINGS AND BEHAVIOR

The following questions ask you about your salespeople. There are no right or wrong answers, we are simply interested in your honest opinions about how you think your salespeople feel about, and behave in, their jobs.

In general, my salespeople cooperate with each other by	To a very Small extent		To a moderate extent		To a very great extent		
Working with each other to improve selling techniques	1	2	3	4	5		
Providing support to each other during sales presentations	1	2	3	4	5		
Taking care of a salesperson's customers during that salesperson's absence	1	2	3	4	5		
Assisting each other by handling paperwork for each other if needed	1	2	3	4	5		
Providing each other with feedback for improving their performance	1	2	3	4	5		
Handling a salesperson's customer complaints in that salesperson's absence	1	2	3	4	5		
Assisting each other in collecting and storing customer-related data	1	2	3	4	5		
Sharing information with each other about competitors	1	2	3	4	5		
Sharing information with each other about product attributes	1	2	3	4	5		
Sharing information with each other about potential customers	1	2	3	4	5		
Sharing information with each other about existing customers	1	2	3	4	5		
Please indicate the typical level of performance that the members of your sales team achieve on the following factors	Typically poor		Typically moderate		Typically excellent		
Sales commissions	1	2	3	4	5		
Sales commission increases (past 6 months)	1	2	3	4	5		
Gross profit	1	2	3	4	5		
Amount of products sold	1	2	3	4	5		
Accuracy of paper work	1	2	3	4	5		
Time management	1	2	3	4	5		
Customer presentations	1	2	3	4	5		
Price negotiations	1	2	3	4	5		
Selling tactics	1	2	3	4	5		
Please use the following scale to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree		
My salespeople probably often feel like I am pushing down on them	1	2	3	4	5		
My salespeople probably feel like they are under constant review by me	1	2	3	4	5		
I try to give a feeling of urgency to my salespeople	1	2	3	4	5		
Often, the economy makes it hard for my team to generate sales	1	2	3	4	5		
I put a lot of pressure on my salespeople to perform	1	2	3	4	5		
The economy in this country makes my salespeople's job harder	1	2	3	4	5		
My salespeople probably feel like I am "sitting on their shoulders"	1	2	3	4	5		
It's difficult for my salespeople to get good sales results in this business	1	2	3	4	5		
Salespeople probably often feel like this company is going through a "bad patch"	1	2	3	4	5		
My salespeople are likely to often feel under pressure because business is hard	1	2	3	4	5		
I make it clear to salespeople that if they don't succeed, then their jobs are on the line	1	2	3	4	5		
In general, I think that:	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree		
The ethical standards of my salespeople are very high	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It would be rare for my salespeople to use unethical selling tactics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salespeople probably behave unethically sometimes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salespeople are essentially very ethical	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My salespeople would probably use unethical selling tactics if they had to	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ethics are not a very important concern for my salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The following scenarios feature a salesperson called John. Please imagine that John is a typical salesperson working in one of your company sales teams. Please read the scenarios and,

(a) using the scale below, indicate how likely it is that John will act in the way indicated in each scenario:

(b) Evaluate the situation described in the scenario with the provided scale. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions, we are simply interested of Your opinions.

John has a purchaser whom he especially likes. Their wives are friends too and their children go to school together. What is the likelihood that John will give this purchaser special consideration on price and delivery that John doesn't give to his other customers?

(a) What is the probability?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John is selling a number of office machines to a small service firm. The firm is ready to order the top of the line machines, even though as far as John can see the firm has no possible use for any of the extra features of this machine, and would be much better off with a less expensive model

(a) What is the probability that John would not explain this, but would continue with the sale?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John's sales manager mistakenly believes that John deserves the credit for landing a major new customer, and has privately praised John for this. In fact, a rookie salesperson who has since left was largely responsible.

(a) What is the probability that John would decide not to inform his manager of this and take the credit for himself?

Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree						Strongly agree	
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the left rookie, the action is wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John's boss is a real stickler for reporting procedures, and for making lots of sales calls. John hasn't been able to convince his boss that John is far more effective making fewer, more targeted sales calls. What is the probability that John would decide to keep his boss happy by exaggerating the number of calls he makes

(a) What is the probability that John would decide to keep his boss happy by exaggerating the number of calls he makes?

Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree						Strongly agree	
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the boss, the action is wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John is negotiating the final details of a large order. The customer is insisting on one minor point about the service that John doesn't think he'll be able to provide. John knows he can clinch the sales by agreeing now; if necessary he can blame the company later for not being able to come through with the service.

(a) What is the likelihood that John will decide to agree to the customer's request?

Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree						Strongly agree	
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John has one product which is selling like the proverbial hot cakes. John knows that he can also sell other products in the product line by insisting that the "hit" product is packaged with other, less popular, products in this line, even though he is bluffing. What is the probability that John would use this strategy?

(a) What is the probability that John would use this strategy?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possi-bility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John is a relatively inexperienced salesperson who is having difficulty living on what he perceives as a less than adequate salary. John occasionally takes his wife out to dinner and charges the company, reasoning that he works hard and deserves to enjoy some company benefits.

