Capacity market in Russia: addressing the energy trilemma
Vanadzina, Evgenia (2016-12-16)
Väitöskirja
Vanadzina, Evgenia
16.12.2016
Lappeenranta University of Technology
Acta Universitatis Lappeenrantaensis
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-335-037-3
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-335-037-3
Tiivistelmä
This doctoral dissertation examines the contribution of the capacity market and capacity
remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) introduced in the liberalized electricity market of
Russia to achieving the objectives of the energy trilemma: energy security, sustainability,
and energy affordability. CRMs are chosen to provide the security of electricity supply
by ensuring investments in new conventional power plants. The investors receive
guarantee of return on their investments within 10 to 20 years, while agreeing on building
contracted capacity on time. Similar CRMs were introduced for renewable energy power
plants in 2013 in order to achieve the sustainability goals. Being non-market-based
investment incentives, the implementation of CRMs, together with overestimation of the
demand growth, has resulted in a capacity oversupply, increasing the amount of the
capacity that is not selected in the capacity auction and receives capacity payments to stay
in the market for the system reliability reasons. Therefore, CRMs and capacity payments
question the design of the capacity market and impact on the final consumer capacity
price, and thus, result in an energy affordability issue. The objective of this doctoral
dissertation is to analyse the outcomes of having a capacity market and CRMs in Russia
and their effectiveness in the context of the energy trilemma. The results suggest that
implemented CRMs can guarantee energy security in the short term. However, the current
capacity market design cannot provide market-based incentives to invest in new power
plants, thereby undermining the provision of energy security in the future. CRMs for
renewable energy alone will not suffice to achieve the sustainability goals set by the
policy makers, at least in the short term. At the same time, CRMs, capacity payments,
and challenges faced in the wholesale electricity and capacity market contribute to the
increase in the final consumer electricity cost, producing incentives for demand response.
remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) introduced in the liberalized electricity market of
Russia to achieving the objectives of the energy trilemma: energy security, sustainability,
and energy affordability. CRMs are chosen to provide the security of electricity supply
by ensuring investments in new conventional power plants. The investors receive
guarantee of return on their investments within 10 to 20 years, while agreeing on building
contracted capacity on time. Similar CRMs were introduced for renewable energy power
plants in 2013 in order to achieve the sustainability goals. Being non-market-based
investment incentives, the implementation of CRMs, together with overestimation of the
demand growth, has resulted in a capacity oversupply, increasing the amount of the
capacity that is not selected in the capacity auction and receives capacity payments to stay
in the market for the system reliability reasons. Therefore, CRMs and capacity payments
question the design of the capacity market and impact on the final consumer capacity
price, and thus, result in an energy affordability issue. The objective of this doctoral
dissertation is to analyse the outcomes of having a capacity market and CRMs in Russia
and their effectiveness in the context of the energy trilemma. The results suggest that
implemented CRMs can guarantee energy security in the short term. However, the current
capacity market design cannot provide market-based incentives to invest in new power
plants, thereby undermining the provision of energy security in the future. CRMs for
renewable energy alone will not suffice to achieve the sustainability goals set by the
policy makers, at least in the short term. At the same time, CRMs, capacity payments,
and challenges faced in the wholesale electricity and capacity market contribute to the
increase in the final consumer electricity cost, producing incentives for demand response.
Kokoelmat
- Väitöskirjat [1060]