Impacts of capacity remunerative mechanisms on cross-border trade

Abstract

The European ambitious targets to increase the share of renewable generation pose a challenge to the generation adequacy. Many European member states are concerned that energy-only markets alone might not be able to deliver sufficient capacity required to meet the future electricity demand and back up shortfalls of energy from renewable energy sources (RES) during periods of low wind and sun. Many EU members consider to re-design their energy-only markets and establish different forms of capacity remunerative mechanisms (CRMs) to maintain the security of supply. There is a certain concern that market design changes at the level of EU member countries might conflict with the European goal of a single market. As soon as many European markets are highly interconnected, uncoordinated CRMs might create negative crossborder effects and hinder the achievement of the Internal Electricity Market in Europe. The pros and cons of capacity markets are well examined at the national level. However, the cross-border effects of capacity markets within the European market aiming at higher integration have received less attention. This doctoral dissertation examines the cross-border effects of unilateral implementation of CRMs applying both theoretical and case study analyses. The results show that capacity remunerative mechanisms (CRMs) may cause negative cross-border effects, especially if they are implemented unilaterally.