(a) What is the likelihood of this?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possi-bility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John sold one of his major customers a large order which was delivered two weeks ago. John has just discovered that the merchandise delivered was a slightly less sophisticated, less expensive model than the one the customer ordered. John can't believe it but the customer simply did not notice the difference.

(a) What is the likelihood that John would decide not to point out the mistake to the customer?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possi-bility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John's manager is pressuring him to "crack" a large account which has never made any major purchases from John's firm. John has made several calls to this account and gotten nowhere. However, he has heard that the only way to get an order from the buyer is to offer the purchasing agent a gift.

(a) How likely it is that John will try this approach?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John has found that exaggerating the seriousness of a customer's problem can get the customer to place a large order.

(a) How likely is it that John will continue to use this approach?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How likely is John to charge more to the buyers for whom he is the sole supplier, than he does in a similar sales situation where he is competing with other buyers?

(a) How likely is this?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of this buyer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Please circle one number.

My salespeople are likely to feel that:	Strongly Disagree				Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree
If they don't perform, then their job is at stake	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Their livelihood is directly related to their performance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
If they want to succeed, then the onus is on them to do it themselves	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
They are under a lot of pressure to perform here	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Low performance means their job is at risk	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
They need to reach targets to feel secure in their positions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Targets may increase, but they still have to be met regardless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Their jobs are highly pressurized	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

PART 3: YOUR INDUSTRY

Please use the following scale to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree				Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree
The industry I work in has a formal code of ethics	1	2	3	4	5			
In general, I would say that sales reps in the industry I work in are quite ethical	1	2	3	4	5			
There is a formal body charged with evaluating ethical sales behavior in my industry	1	2	3	4	5			
The industry I work in is quite unethical	1	2	3	4	5			
My industry's code of ethics is strictly enforced	1	2	3	4	5			
Sales reps in this industry are made aware of industry ethical codes	1	2	3	4	5			
There are formal mechanisms in this industry for ensuring sales reps behave ethically	1	2	3	4	5			
In this industry, a lot of publicity could result if a sales rep was caught behaving unethically	1	2	3	4	5			
To succeed in this industry, sometimes a sales rep has to be somewhat unethical	1	2	3	4	5			
If a sales rep were to behave unethically in this industry, their firm could be done major harm	1	2	3	4	5			
	Strongly Disagree				Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree
Competition in our industry is cutthroat	1	2	3	4	5			
There are many "promotion wars" in our industry	1	2	3	4	5			
Anything that one competitor can offer, others can match readily	1	2	3	4	5			
Price competition is a hallmark of our industry	1	2	3	4	5			
One hears of a new competitive move almost every day	1	2	3	4	5			
Our competitors are relatively weak	1	2	3	4	5			
	Strongly Disagree				Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree
Our customers possess a great deal of market information	1	2	3	4	5			
Our customers are able to bargain the terms of a sales	1	2	3	4	5			
20% of our customers account for 80% of our total sales	1	2	3	4	5			
Most of our customers could buy their products directly from the manufacturer	1	2	3	4	5			
The supplier's brand is not a very important purchasing criterion for our products	1	2	3	4	5			
The cost of finding and qualifying other suppliers is low for our customers	1	2	3	4	5			
Customers in our industry do not insist on buying a specific manufacturer's brand	1	2	3	4	5			
Our customers possess a good idea about the costs of our products to their distributors	1	2	3	4	5			
The importance of product quality as a purchasing criterion for our customers is low	1	2	3	4	5			

Please use the following scale to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements.	Strongly disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am very satisfied with the number of accounts in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am very satisfied with the number of sales calls I have made in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am very satisfied with the amount of travel required in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am very satisfied with the market potential in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I think that the workload required in my salespeople's territories is equally divided	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
In general, I am very satisfied with the territory design	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

What kinds of products and services does your company sell? Please tick the most suitable alternatives.

Industrial goods		
Food, beverages, cigarettes	<input type="checkbox"/>	Buildings, land, construction
Textiles and clothes	<input type="checkbox"/>	Trade, hotel or restaurant services
Wood or wood products	<input type="checkbox"/>	Logistics
Pulp, paper, paper products	<input type="checkbox"/>	Communications
Chemicals or chemical products	<input type="checkbox"/>	Business services .
Rubber and plastic products	<input type="checkbox"/>	Agricultural services
Metals or metal products	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mining services
Machines and devices	<input type="checkbox"/>	Manufacturing services
Electronic and optical equipment	<input type="checkbox"/>	Societal and social services
Vehicles	<input type="checkbox"/>	Personal services
Other industrial goods	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other services
Agricultural or forestal products	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Fish products	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Mining and minerals	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Electricity, gas, water	<input type="checkbox"/>	

What is the average value of a single sales transaction of your company's products or services? € _____

How many sales transactions do your salespeople make per year? _____
ca. _____ pcs/person

PART 4: YOU AND YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT ETHICS

Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number..

	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to "rightness"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved, since what is moral or immoral is up to the individual	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moral standards are simply personal rules of which indicate how a person should behave, and are not to be applied in making judgments of others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not permissible totally depends on the situation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the act against the negative consequences of an act is immoral	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Whether a lie is to judged moral or immoral depends on the circumstances surrounding the action	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number..	Strongly disagree							Neither agree nor disagree							Strongly agree						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One should never psychologically or physically harm another person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A person should make sure their actions never intentionally harm another, even to a small degree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
There are no ethical principles which are so important that they should be part of any code of ethics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Below are some items describing people and their feelings, please use the scale below to indicate whether you feel the item is a true or false description of you...	Definitely false	Mostly false	Don't know	Mostly true	Definitely true
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable	1	2	3	4	5
There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone	1	2	3	4	5
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget	1	2	3	4	5
I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way	1	2	3	4	5
No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener	1	2	3	4	5

Finally a few questions about your background information.

Age? ____ years

How long have you worked for sales? ____ years

How long have you worked for this organization? ____ years

How long have you worked in your current position? ____ years

Gender?

- Male
 Female

What is your level of education?

- Comprehensive school
 High-school diploma
 Trade school or secondary education
 Institute/training centre
 Lower university degree
 Higher university degree
 Other, _____

Approximately, what is your company's annual total sales turnover?	_____ €
Approximately, how many people are employed by your company?	_____ people
What industry would you say your firm operated in?	_____

Thank you for filling the questionnaire!!!

If you have any questions, things you would like to add, or comments, please use the other side of this page.

If you would like to receive a summary of the findings of this study, please provide your business card or email address on the other side of this page.

Thank you for your time,
Your contribution is greatly appreciated.

**COMPENSATION- AND CONTROL SYSTEMS' EFFECTS ON BEHAVIOR AND
PERFORMANCE OF FIELD SALESPEOPLE**

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SALESPERSONS

There are no right or wrong answers to the questions presented in this questionnaire.
We are simply just interested on your opinions.

Obtained responses will be handled confidentially.

Questionnaire

Contact information:

**LAPPEENRANTA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
DEPT. OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION**

**Assi Tarkiainen
P.O Box 20, 53851 Lappeenranta**

tel. 05 – 621 6985

PART 1: YOU AND YOUR JOB TASKS

What percentage of your compensation on a straight salary basis?..... _____ %
 What percentage of your compensation is on a straight commission basis?..... _____ %
 Do you have a sales quota to meet?..... Yes No

What is the average value of a single sales transaction of your company's products or services?..... _____ €

How many sales transactions do you make per year?..... ca. _____ pcs/person

Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly	Neither					Strongly
	disagree	agree	agree	nor	disagree	agree	
It is my firm belief that I can solely overcome the obstacles on sales work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I personally should be responsible for the failure of not reaching the sales quota.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My behavior can greatly influence my selling outcome	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sales performance is strongly related to the efforts I have made	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Becoming an outstanding salesperson depends mostly on timing and opportunity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A prayer for good luck may quite possibly outweigh personal ability and enthusiasm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My sales performance today rests on chance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I takes luck and good fortune to get a promotion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I believe that sales success is mostly influenced by powerful others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sales cannot be effective without favor from important people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Becoming a competent salesperson depends on the help from some people in high positions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The accomplishment I can achieve is often in the hands of powerful others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly	Neither					Strongly
	disagree	agree	agree	nor	disagree	agree	
When I perform well, I know it is for my own desire to achieve	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel a great sense of personal satisfaction, when I do my job well	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Becoming successful in sales is something I really want to do for me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My job increases my feeling of self-esteem	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When I do my work well, it gives me a feeling of accomplishment	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
When I perform my job well, it contributes to my personal growth and development	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If it weren't for the money, I would not be in a selling job	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I sell because I get paid to sell	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
After a long hard day, I realize that if it weren't for the money, I wouldn't put up with this job.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I want to be sure before I act.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I avoid risky things.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I would rather be safe than sorry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly	Neither					Strongly
	disagree	agree	agree	nor	disagree	agree	
I am very satisfied with the number of accounts in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am very satisfied with the number of sales calls I have made in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am very satisfied with the amount of travel required in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am very satisfied with the market potential in my territory	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Compared to my colleagues, the number of accounts in my territory is smaller	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Compared to my colleagues, the market potential in my territory is smaller	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Compared to my colleagues, the my territory requires greater workload	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
In general, I am very satisfied with the territory design	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

What do you think about your sales quota? (If you do not have a sales quota to reach, please skip to the next question)	Strongly	Neither					Strongly
	disagree	agree	agree	nor	disagree	agree	
I believe my assigned quota is very difficult.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It is very easy for me to achieve my assigned quota	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Bad Good						
The chance of me achieving my assigned quota is	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly agree
One needs to return a favor if a colleague lends a helping hand	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
There is everything to gain and nothing to lose for working in a team	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Fellow workers' assistance is indispensable to getting good sales results.	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
I would be willing to change companies if the new job offered a 25 % pay increase.	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
I would be willing to change companies if the new job offered more creative freedom.	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
I would be willing to change companies if the new job offered more status	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
I would be willing to change companies if the new job was with people who were more friendly	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly agree
What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to "rightness"	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved, since what is moral or immoral is up to the individual	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Moral standards are simply personal rules of which indicate how a person should behave, and are not to be applied in making judgments of others	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not permissible totally depends on the situation	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the act against the negative consequences of an act is immoral	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Whether a lie is to be judged moral or immoral depends on the circumstances surrounding the action	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
One should never psychologically or physically harm another person	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
A person should make sure their actions never intentionally harm another, even to a small degree	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
There are no ethical principles which are so important that they should be part of any code of ethics	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Please use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly agree
I tend to ignore certain job-related activities simply because they are not monitored by the division	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
I work on unimportant activities simply because they are evaluated by upper management	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
Even if my productivity is inconsistent, I still try to make it appear consistent	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
I have adjusted marketing data to make my performance appear more in line with division goals	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
When presenting data to upper management, I try to emphasize data that reflects favorably upon me	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
When presenting data to upper management, I try to avoid being the bearer of bad news	1	2 3 4 5	6 7
I think that :	Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Strongly agree
I know what my responsibilities are in this job.	1	2 3 4	5
I know exactly what is expected of me in this job.	1	2 3 4	5
I know the scope of my job. (new item)	1	2 3 4	5
I know exactly how much authority I have in this job	1	2 3 4	5

The following scenarios feature a salesperson called John. Please imagine that John is a typical salesperson working in one of your company sales teams. Please read the scenarios and,

(a) using the scale below, indicate how likely it is that John will act in the way indicated in each scenario:

(b) Evaluate the situation described in the scenario with the provided scale. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions, we are simply interested of Your opinions.

John has a purchaser whom he especially likes. Their wives are friends too and their children go to school together. What is the likelihood that John will give this purchaser special consideration on price and delivery that John doesn't give to his other customers?													
(a) What is the probability?													
Almost no chance	Very Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
John is selling a number of office machines to a small service firm. The firm is ready to order the top of the line machines, even though as far as John can see the firm has no possible use for any of the extra features of this machine, and would be much better off with a less expensive model													
(a) What is the probability that John would not explain this, but would continue with the sale?													
Almost no chance	Very Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John's sales manager mistakenly believes that John deserves the credit for landing a major new customer, and has privately praised John for this. In fact, a rookie salesperson who has since left was largely responsible.

(a) What is the probability that John would decide not to inform his manager of this and take the credit for himself?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the left rookie, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John's boss is a real stickler for reporting procedures, and for making lots of sales calls. John hasn't been able to convince his boss that John is far more effective making fewer, more targeted sales calls. What is the probability that John would decide to keep his boss happy by exaggerating the number of calls he makes

(a) What is the probability that John would decide to keep his boss happy by exaggerating the number of calls he makes?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the boss, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John is negotiating the final details of a large order. The customer is insisting on one minor point about the service that John doesn't think he'll be able to provide. John knows he can clinch the sales by agreeing now; if necessary he can blame the company later for not being able to come through with the service.

(a) What is the likelihood that John will decide to agree to the customer's request?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree			
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John has one product which is selling like the proverbial hot cakes. John knows that he can also sell other products in the product line by insisting that the "hit" product is packaged with other, less popular, products in this line, even though he is bluffing. What is the probability that John would use this strategy?

(a) What is the probability that John would use this strategy?

Almost no chance	Very Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree				
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John is a relatively inexperienced salesperson who is having difficulty living on what he perceives as a less than adequate salary. John occasionally takes his wife out to dinner and charges the company, reasoning that he works hard and deserves to enjoy some company benefits.

(a) What is the likelihood of this?

Almost no chance	Very Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree				
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John sold one of his major customers a large order which was delivered two weeks ago. John has just discovered that the merchandise delivered was a slightly less sophisticated, less expensive model than the one the customer ordered. John can't believe it but the customer simply did not notice the difference.

(a) What is the likelihood that John would decide not to point out the mistake to the customer?

Almost no chance	Very Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possibility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very probable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following statements.					Strongly Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree				
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actually cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate future					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John's manager is pressuring him to "crack" a large account which has never made any major purchases from John's firm. John has made several calls to this account and gotten nowhere. However, he has heard that the only way to get an order from the buyer is to offer the purchasing agent a gift.

(a) How likely is it that John will try this approach?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possi-bility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very pro-bable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following state-ments.					Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree		
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actu-ally cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate fu-ture					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

John has found that exaggerating the seriousness of a customer's problem can get the customer to place a large order.

(a) How likely is it that John will continue to use this approach?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possi-bility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very pro-bable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following state-ments.					Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree		
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actu-ally cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate fu-ture					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of the customer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

How likely is John to charge more to the buyers for whom he is the sole supplier, than he does in a similar sales situation where he is competing with other buyers?

(a) How likely is this?													
Almost no chance	Wery Slight possibility	Slight possibility	Some possibility	Fair possi-bility	Fairly good possibility	Good possibility	Probable	Very pro-bable	Almost sure	Practically certain			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
(b) Please evaluate the scenario with following state-ments.					Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree		
The overall harm (if any) done as a result of the action would be very small					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Most people would agree that the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
There is a very small likelihood that the action will actu-ally cause any harm					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will not cause any harm in an immediate fu-ture					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
If John is a personal friend of this buyer, the action is wrong					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The action will harm very few people (if any)					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Please evaluate your sales team. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The ethical standards of my company's salespeople are very high	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It would be rare for my company's salespeople to use unethical selling tactics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My company's salespeople probably behave unethically sometimes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My company's salespeople are essentially very ethical	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My company's salespeople would probably use unethical selling tactics if they had to	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ethics are not a very important concern for my company's salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Below are some items describing people and their feelings, please use the scale below to indicate whether you feel the item is a true or false description of you...	Definitely false	Mostly false	Don't know	Mostly true	Definitely true
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable	1	2	3	4	5
There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone	1	2	3	4	5
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget	1	2	3	4	5
I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way	1	2	3	4	5
No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I help those of my fellow workers who have heavy work loads.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I help those of my fellow workers who have been absent from work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I willingly help those who have work related problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I help orient new employees even though it is not required	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I consider the impact of my actions on coworkers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am mindful of how behaviour affects other people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I consume a lot of time complaining of trivial matters.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I tend to make "mountains out of molehills"	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I always focus on what is wrong with the situation, rather than the positive side	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I always find fault with what the firm is doing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I attend meetings that are not mandatory.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I attend functions that are not required, but help the firm image.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I read and keep up with the firm's announcements, messages, memos, etc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I "keep up" with developments in the firm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree		Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to figure out a customer's needs.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have the customer's best interests in my mind.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I take a problem solving approach in selling products or services to customers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I recommend products or services that are best suited to solving problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to find out which kinds of products or services would be most helpful to customers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to sell as much as I can, rather than satisfy the customers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I find it necessary to stretch the truth in my sales representations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I try to sell as much as I can to convince the customer to buy, even if it is more than wise customers would buy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I paint too rosy a picture of the products or services to make them sound as good as possible.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I make recommendations based on what I think I can sell and not on the basis of customers' long-term satisfaction.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

PART 2: YOUR INDUSTRY

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree
The industry I work in has a formal code of ethics	1	2	3	4	5
In general, I would say that sales reps in the industry I work in are quite ethical	1	2	3	4	5
There is a formal body charged with evaluating ethical sales behavior in my industry	1	2	3	4	5
The industry I work in is quite unethical	1	2	3	4	5
My industry's code of ethics is strictly enforced	1	2	3	4	5
Sales reps in this industry are made aware of industry ethical codes	1	2	3	4	5
There are formal mechanisms in this industry for ensuring sales reps behave ethically	1	2	3	4	5
In this industry, a lot of publicity could result if a sales rep was caught behaving unethically	1	2	3	4	5
To succeed in this industry, sometimes a sales rep has to be somewhat unethical	1	2	3	4	5
If a sales rep were to behave unethically in this industry, their firm could be done major harm	1	2	3	4	5
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree
Competition in our industry is cutthroat	1	2	3	4	5
There are many "promotion wars" in our industry	1	2	3	4	5
Anything that one competitor can offer, others can match readily	1	2	3	4	5
Price competition is a hallmark of our industry	1	2	3	4	5
One hears of a new competitive move almost every day	1	2	3	4	5
Our competitors are relatively weak	1	2	3	4	5
Our customers possess a great deal of market information	1	2	3	4	5
Our customers are able to bargain the terms of a sales	1	2	3	4	5
20% of our customers account for 80% of our total sales	1	2	3	4	5
Most of our customers could buy their products directly from the manufacturer	1	2	3	4	5
The supplier's brand is not a very important purchasing criterion for our products	1	2	3	4	5
The cost of finding and qualifying other suppliers is low for our customers	1	2	3	4	5
Customers in our industry do not insist on buying a specific manufacturer's brand	1	2	3	4	5
Our customers possess a good idea about the costs of our products to their distributors	1	2	3	4	5
The importance of product quality as a purchasing criterion for our customers is low	1	2	3	4	5
How much do you cooperate with other members of your sales team?	To a very Small extent	To a moderate extent		To a very great extent	
Working with each other to improve selling techniques	1	2	3	4	5
Providing support to each other during sales presentations	1	2	3	4	5
Taking care of a salesperson's customers during that salesperson's absence	1	2	3	4	5
Assisting each other by handling paperwork for each other if needed	1	2	3	4	5
Providing each other with feedback for improving their performance	1	2	3	4	5
Handling a salesperson's customer complaints in that salesperson's absence	1	2	3	4	5
Assisting each other in collecting and storing customer-related data	1	2	3	4	5
Sharing information with each other about competitors	1	2	3	4	5
Sharing information with each other about product attributes	1	2	3	4	5
Sharing information with each other about potential customers	1	2	3	4	5
Sharing information with each other about existing customers	1	2	3	4	5

PART 3: YOU AND YOUR SUPERVISOR

To what extent does your supervisor:	To a very Small extent	To a moderate extent		To a very great extent	
Spend time with salespeople in the field	1	2	3	4	5
Make joint calls with salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Regularly review call reports from salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Monitor the day-to-day activities of salespeople	1	2	3	4	5
Observe the performance of salespeople in the field	1	2	3	4	5
Closely watch salespeople's expense accounts	1	2	3	4	5
Pay attention to the extent to which salespeople travel	1	2	3	4	5

To what extent does your supervisor:	To a very Small extent		To a moderate extent		To a very great extent	
	1	2	3	4	5	
Pay attention to the credit terms that salespeople quote customers	1	2	3	4	5	
Encourage salespeople to increase their sales by rewarding them for achievement	1	2	3	4	5	
Actively participate in training salespeople on the job	1	2	3	4	5	
Regularly spend time coaching salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	
Discuss performance evaluations with salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	
Help salespeople develop their potential	1	2	3	4	5	
Evaluate the number of sales calls made by salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	
Evaluate the profit contribution achieved by each salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	
Evaluate the sales results of each salesperson	1	2	3	4	5	
Evaluate the quality of sales presentations made by salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	
Evaluate the professional development of salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	
Provide performance feedback to salespeople on a regular basis	1	2	3	4	5	
Compensate salespeople based on the quality of their sales activities	1	2	3	4	5	
Use incentive compensation as the main means for motivating salespeople	1	2	3	4	5	
Compensate salespeople based on the quantity of their sales activities	1	2	3	4	5	
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree	
I often have to do things which should be done differently	1	2	3	4	5	
I receive assignments without the manpower to complete them	1	2	3	4	5	
I have to buck a rule or policy in order to carry out an assignment	1	2	3	4	5	
I work with two or more groups who operate quite differently	1	2	3	4	5	
I receive incompatible requests from two or more people	1	2	3	4	5	
I do things which are apt to be accepted by one person and not accepted by another	1	2	3	4	5	
I receive assignments without adequate resources and materials to execute them	1	2	3	4	5	
I work on unnecessary things	1	2	3	4	5	
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree	
In this field of industry the customer relationships are usually long.	1	2	3	4	5	
Our customers buy our products or services on the one-time transaction basis.	1	2	3	4	5	
The duration of a customer relationship depends totally on the customer.	1	2	3	4	5	
Our services or products are of the kind that the customer relationships are naturally very long in their duration.	1	2	3	4	5	
Compared to my supervisor...	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree	
I know more about how to accomplish the work I normally encounter.	1	2	3	4	5	
I am more intimately familiar with the day-to-day decision related to my work.	1	2	3	4	5	
I have developed a better working knowledge of my job.	1	2	3	4	5	
I can more adequately assess my performance after I complete my activities.	1	2	3	4	5	
I can better specify the performance objectives to cover the range of activities I perform.	1	2	3	4	5	
I know more about how to accomplish the work I normally encounter.	1	2	3	4	5	

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree
Top management in my company has let it be known in no uncertain terms that unethical sales behaviours will not be tolerated	1	2	3	4	5
My company has a formal, written code of ethics	1	2	3	4	5
If a salesperson in my company is discovered to have engaged in unethical behaviour that results primarily in corporate gain (rather than personal gain), she or he will be promptly reprimanded	1	2	3	4	5
My company strictly enforces a code of ethics	1	2	3	4	5
If a salesperson in my company is discovered to have engaged in unethical behaviour that results primarily in personal gain (rather than corporate gain), she or he will be promptly reprimanded	1	2	3	4	5
My company has policies with regard to ethical behaviour	1	2	3	4	5
My company strictly enforces policies regarding ethical behaviour	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree
I often feel like our supervisor is pushing down on us	1	2	3	4	5
I feel like we are under constant review by our supervisor	1	2	3	4	5
Our supervisor tries to give a feeling of urgency to us	1	2	3	4	5
Often, the economy makes it hard for my team to generate sales	1	2	3	4	5
Our supervisor puts a lot of pressure on us to perform	1	2	3	4	5
The economy in this country makes our job harder	1	2	3	4	5
I feel like our supervisor is "sitting on their shoulders"	1	2	3	4	5
It's difficult for us to get good sales results in this business	1	2	3	4	5
I often feel like this company is going through a "bad patch"	1	2	3	4	5
I often feel under pressure because business is hard	1	2	3	4	5
Our supervisor makes it clear to us that if we don't succeed, then our jobs are on the line	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on the following statements. Circle one number.	Strongly Disagree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly agree
If my supervisor notices that I have improved my results on the account of customer's interests...					
... it will show in my compensation.	1	2	3	4	5
... my job is at stake.	1	2	3	4	5
... he/she will shift a part of my customers to other salespeople.	1	2	3	4	5
... it will show in my career development.	1	2	3	4	5
... he/she will reduce my sales territory.	1	2	3	4	5
... he/she will reprimand me immediately.	1	2	3	4	5
If my supervisor notices, that I will not always take care of the company interests in my job...					
... it will show in my compensation.	1	2	3	4	5
... my job is at stake.	1	2	3	4	5
... it will show in my career development.	1	2	3	4	5
... he/she will reprimand me immediately.	1	2	3	4	5
... he/she will shift a part of my customers to other salespeople.	1	2	3	4	5
... he/she will reduce my sales territory.	1	2	3	4	5

Finally a few questions about your background information.

Age? ____ years

How long have you worked for sales? ____ years

How long have you worked for this organization? ____ years

How long have you worked in your current position? ____ years

Gender?

- Male
 Female

What is your level of education?

- Comprehensive school
 High-school diploma
 Trade school or secondary education
 Institute/training centre
 Lower university degree
 Higher university degree
 Other, _____

Thank you for filling the questionnaire!!!

Appendix 3.

Motivation	Mot1	When I perform well, I know it is for my own desire to achieve
	Mot2	I feel a great sense of personal satisfaction, when I do my job well
	Mot3	Becoming successful in sales is something I really want to do for me
	Mot4	My job increases my feeling of self-esteem
	Mot5	When I do my work well, it gives me a feeling of accomplishment
	Mot6	When I perform my job well, it contributes to my personal growth and development
Role ambiguity	Ramb1	I know exactly what my duties in this job are
	Ramb2	I know exactly what is expected of me in this job
	Ramb3	I know the scope of my job
	Ramb4	I know exactly my authorities in this job
Role conflict	Rc1	I have to do things which should be done differently
	Rc2	I receive assignments without the manpower to complete them
	Rc3	I have to buck a rule or policy in order to carry out an assignment
	Rc4	I work with two or more groups who operate quite differently
	Rc5	I receive incompatible requests form two or more people
	Rc6	I do things which are apt to be accepted by one person and not accepted by another
	Rc7	I receive assignments without adequate resources and materials to execute them
	Rc8	I work on unnecessary things
Internal locus of control	ILoc1	My behavior can greatly influence my selling outcome
	ILoc2	Sales performance is strongly related to the efforts I have made
	ILoc3	It is my firm belief that I can solely overcome the obstacles on sales work
External locus of control: chance	ELocc1	Becoming an outstanding salesperson depends mostly on timing and opportunity
	ELocc2	A prayer for good luck may quite possibly outweigh personal ability and enthusiasm
	ELocc3	My sales performance today rests on chance
	ELocc4	I takes luck and good fortune to get a promotion
External locus of control: others	ELoco1	I believe that sales success is mostly influenced by powerful others
	ELoco2	Becoming a competent salesperson depends on the help from some people in high positions
	ELoco3	The accomplishment I can achieve is often in the hands of powerful others
Dysfunctional behavior	Dfb1	I tend to ignore certain job-related activities simply because they are not monitored by the division.
	Dfb2	I work on unimportant activities simply because they are evaluated by upper management
	Dfb3	Even if my productivity is inconsistent, I still try to make it appear consistent
	Dfb4	I have adjusted marketing data to make my performance appear more in line with division goals

	Dfb5	When presenting data to upper management, I try to emphasize data that reflects favorably upon me
	Dfb6	When presenting data to upper management, I try to avoid being the bearer of bad news
Selling orientation	So1	I try to sell as much as I can, rather than
	So2	I find it necessary to stretch the truth in my sales presentations
	So3	I try to sell as much as I can to convince the customer to buy, even if it is more than wise customers would buy
	So4	I paint a too rosy a picture of the products or services to make them sound as good as possible
	So5	I make recommendations based on what I think I can sell and not on the basis of customers' long-term satisfaction
Customer orientation	Co1	I try to figure out a customer's needs
	Co2	I have the customer's best interests in mind
	Co3	I take a problem solving approach in selling products or services to customers
	Co4	I recommend products or services that are best suited to solving problems
	Co5	I try to find out which kinds of products or services would be most helpful to customers

Less ethical behavior:

The following scenarios feature a salesperson called John. Please imagine that John is a typical salesperson working in one of your company sales teams. Please read the scenarios and, using the scale below, indicate how likely it is that John will act in the way indicated in each scenario

(0 = Almost No Chance, 10 = Practically certain)

John is selling a number of office machines to a small service firm. The firm is ready to order the top of the line machines, even though as far as John can see the firm has no possible use for any of the extra features of this machine, and would be much better off with a less expensive model. What is the probability that John would not explain this, but would continue with the sale? (Lesb1)

John is negotiating the final details of a large order. The customer is insisting on one minor point about the service that John doesn't think he'll be able to provide. John knows he can clinch the sales by agreeing now; if necessary he can blame the company later for not being able to come through with the service. What is the likelihood that John will decide to agree to the customer's request? (Lesb2)

John has one product which is selling like the proverbial hot cakes. John knows that he can also sell other products in the product line by insisting that the "hit" product is packaged with other, less popular, products in this line, even though he is bluffing. What is the probability that John would use this strategy? (Lesb3)

John sold one of his major customers a large order which was delivered two weeks ago. John has just discovered that the merchandise delivered was a slightly less sophisticated, less expensive model than the one the customer ordered. John can't believe it but the customer simply did not notice the difference. What is the likelihood that John would decide not to point out the mistake to the customer? (Lesb4)

John has found that exaggerating the seriousness of a customer's problem can get the customer to place a large order. How likely is it that John will continue to use this approach? (Lesb5)

How likely is John to charge more to the buyers for whom he is the sole supplier, than he does in a similar sales situation where he is competing with other buyers? (Lesb6)

SALES MANAGERS

Group Statistics

	Return length	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
input evaluation	Late	64	3,3047	,77724	,09716
	Early	69	3,3732	,88245	,10623
performance contingent rewards	Late	63	2,6310	,89449	,11270
	Early	69	2,8720	,95535	,11501
support	Late	64	3,2617	,77392	,09674
	Early	69	3,1993	,62659	,07543
closeness of supervision	Late	64	3,0938	1,08333	,13542
	Early	68	2,9559	,97252	,11793
cost	Late	64	3,3516	,90711	,11339
	Early	68	3,1397	1,03248	,12521
output evaluation	Late	64	3,5391	,74698	,09337
	Early	69	3,9058	,82816	,09970
How many salespeople are in your team?	Late	64	9,4219	10,42251	1,30281
	Early	68	13,3676	25,74322	3,12182
How many are employed as field salespeople?	Late	64	7,5469	13,20165	1,65021
	Early	68	8,6029	15,92533	1,93123

	t-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
input evaluation	-,474	131	,637	-,06850	,14465
performance contingent rewards	-1,492	130	,138	-,24103	,16151
support	,513	131	,609	,06244	,12171
closeness of supervision	,770	130	,443	,13787	,17898
cost	1,244	130	,214	,21186	,16958
output evaluation	-2,674	131	,008	-,36673	,13713
How many salespeople are in your team?	-1,141	130	,256	-3,94577	3,45779
How many are employed as field salespeople?	-,413	130	,680	-1,05607	2,55466

SALESPERSONS**Group Statistics**

	Response length	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Less ethical beh	Late	112	3,0228	1,75509	,16584
	Early	133	3,4709	1,68494	,14610
Capability control	Late	113	2,7065	,94555	,08895
	Early	134	2,6125	,86183	,07445
Dysf. Beh.	Late	114	2,4950	,99708	,09338
	Early	136	2,5703	1,03706	,08893
Cust. Or.	Late	113	6,2142	,64460	,06064
	Early	136	6,1735	,62625	,05370
Sales or.	Late	113	2,4066	1,07166	,10081
	Early	136	2,6099	1,05300	,09029
Motivation	Late	114	5,8167	,82100	,07689
	Early	136	5,7039	,79026	,06776
Role amb.	Late	114	1,4715	,52982	,04962
	Early	136	1,6176	,61233	,05251
Role conflict	Late	113	2,2745	,79606	,07489
	Early	135	2,5791	,86064	,07407
Locus of control: self	Late	114	4,9269	,88887	,08325
	Early	136	4,8922	1,07181	,09191
Locus of control: Chance	Late	114	2,8662	,94194	,08822
	Early	136	3,2353	1,09746	,09411
Locus of control: Others	Late	114	3,1316	1,22805	,11502
	Early	136	3,3762	1,04842	,08990
Closeness of supervision	Late	113	2,3053	1,09674	,10317
	Early	134	2,2724	1,02711	,08873
Perf. Contingent Rewarding	Late	113	2,2883	1,07454	,10108
	Early	134	2,2525	1,04033	,08987
Cost control	Late	112	3,3155	,98318	,09290
	Early	134	3,2873	,89400	,07723
Output evaluation	Late	113	3,3451	,99570	,09367
	Early	134	3,4478	1,00426	,08675

	t-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Less ethical beh	-2,035	243	,043	-,44816	,22024
Capability control	,817	245	,414	,09407	,11508
Dysf. Beh.	-,582	248	,561	-,07531	,12940
Cust. Or.	,503	247	,615	,04063	,08078
Sales or.	-1,505	247	,134	-,20329	,13512
Motivation	1,104	248	,271	,11275	,10215
Role amb.	-1,998	248	,047	-,14616	,07317
Role conflict	-2,872	246	,004	-,30461	,10606
Locus of control: self	,276	248	,783	,03474	,12605
Locus of control: Chance	-2,823	248	,005	-,36907	,13073
Locus of control: Others	-1,699	248	,091	-,24465	,14397
Closeness of supervision	,243	245	,808	,03292	,13532
Perf. Contingent Rewarding	,266	245	,791	,03586	,13489
Cost control	,235	244	,814	,02816	,11979
Output evaluation	-,803	245	,423	-,10263	,12776

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